Jeffrey E. Streisfield

The decision concerns a dispute over the renewal of a commercial lease between McDonald’s Restaurants of Canada Limited and North Elgin Centre Inc. McDonald’s sought to exercise its option to renew the lease for two additional 10-year terms, while North Elgin opposed the renewal, seeking to terminate the lease and redevelop the property.

The court reviewed the lease provisions, the requirements of the Planning Act, and the parties’ conduct, ultimately finding that the lease had been validly renewed for both the first and second renewal terms, subject to municipal consent.

The court dismissed North Elgin’s application to terminate the lease and granted McDonald’s a declaration of renewal, ordering North Elgin to refrain from further communications that would undermine the consent process.

The decision concerns a dispute over the renewal of a commercial lease between McDonald’s Restaurants of Canada Limited and North Elgin Centre Inc. McDonald’s sought to exercise its option to renew the lease for two additional 10-year terms, while North Elgin opposed the renewal, seeking to terminate the lease and redevelop the property.

The court reviewed the lease provisions, the requirements of the Planning Act, and the parties’ conduct, ultimately finding that the lease had been validly renewed for both the first and second renewal terms, subject to municipal consent.

The court dismissed North Elgin’s application to terminate the lease and granted McDonald’s a declaration of renewal, ordering North Elgin to refrain from further communications that would undermine the consent process.

The applicant, Carolyn Liddy, brought a motion under Rule 30.10 for production of documents from a non-party lawyer, Jeffrey Streisfield, her former counsel in an underlying negligence action.

The documents sought included files received from previous counsel, work product, and invoices, which were deemed relevant to the current action concerning legal costs incurred to "repair" previous work.

Streisfield asserted a lawyer's lien over the documents due to unpaid accounts.

The court found that Liddy failed to establish that it would be unfair to proceed to trial without the documents, as her inability to obtain them appeared to stem from her unwillingness to pay Streisfield's outstanding account, and she had not brought a necessary motion under Rule 15.03(4) to determine the lien's existence and terms.

The motion for production was dismissed.

This endorsement addresses the costs of a contempt motion brought by McDonald's against North Elgin Centre Inc. (NEC), and NEC's cross-motion for declaratory relief.

Both the motion and cross-motion were dismissed.

NEC, as the successful party, sought substantial indemnity costs of $153,368.

McDonald's argued for $15,000.

The court found NEC substantially successful but awarded partial indemnity costs of $37,000, significantly reducing the amount claimed.

The reduction was based on the unreasonableness of NEC's claimed hours, the failure to delegate work to lower-cost timekeepers, and the fact that McDonald's prepared most of the voluminous record.

The court also found NEC's offer to settle did not comply with Rule 49 and thus did not attract substantial indemnity cost consequences.

McDonald's sought to declare North Elgin Centre Inc. (NEC) in contempt of a prior court order requiring NEC to provide "all reasonable cooperation" to obtain Planning Act consent for a renewed lease.

NEC filed a report with the Town's Committee of Adjustment proposing conditions for consent approval, which McDonald's argued was a breach.

NEC also brought a cross-motion for declaratory relief and directions.

The court dismissed McDonald's contempt motion, finding that NEC's report, including its proposed conditions, reflected legitimate concerns as the property owner and did not constitute a failure to provide "all reasonable cooperation." NEC's cross-motion was also dismissed as unnecessary given the contempt motion's dismissal, and because a single judge could not vary a panel order.

On appeal from a Divisional Court decision, the Court of Appeal considered whether the Ontario Municipal Board (OMB) had jurisdiction to impose a 25 percent cap on the alternative parkland dedication requirement under section 42 of the Planning Act.

The Town of Richmond Hill had adopted an Official Plan policy allowing for parkland dedication at a rate of one hectare per 300 dwelling units.

Developers challenged this policy, and the OMB imposed a 25 percent cap on the amount of land required to be conveyed.

The Divisional Court set aside the cap, finding the OMB lacked authority to impose it.

The Court of Appeal upheld this decision, holding that the legislature has given municipalities exclusive authority to determine the rate under section 42(3), subject only to the requirement that an Official Plan contain specific policies dealing with parkland provision and the use of the alternative requirement.

The OMB's role is limited to reviewing whether such policies are appropriate and accord with provincial policies, not to set or cap the rate itself.

A motion was brought seeking various forms of disclosure and re-attendance at discovery.

Some matters were resolved by consent, including a defendant municipality serving a supplementary affidavit of documents and a representative attending discovery for up to 2 hours.

The court addressed the requirement for leave to bring the contested parts of the motion, denying leave for most requests as they did not fall under Rule 48.04(2)(b).

For the remaining contested relief concerning a co-defendant's supplementary affidavit, the court declined to order it as the co-defendant agreed to comply with their obligations.

The scope of the municipality's re-attendance was limited to documents in the supplementary affidavit.

The court also ordered the moving party to pay installment costs thrown away for amendments to the statement of claim to the responding parties.