Jonathan H. Wigley

This is a ruling on a Charter application under subsections 11(b) and 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The corporate defendants challenged whether their right to be tried within a reasonable time had been infringed.

The court applied the Jordan framework and determined that the trial delay exceeded the 18-month presumptive ceiling for provincial court cases.

The court found that while certain discrete exceptional events could be deducted from the total delay, the remaining delay still exceeded the ceiling and could not be justified by the complexity of the case.

Accordingly, the charges against all corporate defendants were stayed.

The Halton Region Conservation Authority sought to amend charges against a corporate defendant relating to alleged interference with a wetland and watercourse.

The prosecution moved to expand the time frame of 30 charges from August 28, 2012 to September 26, 2012, to May 1, 2011 to September 26, 2012, and to add particulars regarding destruction of vegetation to three counts.

The court granted the motion, finding that the evidence of the defendant's farming activities supported the amendments, the circumstances were serious environmental protection matters, the defendant was not prejudiced, and the limitation period had not expired.

The defendants brought a Charter application under subsections 11(b) and 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging that their right to be tried within a reasonable time had been infringed due to unreasonable delay in consolidated provincial offence proceedings involving 39 defendants and 812 charges under the Conservation Authorities Act.

The court applied the analytical framework established in Regina v. Jordan, 2016 SCC 27, distinguishing between individual defendants and corporate defendants.

The court found that the individual defendants' rights had been infringed and stayed their charges, while the corporate defendants' applications were dismissed based on the principle that prejudice to fair trial rights cannot be inferred for corporations and the application of the transitional exceptional circumstance.

A ruling on a voir dire concerning the admissibility of Approximate Regulation Limit (A.R.L.) maps created by the Halton Region Conservation Authority.

The prosecution sought to admit these maps as evidence to establish the regulatory jurisdiction of the Authority over properties at 7459 Auburn Road, Milton, Ontario.

The defendants challenged admissibility on hearsay grounds.

The court determined that the A.R.L. maps, created pursuant to Ontario Regulation 162/06, constitute part of the regulation itself and are therefore admissible under section 25 of the Evidence Act as copies of regulations.

The applicants sought an order in the nature of certiorari to challenge a justice of the peace's ruling that a charge under the Conservation Authorities Act was not statute-barred.

The applicants argued that the two-year limitation period commenced earlier than determined by the justice, rendering the charge out of time.

The Superior Court dismissed the application, finding that the justice's ruling was made within jurisdiction and was not so obviously wrong as to warrant intervention during the ongoing trial.

The court emphasized that certiorari should be granted rarely in such circumstances, especially when an appeal is available post-trial, and that the policy considerations favour a non-interventionist approach to avoid fragmenting proceedings.

The Liquidator of Maple Bank GmbH's Canadian business sought an interim distribution of surplus funds to the German Insolvency Administrator (GIA) during winding-up proceedings.

The motion was unopposed.

The court approved the interim distribution, finding it appropriate given that adequate reserves were established to cover all proven and potential claims, ensuring no prejudice to Canadian creditors.

The court emphasized a broad, flexible interpretation of insolvency legislation and the policy of assisting foreign insolvency proceedings.

The applicants, who were charged under the Conservation Authorities Act, brought an application for certiorari to quash a justice of the peace's decision that their charges were not statute-barred.

The applicants requested an adjournment of their certiorari application, which was granted.

The respondent brought a motion under section 141(2.1) of the Provincial Offences Act for an order that the trial continue despite the pending certiorari application.

The court granted the respondent's motion, finding that it is generally inappropriate to interrupt ongoing proceedings with judicial review applications and that continuing the trial was in the interests of justice.