Emily Hives

The plaintiff seller brought a motion for default judgment against the defendant purchaser after the defendant failed to close a real estate transaction.

The defendant was noted in default, and the court found that the deemed admissions established liability for breach of the agreement of purchase and sale.

The court awarded the plaintiff $182,852.33 in damages, representing the loss of bargain (the difference between the original purchase price and the resale price, less the deposit), carrying costs, and the commission paid to resell the property.

Costs and prejudgment interest were also awarded.

The respondent purchased a commercial condominium unit with an exclusive use designation for a dental clinic and leased it to the appellant dentist.

Near the end of the lease, the appellant secretly purchased an adjacent unit, moved his practice there, and purported to assign the exclusive use designation to his new unit in perpetuity.

The application judge held that the appellant could only assign the exclusive use right for the duration of his lease term.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the application judge correctly applied contractual interpretation principles and the nemo dat principle to conclude that the tenant could not permanently divest the owner of its exclusive use right.

The appellants, LMC 477R Corp. and Newstead Inc., appealed the dismissal of their oppression application under the Condominium Act, 1998, against Metropolitan Toronto Condominium Corporation No. 1046.

The application alleged oppressive conduct by the respondent in interfering with the appellant's parking facility operations and refusing good faith negotiations for a new parking agreement.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the application judge's decision, finding no error in the application of the oppression test or in the factual findings, and dismissed the appeal.

This is an appeal from an order dismissing a motion to stay an application in favour of arbitration.

The dispute concerns a cost-sharing agreement between condominium corporations regarding common expenses.

The motion judge found the essence of the claim was oppressive conduct, which he believed was not arbitrable.

The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the core dispute was the interpretation and application of the reciprocal agreement, which contained a broad arbitration clause.

Citing recent Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence, the Court emphasized that courts should not refuse to stay claims covered by a valid arbitration agreement and that oppression claims under the Condominium Act, 1998, are not exclusively for the Superior Court and can be arbitrated.

The appeal was allowed, and the application was stayed as it related to the issues between the two main condominium corporations.

The plaintiff vendor brought a motion for summary judgment for damages arising from the defendant purchaser's failure to close a real estate transaction.

The purchaser counterclaimed for the return of his deposit, arguing the contract was frustrated by a significant drop in the real estate market that prevented him from securing financing.

The court granted the vendor's motion, finding that a market decline does not constitute frustration or impossibility.

The vendor was awarded damages for the loss in property value upon resale and carrying costs, less the deposit, but the court declined to enforce a 20% interest rate provision in the agreement, applying the Courts of Justice Act rate instead.

The moving party sought to quash an appeal from a motion judge's order refusing to stay a court proceeding in favour of arbitration.

The moving party argued that section 7(6) of the Arbitration Act barred the appeal, relying on the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Wellman to argue that the Huras line of cases should be overruled.

The Court of Appeal held that Wellman did not overrule Huras, affirmed that Huras was correctly decided, and found that because the motion judge had no statutory authority under section 7(5) to refuse to stay the arbitrable claims, his decision was not made under section 7.

Therefore, section 7(6) did not bar the appeal.

The motion to quash was dismissed.

The defendants brought a motion to strike out the statements of claim in four related actions against the defendant Adam Abramson, arguing that the pleadings, even with particulars, failed to disclose a reasonable cause of action.

The court granted the motion, finding that the plaintiffs had not pleaded sufficient material facts to establish specific causes of action (negligence, negligent misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, and conspiracy) against Adam Abramson individually.

The court emphasized that merely grouping defendants together was insufficient to provide Adam Abramson with adequate notice of the case against him.

However, the plaintiffs were granted leave to amend their statements of claim.

The respondents moved to stay an application brought by the applicant, TSCC 1628, in favour of arbitration.

The application sought remedies under the Condominium Act, including for oppression (s. 135) and false/misleading statements (s. 133), against TSCC 1636, Soho Grand Condominiums Inc., and Soinco Limited.

The respondents argued the dispute fell under an arbitration clause in a Reciprocal Agreement and s. 132 of the Condominium Act.

The court denied the motion to stay, finding that the essence of the dispute was the allegedly oppressive conduct of Soho in imposing the Reciprocal Agreement, and that remedies under ss. 133 and 135 of the Condominium Act are exclusively within the Superior Court's jurisdiction.

The court also emphasized avoiding multiplicity of proceedings by keeping all related claims in one forum.

The applicants sought a declaration that a binding settlement agreement had been reached with the respondents regarding rent disputes under four leases.

The respondents argued that no agreement was formed as formal execution and delivery of post-dated cheques were conditions precedent.

Applying an objective test, the court found that the respondents' lawyer had apparent authority to make a binding offer via email, which the applicants accepted by returning executed drafts.

The court declared a binding agreement existed and awarded damages for breach of contract.

The applicant tenant moved for an interlocutory injunction to prevent the new owner of the property from demolishing or renovating the premises, claiming the former landlord breached a right of first refusal (ROFR) in the lease.

The respondents moved to discharge a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) and for security for costs.

The court dismissed the injunction motion and discharged the CPL, finding no serious issue to be tried because the tenant had signed an Estoppel Certificate confirming no material default by the landlord and postponing its interest to the new mortgage.

The respondents' motion for security for costs was dismissed as they failed to show the tenant had insufficient assets.