Sean Michael Blakeley

The applicant sought an order disqualifying and removing the arbitrator in a mediation-arbitration proceeding between a condominium corporation and a hotel corporation regarding disputes over cost-sharing, maintenance, and utilities.

The arbitrator disclosed that a proposed expert witness for the applicant had recently referred an unrelated litigation matter to the arbitrator's law firm, with the arbitrator tasked with carriage of that matter.

The arbitrator initially identified a clear appearance of conflict and proposed three options, including his resignation or waiver by both parties.

However, after the respondent objected to the arbitrator's withdrawal, the arbitrator reversed his position and refused to resign.

The court found that while a single business referral might not justify disqualification, the subsequent events—including the arbitrator's initial determination of a clear appearance of conflict, his reversal of position, and the manner in which he attempted to manage the conflict—gave rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The application was granted and the arbitrator was disqualified.

This application concerned a dispute over an earn-out calculation following a share purchase agreement.

The applicant sought an order compelling the respondents to refer the dispute to KPMG, as stipulated in the agreement.

The respondents argued the applicant's notice of objection was untimely and lacked particularity, and that the objections raised were contractual, not accounting, issues.

The court found the applicant's notice was timely, given the need for additional financial information, and that the objections, properly interpreted, fell within the scope of the expedited dispute resolution process.

The application was allowed, and the dispute was ordered to be submitted to KPMG.

Costs were not awarded to the successful applicant due to her role in protracting the process.

Great American Insurance Company appealed a judgment finding it had a duty to defend the City of Thunder Bay against claims related to property damage from sodium hydroxide in the water supply.

Great American argued a lead exclusion in its policy precluded coverage.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's finding that a section of the lead exclusion was ambiguous, thus triggering the duty to defend based on the "mere possibility" of coverage, as per *Progressive Homes Ltd. v. Lombard General Insurance Co. of Canada*.

The appeal was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the respondents.

A.K. appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board (CCB) that found him incapable of consenting to treatment for schizophrenia.

The appeal focused on whether A.K. could appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of taking or refusing treatment, as per the second prong of the capacity test under the Health Care Consent Act.

The court reviewed the CCB's findings for palpable and overriding error, considering A.K.'s denial of symptoms and his understanding of medication benefits.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the CCB's conclusion that A.K. was unable to appreciate the manifestations of his illness and the consequences of treatment.

This decision addresses the issue of costs following an application that determined the rights of a landlord and tenant under a lease agreement.

The applicant, 2327451 Ontario Inc., was partially successful on jurisdictional issues and successful on the interpretation of a restrictive covenant, but unsuccessful on other claims.

The court, applying the principles of mixed success under the Courts of Justice Act and Rules of Civil Procedure, awarded the applicant partial indemnity costs of $17,934.53, finding that litigation was a necessary step despite no formal settlement offers.

The appellant, Oslyn Lewis, appealed the dismissal of his action for a real estate commission, which was granted by a motion judge on summary judgment due to the expiry of the limitation period.

The appellant argued that the motion judge erred in finding no tolling agreement, in not allowing him to adduce evidence of psychological incapacity, and in applying the discovery rule.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's decision.

The court affirmed the strict test for tolling agreements, found the fresh evidence regarding incapacity insufficient and inconsistent with the appellant's prior actions, and distinguished the case from situations involving running accounts for limitation purposes.

The appellant's motion to adduce fresh evidence was also dismissed.

This endorsement addresses the costs of a contempt motion brought by McDonald's against North Elgin Centre Inc. (NEC), and NEC's cross-motion for declaratory relief.

Both the motion and cross-motion were dismissed.

NEC, as the successful party, sought substantial indemnity costs of $153,368.

McDonald's argued for $15,000.

The court found NEC substantially successful but awarded partial indemnity costs of $37,000, significantly reducing the amount claimed.

The reduction was based on the unreasonableness of NEC's claimed hours, the failure to delegate work to lower-cost timekeepers, and the fact that McDonald's prepared most of the voluminous record.

The court also found NEC's offer to settle did not comply with Rule 49 and thus did not attract substantial indemnity cost consequences.

The appellants, triplets born with serious disabilities, appealed the dismissal of their negligence claim against a physician who prescribed a fertility drug to their mother pre-conception.

They alleged the physician failed to provide informed consent and prescribed a contraindicated medication.

The Court of Appeal, in a majority decision, dismissed the appeal, affirming that a physician does not owe a duty of care to a future child for alleged negligence occurring pre-conception, citing policy concerns regarding conflicting duties and women's autonomy.

The dissenting judge argued that the allegation of a contraindicated drug could distinguish the case and warrant a full trial to determine if a novel duty of care exists.

McDonald's sought to declare North Elgin Centre Inc. (NEC) in contempt of a prior court order requiring NEC to provide "all reasonable cooperation" to obtain Planning Act consent for a renewed lease.

NEC filed a report with the Town's Committee of Adjustment proposing conditions for consent approval, which McDonald's argued was a breach.

NEC also brought a cross-motion for declaratory relief and directions.

The court dismissed McDonald's contempt motion, finding that NEC's report, including its proposed conditions, reflected legitimate concerns as the property owner and did not constitute a failure to provide "all reasonable cooperation." NEC's cross-motion was also dismissed as unnecessary given the contempt motion's dismissal, and because a single judge could not vary a panel order.