Allan Sternberg

The plaintiff estate sought costs following a trial where it recovered a portion of the $30 million claimed from the defendant, including an 80% interest in a property.

The defendant counterclaimed for sexual abuse, which was dismissed.

Both parties sought costs.

The court found the plaintiff was the more successful party and entitled to costs.

The court declined to award substantial indemnity costs to either party based on unproven allegations of fraud and sexual abuse, finding the allegations did not amount to reprehensible conduct warranting chastisement.

Applying the factors in Rule 57.01, the court fixed the plaintiff's costs at $800,000 on a partial indemnity basis, reflecting its divided success.

The court considered an application by Bob Alan Barker to remove his sister, Catherine Elizabeth Barker, as Estate Trustee of their late brother John Joseph Barker’s estate, and to disqualify her from receiving a share of the estate due to alleged breaches of fiduciary duty and misappropriation.

The decision addresses requests for production of financial records, including Catherine’s line of credit and her mother’s bank accounts, and analyzes inconsistencies in Catherine’s explanations regarding the handling of estate assets, the sale of a condominium, and life insurance proceeds.

The court granted some of the requested orders, including production of specific financial documents and an examination under oath, and awarded costs personally against Catherine.

The Estate of William Waters sought the return of over $30 million advanced by the deceased to his wife's personal support worker, Gillian Henry, over a ten-year period.

The Estate argued the funds were investments held on resulting trust, while Henry maintained they were gifts made during a secret intimate relationship.

The court found that the deceased, a sophisticated businessman, intended most of the advances as gifts, except for funds invested in a horse stable business (King of Hearts), which were held on resulting trust.

The court also found that the deceased improperly gifted $2.85 million of his incapacitated wife's money to Henry, which constituted unjust enrichment and must be returned.

Henry's counterclaim for sexual battery was dismissed due to lack of credibility and absence of corroboration required under the Evidence Act.

The third parties brought a motion for leave to appeal the order of Jaye Hooper J. dated February 27, 2023.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs of $4,000 to the responding parties.

The defendants brought a motion to compel the plaintiff estate to produce unredacted solicitor files of the deceased, William Waters, arguing that the "wills exception" to solicitor-client privilege should extend to determine the deceased's intent regarding inter vivos transfers.

The estate claimed the transfers were impressed with a resulting trust, while the defendants asserted they were gifts.

The court found that the previous order allowed for disputes over privilege and that applying res judicata to informal case management directions would inhibit the process.

The court extended the "wills exception" from Geffen v. Goodman Estate to this case, finding ambiguity in the deceased's will regarding the nature of the transfers.

It ordered the production of all information shedding light on whether the transfers were gifts, including information on the deceased's capacity and susceptibility to undue influence, subject to a protective order to prevent a fishing expedition for claims against the solicitor.

The respondent purchased a commercial condominium unit with an exclusive use designation for a dental clinic and leased it to the appellant dentist.

Near the end of the lease, the appellant secretly purchased an adjacent unit, moved his practice there, and purported to assign the exclusive use designation to his new unit in perpetuity.

The application judge held that the appellant could only assign the exclusive use right for the duration of his lease term.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the application judge correctly applied contractual interpretation principles and the nemo dat principle to conclude that the tenant could not permanently divest the owner of its exclusive use right.

The appellants, LMC 477R Corp. and Newstead Inc., appealed the dismissal of their oppression application under the Condominium Act, 1998, against Metropolitan Toronto Condominium Corporation No. 1046.

The application alleged oppressive conduct by the respondent in interfering with the appellant's parking facility operations and refusing good faith negotiations for a new parking agreement.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the application judge's decision, finding no error in the application of the oppression test or in the factual findings, and dismissed the appeal.

This is an appeal from an order dismissing a motion to stay an application in favour of arbitration.

The dispute concerns a cost-sharing agreement between condominium corporations regarding common expenses.

The motion judge found the essence of the claim was oppressive conduct, which he believed was not arbitrable.

The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the core dispute was the interpretation and application of the reciprocal agreement, which contained a broad arbitration clause.

Citing recent Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence, the Court emphasized that courts should not refuse to stay claims covered by a valid arbitration agreement and that oppression claims under the Condominium Act, 1998, are not exclusively for the Superior Court and can be arbitrated.

The appeal was allowed, and the application was stayed as it related to the issues between the two main condominium corporations.

The applicant landlord sought a declaration regarding its rights under a commercial condominium declaration after its tenant, a dentist, purchased an adjacent unit and purported to transfer the exclusive use designation for a dental clinic to the new unit.

The court applied the nemo dat principle, holding that the tenant could only consent to the transfer of the exclusive use for the remaining duration of his lease, protecting the landlord's premium-paid exclusivity.

The moving party sought to quash an appeal from a motion judge's order refusing to stay a court proceeding in favour of arbitration.

The moving party argued that section 7(6) of the Arbitration Act barred the appeal, relying on the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Wellman to argue that the Huras line of cases should be overruled.

The Court of Appeal held that Wellman did not overrule Huras, affirmed that Huras was correctly decided, and found that because the motion judge had no statutory authority under section 7(5) to refuse to stay the arbitrable claims, his decision was not made under section 7.

Therefore, section 7(6) did not bar the appeal.

The motion to quash was dismissed.

The plaintiff brought a motion to compel 1346150 Ontario Inc., Sadie Moranis Real Estate Limited, and Bella Levy to comply with their obligations under Rules 30.02 and 30.03 of the Rules of Civil Procedure by serving affidavits of documents.

The motion, initially heard on February 26, 2020, was adjourned for continuation but further delayed due to the court's suspension of operations owing to COVID-19.

The court addressed the plaintiff's request to conclude the motion, considering health concerns raised by Mr. Moranis (representing the corporations).

The court directed the motion to continue in writing for the corporations, requiring Mr. Moranis to propose a deadline for document service, and set a timeline for Ms. Levy's submissions.

The court also noted that Mr. Moranis could not act as agent for Ms. Levy due to potential conflict of interest.

The applicant tenant brought an application for a declaration that the respondent landlord unlawfully terminated its commercial lease for a parking lot.

The landlord had posted a Notice of Termination alleging the tenant abandoned the premises.

The court found that the landlord's notice did not comply with s. 19(2) of the Commercial Tenancies Act because it failed to provide the tenant with a reasonable opportunity to remedy the alleged breach or make compensation.

Consequently, the court declared the termination of the lease invalid.

The defendants brought a motion to strike out the statements of claim in four related actions against the defendant Adam Abramson, arguing that the pleadings, even with particulars, failed to disclose a reasonable cause of action.

The court granted the motion, finding that the plaintiffs had not pleaded sufficient material facts to establish specific causes of action (negligence, negligent misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, and conspiracy) against Adam Abramson individually.

The court emphasized that merely grouping defendants together was insufficient to provide Adam Abramson with adequate notice of the case against him.

However, the plaintiffs were granted leave to amend their statements of claim.

The respondents moved to stay an application brought by the applicant, TSCC 1628, in favour of arbitration.

The application sought remedies under the Condominium Act, including for oppression (s. 135) and false/misleading statements (s. 133), against TSCC 1636, Soho Grand Condominiums Inc., and Soinco Limited.

The respondents argued the dispute fell under an arbitration clause in a Reciprocal Agreement and s. 132 of the Condominium Act.

The court denied the motion to stay, finding that the essence of the dispute was the allegedly oppressive conduct of Soho in imposing the Reciprocal Agreement, and that remedies under ss. 133 and 135 of the Condominium Act are exclusively within the Superior Court's jurisdiction.

The court also emphasized avoiding multiplicity of proceedings by keeping all related claims in one forum.

The applicant tenant moved for an interlocutory injunction to prevent the new owner of the property from demolishing or renovating the premises, claiming the former landlord breached a right of first refusal (ROFR) in the lease.

The respondents moved to discharge a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) and for security for costs.

The court dismissed the injunction motion and discharged the CPL, finding no serious issue to be tried because the tenant had signed an Estoppel Certificate confirming no material default by the landlord and postponing its interest to the new mortgage.

The respondents' motion for security for costs was dismissed as they failed to show the tenant had insufficient assets.

An accounting firm filed a corporate client's tax returns after the due date, resulting in the denial of approximately $550,000 in tax credits by the Canada Revenue Agency.

The client received notices of assessment in April 2010 and pursued administrative remedies through the CRA appeal process, with the accountant's assistance, until May 2011 when the CRA advised it intended to confirm the assessments.

The client commenced a negligence action in August 2012.

The motion judge dismissed the action as statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002, finding the claim was discoverable in April 2010.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the claim was not discovered until May 2011 when the CRA appeal process concluded, as it would not have been appropriate to commence proceedings while alternative remedies remained available.

Whirlpool appealed a decision dismissing its application for a finding of conflict of interest.

Whirlpool had sold contaminated industrial land to Chavila and Outrigger (affiliates of 863) at a reduced price in exchange for an indemnity agreement obligating them to defend Whirlpool against any claims arising from the property's condition.

When CP and Oxford brought contribution and indemnity claims against Whirlpool, Chavila and Outrigger appointed counsel to defend Whirlpool.

Whirlpool argued this created a conflict of interest because the appointed counsel would be taking instructions from entities affiliated with 863, the plaintiff in the main action against CP and Oxford, and would be unable to raise a limitation defence that would benefit Whirlpool but harm 863.

The majority found no conflict existed because Whirlpool's immediate interests were not directly adverse to those of Chavila and Outrigger, and the indemnity agreement contemplated this scenario.

The dissent argued a patent conflict existed and that Whirlpool was entitled to independent counsel free of conflicts.

The appellant brought an action for unpaid commissions against several defendants, including the respondent.

The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing the action against the respondent, finding no agreement, no basis to disregard separate legal personalities, no partnership, and no unjust enrichment.

On appeal, the appellant argued the motion judge erred regarding privity of contract, equitable assignments, partnership, and credibility assessment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the appellant's own testimony contradicted the privity argument, the equitable assignment issue was not raised below, and the motion judge correctly applied the Partnerships Act.

The defendants, an accounting firm and an individual accountant, brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's professional negligence claim based on the Limitations Act, 2002.

The plaintiff alleged that the defendants' failure to timely file tax returns resulted in the loss of refundable dividend tax on hand (RDTOH) and associated penalties and interest.

The court considered whether the plaintiff's claim was discoverable more than two years prior to its commencement on August 1, 2012.

The court found that the plaintiff had sufficient knowledge of the injury, its cause, and the identity of the wrongdoers by June 2010 at the latest, and that a proceeding would have been a legally appropriate means to seek a remedy at that time, despite ongoing mitigation efforts and the defendants' failure to advise of a potential claim against them.

The court dismissed the plaintiff's arguments regarding prematurity, fraudulent concealment, and estoppel.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment seeking specific performance of an agreement to lease a commercial property for a car dealership.

The defendant landlord argued the agreement was null and void due to the failure to waive certain conditions, including a solicitor review condition and a due diligence condition, within the stipulated timeframes.

The court found that the defendant, through its conduct and communications, had represented that it would not rely on its strict legal rights regarding the conditions, and the plaintiff had relied on these representations to its detriment.

Applying the doctrine of promissory estoppel, the court held the agreement was binding.

Finding the property to be unique for the plaintiff's intended use, the court granted summary judgment and ordered specific performance.