Raymond M. Slattery

The Receiver brought a motion seeking approval of its activities, approval of a sales process for two properties, and an order requiring a tenant to disclose tenancy documentation.

The court declined to grant a generic approval of the Receiver's activities, finding it unnecessary.

The court ordered the tenant to comply with its disclosure obligations, rejecting the tenant's confidentiality objections.

The court approved the proposed sales process and listing agreements, subject to conditions including a time-limited sealing order for appraisals and the circulation of redacted listing proposals to the parties.

The parties, equal shareholders in six corporations holding real property, were engaged in a commercial dispute involving competing oppression claims.

The motion judge appointed a Sales Officer to initiate a process for the potential sale of the properties.

The appellant appealed the order and sought a stay pending appeal, while the respondent moved to quash the appeal on the basis that the order was interlocutory and required leave.

The Divisional Court held that the order was interlocutory because any actual sale required further court approval, meaning no substantive rights were finally determined.

Consequently, the appeal was quashed for lack of leave, and the motion for a stay was dismissed as premature since no irreparable harm could occur before a sale was approved.

The applicant brought a motion to enforce Minutes of Settlement regarding her late parents' estates.

The parties disputed the valuation date for real estate joint ventures and corporate shares used to fund a $4.9 million preference payment to the applicant.

The applicant argued for 2010 valuations, which would grant her the subsequent appreciation in value, while the respondent argued for current valuations.

The court held that, based on an objective interpretation of the settlement and the general rule for estate distributions, the assets must be valued at a date proximate to their distribution.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment decision granting payment of invoices for demolition and clean-up work performed on their fire-damaged property.

The motion judge found no genuine issue requiring a trial regarding the amount owing.

The respondent had provided comprehensive documentation including receipts, supplier invoices, worker timesheets, and the final amount had been audited by a company appointed by the appellants' insurer.

The appellants did not cross-examine and failed to raise sufficient doubt about the amount.

The Court of Appeal upheld the summary judgment and dismissed the appeal.

A priority dispute arose between Royal Bank of Canada (RBC), a secured creditor of bankrupt contractor A-1 Asphalt Maintenance Ltd., Guarantee Company of North America (GCNA), a bond company and secured creditor, and certain employees represented by unions.

The central issue was whether funds paid to the receiver by owners, which constituted "trust funds" under section 8 of the Construction Lien Act (CLA), were excluded from the bankrupt's estate available to creditors pursuant to section 67(1)(a) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA).

The motion judge found the funds were not excluded and were available for distribution.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that provincially created statutory trusts satisfying general principles of trust law are preserved from distribution to ordinary creditors under the BIA.

The applicant, Icona Hospitality Inc., sought an order under s. 61(1) of the Conveyancing and Law of Property Act to delete restrictive covenants from the title to its land.

The covenants restricted the site's use solely to a hotel.

Icona proposed a mixed-use high-rise redevelopment, arguing the covenants were spent or unsuitable due to changed planning policies and the area's designation as an Urban Growth Centre.

The respondents, beneficiaries of the covenants, opposed the application, citing potential negative impacts on their own development plans and market competition.

The court dismissed the application, finding that Icona failed to demonstrate that the covenants were spent or so unsuitable as to be of no value, or that their assertion by the respondents would be vexatious.

The court emphasized that the jurisdiction under s. 61(1) must be exercised with caution and an order will seldom be granted if prejudicial to the adjacent landowner, rejecting a simple balancing of monetary interests.

In a priority dispute following the bankruptcy of a paving company, a bond company argued that funds held by the receiver in a project account were statutory trust funds under the Construction Lien Act and therefore excluded from the bankrupt's estate under s. 67(1)(a) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The court dismissed the trust claim, finding that the funds lacked the certainty of subject matter required to constitute a true common law trust, as they were not identifiable or held separately prior to the receivership.

Consequently, the funds were to be distributed under the BIA scheme.

A receiver sought to defeat an appeal from a court order approving the sale of real property (a residential condominium project for seniors) to Pinnacle International One Lands Inc. The appellant, Fortress, had competed for the property through a stalking horse bidding process and subsequently submitted competing offers.

The receiver accepted Pinnacle's offer.

Fortress appealed, relying solely on section 193(c) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, which provides an automatic right of appeal if property involved exceeds $10,000 in value.

The Court of Appeal held that the approval order did not "result in a loss" within the meaning of section 193(c) because the receiver could not have obtained a better deal than Pinnacle's offer.

The court found that Pinnacle's offer had superior practical value due to a higher deposit, all-cash financing, support from the first mortgagee, and the integrity of the sale process.

Burnco Manufacturing Inc. was successful on a motion to have two actions tried together and sought partial indemnity costs of $37,248.71.

Ellisdon Corporation and E.S. Fox Limited, who had opposed the underlying motion and conducted cross-examinations, argued the amount sought was excessive.

The Master, applying principles of fairness, reasonableness, and proportionality, and considering factors such as the motion's complexity, counsel's seniority, and actions that prolonged the motion, reduced Burnco's costs.

The final award was $20,000, inclusive of fees, HST, and disbursements, to be shared equally by Ellisdon and Fox.

The plaintiff subcontractor brought a motion under Rule 6.01 to have its action against the general contractor tried together with or immediately following a companion action brought against it by its sub-subcontractor.

Both actions arose from delays and scope changes on the same construction project.

The court applied the Master Dash factors and concluded that the actions shared interwoven issues regarding project changes and delays, creating a risk of inconsistent findings if tried separately.

The motion was granted, and the court ordered the actions to be tried consecutively, with the plaintiff's action proceeding first.

The appellant tenant appealed a summary judgment decision that found it had not validly exercised its lease renewal option.

The motion judge concluded that the parties' conduct did not amount to a waiver of the notice requirement and that post-deadline negotiations were for a new lease, not a renewal.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, finding the record supported the motion judge's conclusions and that the landlord did not act in bad faith by considering other tenant options.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The defendants sought summary judgment dismissing an action by a commercial tenant alleging that the landlord waived a lease provision requiring written notice to exercise a renewal option.

The tenant conceded that it failed to deliver written notice within the contractual deadline but argued that continued negotiations constituted waiver or estoppel.

The court held that negotiations regarding a possible new lease did not amount to a clear, explicit, and unequivocal exercise of the renewal option and did not establish waiver by the landlord.

The court further held that there was no independent tort duty requiring the landlord’s leasing agent to negotiate reasonably or in good faith.

Finding the matter entirely document-driven with no genuine issue requiring trial, the court granted summary judgment and dismissed the action.

The appellant appealed an order staying and dismissing his action against the respondents as an abuse of process.

The motion judge found that the appellant's claims were barred by a broad release contained in a Plan of Compromise and Arrangement under the CCAA that restructured the Canadian market for Asset-Backed Commercial Paper (ABCP).

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, agreeing that the release clearly captured the appellant's claims and that it would be unjust to allow his claim to proceed in isolation after he had participated in the CCAA proceedings and voted in favour of the Plan.

The moving party (appellant) sought a stay of the judgment pending appeal.

The court applied the RJR-MacDonald test and found that there were serious issues to be determined regarding the scope of a non-registration clause in an agreement of purchase and sale and its relation to a purchaser's lien.

The court also found that the moving party would suffer irreparable harm without a stay, as the responding party no longer had the $4.3 million deposit and intended to sell the property.

The balance of convenience favoured the moving party.

The motion for a stay was granted.

The moving party sought directions on whether leave to appeal was required from an order terminating a unanimous shareholders' agreement and approving a proposal under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The court held that the termination of the agreement did not involve future rights, meaning leave to appeal was required under s. 193(e) of the BIA.

The court granted leave to appeal, finding the issues significant to bankruptcy practice, and transferred a related Divisional Court appeal to be heard together.

The successful respondents sought costs of the appeal in the amount of $23,013.02 on a partial indemnity basis.

The appellants argued the amount was excessive and suggested $6,731.58.

The Divisional Court found the respondents' claim high given the narrow and straightforward issue on appeal.

Applying the principles from Boucher, the court fixed costs at $12,000 all inclusive.

The appellants appealed an order appointing the respondent as receiver of two corporations, alleging a conflict of interest due to the respondent's role as trustee in bankruptcy for related parties.

The Court of Appeal first determined it had jurisdiction, finding the appointment order was final rather than interlocutory.

The Court admitted fresh evidence—a statement of defence filed by the respondent in related litigation—which crystallized a pervasive conflict of interest.

Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal, set aside the order appointing the receiver, and referred the matter back to the Commercial List Court, also setting aside the provision granting priority to the receiver's fees.

The appellant challenged summary judgment dismissing claims arising from a municipality's road-closing by-laws and related dealings with an adjoining landowner near Lake Ontario.

He alleged the segmented by-laws were used to avoid ministerial approval for closing a road leading to a lake and argued that a perpetual grading easement was effectively a sale that had to be offered to him as the abutting owner.

The court rejected both arguments, finding no evidentiary foundation for allegations of bad faith and holding that the easement did not trigger statutory sale rights.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellants were former employees of a bankrupt shoe retailer.

Following the bankruptcy, the employees' employment was terminated.

The Ministry of Labour filed a proof of claim for termination and severance pay under the Employment Standards Act, which the Trustee disallowed on the basis that bankruptcy does not constitute termination 'by an employer'.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the words of an Act must be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament.

The Court found that interpreting the ESA to exclude bankrupt employers would lead to absurd results and defeat the remedial purpose of the legislation.

The appellant provided funds to a director of the respondent company to invest in the company.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that, based on the trial judge's findings, the appellant was entitled to the protection of the indoor management rule under section 19 of the Ontario Business Corporations Act.

The respondent was therefore bound by its director's representations.

The appeal was allowed and the trial judgment restored.