Jonathan H. Wigley

This is a ruling on a Charter application under subsections 11(b) and 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The corporate defendants challenged whether their right to be tried within a reasonable time had been infringed.

The court applied the Jordan framework and determined that the trial delay exceeded the 18-month presumptive ceiling for provincial court cases.

The court found that while certain discrete exceptional events could be deducted from the total delay, the remaining delay still exceeded the ceiling and could not be justified by the complexity of the case.

Accordingly, the charges against all corporate defendants were stayed.

The Halton Region Conservation Authority sought to amend charges against a corporate defendant relating to alleged interference with a wetland and watercourse.

The prosecution moved to expand the time frame of 30 charges from August 28, 2012 to September 26, 2012, to May 1, 2011 to September 26, 2012, and to add particulars regarding destruction of vegetation to three counts.

The court granted the motion, finding that the evidence of the defendant's farming activities supported the amendments, the circumstances were serious environmental protection matters, the defendant was not prejudiced, and the limitation period had not expired.

The applicant sought an order of mandamus requiring the conservation authority to consider its permit application under the Conservation Authorities Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the order would have no practical value or effect because the proposed development would violate the Provincial Policy Statement's prohibition against development in a floodway.

The court also noted concerns regarding the applicant's delay in bringing the application.

The defendants brought a Charter application under subsections 11(b) and 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging that their right to be tried within a reasonable time had been infringed due to unreasonable delay in consolidated provincial offence proceedings involving 39 defendants and 812 charges under the Conservation Authorities Act.

The court applied the analytical framework established in Regina v. Jordan, 2016 SCC 27, distinguishing between individual defendants and corporate defendants.

The court found that the individual defendants' rights had been infringed and stayed their charges, while the corporate defendants' applications were dismissed based on the principle that prejudice to fair trial rights cannot be inferred for corporations and the application of the transitional exceptional circumstance.

A ruling on a voir dire concerning the admissibility of Approximate Regulation Limit (A.R.L.) maps created by the Halton Region Conservation Authority.

The prosecution sought to admit these maps as evidence to establish the regulatory jurisdiction of the Authority over properties at 7459 Auburn Road, Milton, Ontario.

The defendants challenged admissibility on hearsay grounds.

The court determined that the A.R.L. maps, created pursuant to Ontario Regulation 162/06, constitute part of the regulation itself and are therefore admissible under section 25 of the Evidence Act as copies of regulations.

The applicants sought an order in the nature of certiorari to challenge a justice of the peace's ruling that a charge under the Conservation Authorities Act was not statute-barred.

The applicants argued that the two-year limitation period commenced earlier than determined by the justice, rendering the charge out of time.

The Superior Court dismissed the application, finding that the justice's ruling was made within jurisdiction and was not so obviously wrong as to warrant intervention during the ongoing trial.

The court emphasized that certiorari should be granted rarely in such circumstances, especially when an appeal is available post-trial, and that the policy considerations favour a non-interventionist approach to avoid fragmenting proceedings.

The Liquidator of Maple Bank GmbH's Canadian business sought an interim distribution of surplus funds to the German Insolvency Administrator (GIA) during winding-up proceedings.

The motion was unopposed.

The court approved the interim distribution, finding it appropriate given that adequate reserves were established to cover all proven and potential claims, ensuring no prejudice to Canadian creditors.

The court emphasized a broad, flexible interpretation of insolvency legislation and the policy of assisting foreign insolvency proceedings.

The applicants, who were charged under the Conservation Authorities Act, brought an application for certiorari to quash a justice of the peace's decision that their charges were not statute-barred.

The applicants requested an adjournment of their certiorari application, which was granted.

The respondent brought a motion under section 141(2.1) of the Provincial Offences Act for an order that the trial continue despite the pending certiorari application.

The court granted the respondent's motion, finding that it is generally inappropriate to interrupt ongoing proceedings with judicial review applications and that continuing the trial was in the interests of justice.

The court-appointed receiver appealed a motion judge's decision denying $30,000 in receiver fees and $20,000 in legal costs.

These fees were incurred when the receiver brought an unsuccessful motion to cancel an approved auction process in favour of a private sale.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while a receiver's business decisions are owed deference, the receiver still bears the burden of proving its fees are fair and reasonable.

The motion judge correctly concluded that the receiver's motion to abort the auction was ill-considered and that safeguarding the integrity of the sale process was paramount.

The court-appointed receiver brought a motion to approve a private agreement of purchase and sale for a residential property and to halt a previously court-approved auction scheduled to take place in four days.

The second mortgagee opposed the motion, arguing the auction should proceed.

The court dismissed the motion, applying the Soundair principles and finding that accepting a pre-emptive offer and halting the auction at this late stage would damage the integrity of the sales process.

A purchaser of assets from a bankrupt estate brought a motion to amend a prior court approval order to expressly include intellectual property within the assets conveyed.

The original order had approved the sale of the bankrupt’s residual assets, but the trustee refused to execute a bill of sale including trademarks, asserting uncertainty about whether they formed part of the estate.

The court held that the approval order clearly conveyed all remaining assets and criticized the trustee for failing to deal with the issue promptly and for raising concerns inconsistent with the record.

The court concluded that the motion should not have been necessary and that the trustee’s conduct justified a personal costs award.

Partial indemnity costs were ordered against the trustee.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's order dismissing its request to set aside a Notice of Disallowance of its claim in a consumer proposal.

The Court of Appeal agreed the motion should have been brought in Saskatchewan, where the proposal was filed, but found the motion judge erred by failing to consider transferring the proceedings under s. 187(10) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The appeal was allowed, the order set aside, and the motion transferred to the Court of Queen's Bench of Saskatchewan.

HSBC Bank Canada brought a motion for an order that Jack Lechcier-Kimel requires leave to appeal an order adding HSBC as a creditor in his bankruptcy application.

Lechcier-Kimel brought a cross-motion for leave to appeal.

The Court of Appeal held that leave is required because adding a party does not involve future rights under s. 193 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The court further held that a single judge has jurisdiction to grant leave.

Leave to appeal was refused because the proposed grounds of appeal lacked prima facie merit.

The applicant brought an application for judicial review.

The respondents argued the application was moot because they had sought approval of a second site plan.

The Divisional Court rejected the mootness argument and held it had jurisdiction under section 106 of the Courts of Justice Act to stay the application.

The court ordered the application for judicial review stayed pending the final disposition of the appeal of the second site plan to the Mining and Lands Commissioner, noting that if the second site plan is approved, the application will become moot.

The moving party sought directions on whether leave to appeal was required from an order terminating a unanimous shareholders' agreement and approving a proposal under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The court held that the termination of the agreement did not involve future rights, meaning leave to appeal was required under s. 193(e) of the BIA.

The court granted leave to appeal, finding the issues significant to bankruptcy practice, and transferred a related Divisional Court appeal to be heard together.

The appellant appealed a Board decision that found it had no jurisdiction to hear a claim for injurious affection under the Expropriations Act.

The Divisional Court held that while the Board correctly found the land was voluntarily dedicated rather than expropriated under s. 1(1)(a), it erred in concluding that s. 1(1)(b) required a taking of land.

Section 1(1)(b) contemplates an action for injurious affection where no expropriation has occurred.

The Court also found the Board erred in its interpretation of the limitation period under s. 22(1), holding that time runs from the completion of construction when actual damage is discovered, not from a pre-construction opinion.

The appeal was allowed and the matter remitted to the Board for a full hearing.

The appellant mortgagee held two mortgages on golf course properties owned by the respondent.

After the mortgages matured and went into default, the appellant appointed a receiver and eventually took possession of the properties, later selling them at auction.

The trial judge limited the appellant's recovery to the mortgage debt as of October 31, 1996, finding that the appellant had a duty to mitigate its losses and should have sold the properties earlier.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the appellant was not in possession until August 1996 and that the principle of mitigation does not apply to an action for a fixed debt.

The Court affirmed that a mortgagee may exercise its power of sale whenever it chooses, provided it acts in good faith and takes reasonable precautions to obtain true market value.

This appeal concerned a priority dispute under the Personal Property Security Act arising from refinancing of a printing press subject to a lease with an option to purchase.

The appellant bank discharged the original lender's security, enabling the debtor to obtain legal title, and then took its own security interest.

The court held that this financing enabled the debtor to acquire further rights in the collateral and therefore satisfied the statutory definition of a purchase-money security interest.

Because the statutory conditions for priority were met, the appellant's security interest ranked ahead of the respondent's earlier perfected general security agreement.

The appeal was allowed and priority declared in favour of the appellant.

The respondent was charged under a municipal by-law that prohibited all postering on public property after he affixed posters to hydro poles to advertise his band's performances.

He challenged the constitutionality of the by-law under s. 2(b) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that postering conveys a meaning and is a protected form of expression under s. 2(b).

The Court found that the absolute ban on postering on public property infringed freedom of expression.

While the by-law's objectives of preventing litter, aesthetic blight, and safety hazards were pressing and substantial, the complete ban did not minimally impair the right and could not be justified under s. 1 of the Charter.