Rachel Rosamund Fielding

The applicant condominium corporation brought a motion for compliance and contempt against a unit occupant and his parents (the unit owners) for a persistent campaign of harassing, defamatory, and discriminatory communications directed at the board, property manager, and other residents.

The court found the occupant violated s. 117 of the Condominium Act and ordered him prohibited from the property and from communicating with the corporation's representatives.

The court also found the parents failed to take reasonable steps to prevent the misconduct under s. 119(2) and ordered them jointly and severally liable for damages and costs on a full indemnity basis, collectible as a common expense.

This is an appeal from an order dismissing a motion to stay an application in favour of arbitration.

The dispute concerns a cost-sharing agreement between condominium corporations regarding common expenses.

The motion judge found the essence of the claim was oppressive conduct, which he believed was not arbitrable.

The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the core dispute was the interpretation and application of the reciprocal agreement, which contained a broad arbitration clause.

Citing recent Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence, the Court emphasized that courts should not refuse to stay claims covered by a valid arbitration agreement and that oppression claims under the Condominium Act, 1998, are not exclusively for the Superior Court and can be arbitrated.

The appeal was allowed, and the application was stayed as it related to the issues between the two main condominium corporations.

The moving parties sought an adjournment of four related applications and two summary judgment motions due to the late filing of a responding record containing an expert report.

The responding party did not oppose the adjournment but argued the expert report should not have been a surprise.

The court granted the adjournment, extended the deadline to set three of the related cases down for trial, and reserved the costs of the appearance to the hearing on the merits.

The moving party sought to quash an appeal from a motion judge's order refusing to stay a court proceeding in favour of arbitration.

The moving party argued that section 7(6) of the Arbitration Act barred the appeal, relying on the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Wellman to argue that the Huras line of cases should be overruled.

The Court of Appeal held that Wellman did not overrule Huras, affirmed that Huras was correctly decided, and found that because the motion judge had no statutory authority under section 7(5) to refuse to stay the arbitrable claims, his decision was not made under section 7.

Therefore, section 7(6) did not bar the appeal.

The motion to quash was dismissed.

The applicant, a condominium unit owner, brought a motion seeking a declaration that a new rule (Rule 19) enacted by the respondent condominium corporation's board of directors was invalid.

Rule 19 prohibited short-term leasing (less than six months) and deemed any person involved in such use a trespasser.

The applicant argued that Rule 19 was inconsistent with Article 4.9(e) of the condominium's declaration, which stated that no provision should limit an owner from leasing their unit for "any period of time whatsoever." The applicant also contended that paragraph 7 of Rule 19, deeming occupants trespassers, was inconsistent with the Condominium Act.

The court found that the board's interpretation of the declaration, which did not expressly permit short-term leasing, was unreasonable given the clear wording of Article 4.9(e).

Consequently, Rule 19 was declared invalid for being inconsistent with the declaration by prohibiting short-term leasing and imposing a minimum lease term.

Paragraph 7 was also found inconsistent with the Condominium Act, as owners cannot be deemed trespassers.

The defendants brought a motion for security for costs against the plaintiffs, who reside in South Korea.

The plaintiffs commenced an action seeking repayment of loans and a share of the equity from the sale of a property.

The court found that the defendants met their initial onus as the plaintiffs reside outside Ontario.

However, the plaintiffs successfully rebutted the onus by demonstrating that they are impecunious and that their claim is not devoid of merit.

The motion for security for costs was dismissed.

On appeal from a Superior Court order granting relief under section 135 of the Condominium Act, the Court of Appeal considered whether the application judge erred in granting discretionary relief based on facts that changed after the hearing.

The respondent had sought relief based on a pending sale of two condominium units for the purpose of operating an Indian and Mughlai restaurant.

Fresh evidence disclosed that the sale did not proceed and the units were subsequently leased to other tenants.

The Court of Appeal found that the equitable relief granted would provide no practical benefit and set aside portions of the order.

The Court also addressed issues regarding the production of records showing exclusive business uses and the assessment of damages.

The applicant unit owner brought an application against the condominium corporation for breach of its duty to maintain and repair common elements and for oppressive conduct, stemming from a long-standing mould problem in her unit.

The condominium corporation brought a competing application, alleging the unit owner breached her duty to maintain her unit due to lifestyle choices.

The court admitted fresh evidence regarding water leakage and insulation issues.

The court found that the mould was primarily caused by building design issues related to common elements, not the unit owner's lifestyle.

While the condominium corporation eventually remediated the mould, its overall response was deemed unreasonably delayed and not timely enough, thus breaching its duty to repair and maintain common elements under the Condominium Act.

However, the court dismissed the oppression claim, finding that the corporation's conduct, though delayed, did not amount to oppression, unfair prejudice, or unfair disregard of the unit owner's interests.

The unit owner's application was allowed to the extent that the condominium corporation was ordered to pay for the remediation costs, subject to the unit owner's proportionate share of common expenses.

The respondents moved to stay an application brought by the applicant, TSCC 1628, in favour of arbitration.

The application sought remedies under the Condominium Act, including for oppression (s. 135) and false/misleading statements (s. 133), against TSCC 1636, Soho Grand Condominiums Inc., and Soinco Limited.

The respondents argued the dispute fell under an arbitration clause in a Reciprocal Agreement and s. 132 of the Condominium Act.

The court denied the motion to stay, finding that the essence of the dispute was the allegedly oppressive conduct of Soho in imposing the Reciprocal Agreement, and that remedies under ss. 133 and 135 of the Condominium Act are exclusively within the Superior Court's jurisdiction.

The court also emphasized avoiding multiplicity of proceedings by keeping all related claims in one forum.

The Applicant sought to enforce a settlement agreement for the sale of a property, which the Respondent refused to close due to an alleged increase in property value and a change of heart.

The court found the settlement agreement valid and enforceable, rejecting the Respondent's arguments of defective tendering, lack of readiness, and contractual frustration.

The court ordered the Respondent to close the sale within 30 days and encouraged parties to settle outstanding rent and costs.

The appellants appealed a Small Claims Court decision finding the individual appellant personally liable for a breach of contract regarding kitchen cabinetry work.

The trial judge had found that the contract was with the corporate appellant, but held the individual appellant personally liable because the corporate name was misspelled on the contract and the individual had claimed for the balance of the contract in his own name in a cross-claim.

The Divisional Court granted the appeal, holding that the trial judge erred in law by piercing the corporate veil without evidence of fraudulent or improper conduct, and by drawing an improper inference from the pleadings that contradicted his own factual findings.