Madeleine Andrew-Gee

The Ontario Government moved to dismiss or stay a human rights action brought by a self-represented Crown lawyer alleging workplace discrimination and harassment based on race and gender.

The Crown argued that the plaintiff was bound by a collective agreement containing mandatory arbitration provisions.

The court dismissed the motion on two grounds: first, the plaintiff was not a unionized employee and therefore the Weber doctrine did not deprive the court of jurisdiction; and second, the Crown failed to establish on the evidence that the plaintiff was a party to the collective agreement.

The court also found that portions of the plaintiff's claim alleging systemic institutional racism fell outside the scope of the arbitration agreement's subject matter jurisdiction, even if the agreement were binding.

The plaintiff was entirely successful at a five-day trial for specific performance of an oral agreement for the sale of land and sought partial indemnity costs of $164,698.14.

The defendant argued the costs were excessive due to over-lawyering and suggested $70,000.

The court reviewed the factors under Rule 57.01 and the principles from Apotex, reducing the legal fees to account for duplication but allowing time for an articling student who managed documents during the virtual trial.

The court awarded the plaintiff $100,000 in fees plus $19,120.98 in disbursements, plus HST.

The plaintiff purchaser brought an action for specific performance of an oral agreement to purchase a 32-acre property from the defendant owner.

The parties had negotiated an all-cash deal for $4.1 million, with the purchaser paying a $200,000 broker commission.

The owner later refused to close the transaction, arguing there was no binding agreement and relying on the Statute of Frauds.

The Superior Court of Justice found that a binding oral agreement was reached on all essential terms.

The court held that the doctrine of part performance applied, taking the agreement outside the Statute of Frauds, as both parties had engaged in acts unequivocally referable to the land.

Finding the property unique due to its contiguity with the purchaser's existing land, the court ordered specific performance.