Gillian E. Roberts

This sentencing decision concerns Noah Anderson and Junior Jahmal Harvey, who were convicted by a jury of the first-degree murder of Thane Murray and the attempted murder of Allen Uthayakumaran and Tony Nguyen.

The court imposed the mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without parole eligibility for 25 years for first-degree murder and, after considering aggravating and mitigating factors, imposed concurrent life sentences for the two counts of attempted murder.

The reasons detail the circumstances of the offence, the profound impact on the victims and community, the backgrounds of the offenders, and the applicable sentencing principles and case law.

The court sentenced Jaleem Abdella-Smith for second degree murder, following a jury verdict.

The sentencing reasons review the facts of the offence, the circumstances of the offender, the impact on the victim’s family, and the applicable sentencing principles and ranges.

The court imposed a life sentence with 12 years of parole ineligibility, considering the impulsive nature of the shooting, the offender’s youth, lack of criminal record, difficult background, and the particularly harsh conditions of pre-sentence custody.

The decision also addresses the weight of jury recommendations and the importance of denunciation and deterrence in gun violence cases.

The court considered whether to admit expert evidence from Dr. Jabari M. Evans on the history and social context of drill rap in a criminal trial involving the use of rap lyrics as circumstantial evidence.

The defence sought to qualify Dr. Evans to provide context for the jury regarding the conventions of drill rap, arguing that a jury instruction would be insufficient, especially given the risk of racist stereotypes.

The Crown opposed, citing prejudice and confusion.

The court found that the subject matter was not complex and that a proper jury instruction would suffice.

The court held that Dr. Evans' evidence was not necessary and, even if it were, its prejudicial effect would substantially outweigh its probative value.

The evidence was excluded.

The court sentenced Josue Varela Granado for a series of offences including possession of a loaded prohibited firearm, possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, impaired driving, and related offences.

The court found the circumstances to be at the most serious end of the spectrum for true crime firearm possession, emphasizing the aggravating factors of impairment, public possession, and resistance to arrest.

The total sentence imposed was seven years and 15 days, with ancillary orders including a DNA order, weapons prohibition, forfeiture, and a driving prohibition.

The court considered mitigating factors such as youth, rehabilitative potential, family support, and harsh pre-sentence custody conditions, but prioritized deterrence and denunciation.

The court considered whether Jason Buick, who pleaded guilty to armed robbery and dangerous driving, should be declared a dangerous offender and receive an indeterminate sentence.

Both parties agreed that Buick met the statutory criteria for a dangerous offender under s.753(1)(a)(ii) of the Criminal Code.

The main issue was whether a determinate sentence, possibly followed by a long-term supervision order (LTSO), would adequately protect the public.

After reviewing expert psychiatric evidence, Buick’s history, and the available supervision and treatment options, the court found there was no reasonable expectation that anything less than an indeterminate sentence would manage the risk of violent re-offending.

The court imposed an indeterminate sentence and made ancillary orders.

The defendant brought a pre-trial motion to exclude evidence obtained from a dash camera and its memory card, arguing a violation of section 8 of the Charter due to a warrantless search.

The court found that while the dash camera was lawfully seized under s.489(1)(c) of the Criminal Code, the subsequent search of its memory card was warrantless and violated the defendant's section 8 Charter rights, as the search warrant did not explicitly cover such a device.

However, applying the Grant test under section 24(2) of the Charter, the court determined that the police acted in good faith based on an understandable mistake, the evidence was inevitably discoverable, and its admission was crucial for the truth-seeking function of the trial, particularly regarding the defendant's statements about the altercation.

Consequently, the motion to exclude the evidence was dismissed, and the audio and video recordings were deemed admissible.

Rushaune Champagnie pleaded guilty to two counts of possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking.

The Crown sought an 8-year sentence, while the defence sought 7 years with additional credit for harsh pre-sentence custody conditions.

The court imposed a sentence of 6.5 years concurrent on both counts, acknowledging the serious nature of the offence and the offender's lengthy record, but also considering his difficult upbringing, significant mitigating circumstances, and particularly harsh pre-sentence custody conditions.

The court declined to apply additional credit for lockdown days beyond the statutory Summers credit, instead treating harsh conditions as a mitigating factor.

The Superior Court of Justice sentenced Jamal Fogah-Pierre for reckless discharge of a handgun and related offences.

Despite the Crown seeking 8.5 years, the court imposed the mandatory minimum of 5 years, citing exceptional mitigating factors.

These included the defendant's youth, lack of criminal record, difficult upbringing, exposure to systemic racial bias, significant pre-trial delay, and stringent house arrest conditions.

The court applied the Kienapple principle to stay lesser possession charges and ordered concurrent sentences for pointing a firearm and reckless discharge, finding them factually distinct but part of the same transaction.

The applicants, L.H. and D.P., charged with manslaughter, criminal negligence causing death, and failing to provide necessaries of life, brought an application for a stay of proceedings due to unreasonable delay under section 11(b) of the Charter.

The court analyzed the total elapsed time against the Jordan ceiling, considering periods of delay attributable to the COVID-19 pandemic and defence actions as exceptional circumstances.

The court found that after deducting these periods, the delay fell below the presumptive ceiling.

Furthermore, the court determined that the defence had not taken meaningful steps to expedite proceedings and that the case had not taken markedly longer than it reasonably should have, dismissing both applications for a stay.

The Crown sought to admit preliminary inquiry evidence of a police officer (PC Stamplecoskie) at trial under s.715 or s.715.01 of the Criminal Code, as the officer was unavailable due to a workplace injury.

The defence argued the unavailability under s.715 was not sufficiently proven.

The court found the evidence insufficient to establish unavailability for s.715 but admitted the transcript under s.715.01.

The court declined to compel the officer's attendance for cross-examination, finding no suggestion of unfairness or lack of full opportunity to cross-examine at the preliminary inquiry, and rejecting the defence's argument to read a necessity requirement into s.715.01.

The accused, Jamal Fogah-Pierre, was charged with multiple offences related to a shooting incident.

The central issue at trial was the identity of the shooter.

The Crown presented circumstantial evidence, primarily surveillance video footage, to establish the accused's identity.

The court meticulously analyzed the video evidence, comparing the physical characteristics and clothing of individuals captured on camera with the accused's appearance.

The court found that the man involved in an earlier attack, who strongly resembled the accused, was indeed the accused, providing a powerful motive for the subsequent shooting.

Despite the poor quality and fleeting nature of some video images, the court concluded that the cumulative circumstantial evidence, including resemblance, opportunity, connection to the weapon found in a friend's apartment, and motive, proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was the shooter.

The accused was found guilty of counts one to five on the indictment.

Luan Ngo was found guilty of producing methamphetamine, possession of methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking, and possession of proceeds of crime over $5000.

The Crown sought an eight-year penitentiary sentence, while the defence sought four to five years.

The court imposed a global sentence of seven years in the penitentiary, with concurrent sentences for the other offences, finding it fit and appropriate given the large-scale operation, the accused's significant role, and the dangerous nature of the drug.

The court also considered the accused's status as a first offender and the efficient conduct of the trial as mitigating factors, alongside potential immigration consequences.

Following a five-day trial, the offender was found guilty of trafficking cocaine and assault.

The court, in sentencing, balanced the paramount principles of general deterrence and denunciation for serious drug offences with the offender's significant rehabilitative potential and lack of prior criminal record.

The trafficking was characterized as persistent, full-time street-level dealing at the higher end of the sentencing range.

The court ultimately imposed a custodial sentence, rejecting a conditional sentence, and addressed arguments concerning systemic racism and the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on sentencing.

Chaddrick Brown was charged with possession of a loaded illegal handgun.

He pleaded guilty to drug trafficking but denied knowledge of the handgun found in his rented car.

The trial focused on whether the Crown could prove constructive possession of the firearm beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court rejected Brown's testimony, finding his account vague and inconsistent with other evidence, including his friend's testimony.

The judge concluded that the handgun was habitually kept in the car for the driver's use and that Brown, as the primary driver and controller of the vehicle, was in possession of it.

Brown was found guilty of the handgun offences.

The applicants sought substantial indemnity costs after successfully obtaining a declaration that their tenancy was residential, not commercial, thereby establishing the Landlord and Tenant Board's exclusive jurisdiction over the remaining issues.

The court declined to award elevated costs, finding that the applicants' offers to settle did not engage Rule 49.10 consequences and the respondent's conduct, while concerning, did not meet the threshold for reprehensible, scandalous, or outrageous behavior warranting substantial indemnity.

However, the court deemed it appropriate to award the applicants partial costs for the emergency injunction and the preliminary jurisdictional ruling, considering the work done and the modest amount at stake, ultimately awarding $12,000.

The applicant sought a declaration that their tenancy was governed by the Residential Tenancies Act (RTA) and to continue an interim injunction against lockout.

The respondent sought a declaration that the Commercial Tenancies Act (CTA) applied and an order for possession.

The court applied the "predominant purpose" test under RTA s. 5(j) and s. 202, considering all circumstances including the actual use of the premises, the parties' intentions, and the landlord's knowledge.

The court found the tenancy's predominant purpose was residential, thus the RTA applied, and the Landlord and Tenant Board had exclusive jurisdiction.

The respondent failed to discharge the burden of proving the s. 5(j) exemption.

The plaintiff sued her plastic surgeon for negligence, alleging lack of informed consent for a breast reduction surgery.

She claimed the surgeon failed to disclose the material risk of fat necrosis, which was elevated due to her obesity and smoking, and which she subsequently suffered.

The court found that while the surgeon did not specifically disclose the risk of fat necrosis, and should have, the plaintiff failed to establish causation.

Applying a modified objective test, the court concluded that both the plaintiff and a reasonable person in her circumstances would have proceeded with the elective surgery due to significant and persistent back pain, despite the very low, albeit material, risk.

Therefore, the surgeon was not held liable for damages.

The applicant, a condominium unit owner, brought a motion seeking a declaration that a new rule (Rule 19) enacted by the respondent condominium corporation's board of directors was invalid.

Rule 19 prohibited short-term leasing (less than six months) and deemed any person involved in such use a trespasser.

The applicant argued that Rule 19 was inconsistent with Article 4.9(e) of the condominium's declaration, which stated that no provision should limit an owner from leasing their unit for "any period of time whatsoever." The applicant also contended that paragraph 7 of Rule 19, deeming occupants trespassers, was inconsistent with the Condominium Act.

The court found that the board's interpretation of the declaration, which did not expressly permit short-term leasing, was unreasonable given the clear wording of Article 4.9(e).

Consequently, Rule 19 was declared invalid for being inconsistent with the declaration by prohibiting short-term leasing and imposing a minimum lease term.

Paragraph 7 was also found inconsistent with the Condominium Act, as owners cannot be deemed trespassers.

The applicants sought declarations that short-term leasing was permitted in their condominium corporation (TSCC 2492), an injunction against the corporation preventing such leasing, and an oppression remedy with damages and costs, arguing that TSCC 2492's rule prohibiting leases under six months contradicted its declaration.

The respondent sought dismissal of the application.

The court applied the business judgment rule, finding that the board acted diligently and in good faith, adopting a reasonable interpretation of its declaration and rules.

The court dismissed the application, concluding that the board's rule was not inconsistent with the declaration and that the applicants failed to establish a breach of reasonable expectations or oppressive conduct.

The accused, a young man with no prior criminal record, was found guilty of possession of a prohibited firearm (a sawed-off semi-automatic rifle) with readily accessible ammunition, and possession of cocaine and marijuana.

The firearm and drugs were found hidden in his bedroom during a police search.

The court considered the sentencing principles, including the paramountcy of denunciation and general deterrence for serious firearm offences, while also giving significant weight to the accused's youth, disadvantaged background, and rehabilitative potential.

The court applied Gladue principles by analogy, acknowledging the impact of systemic racism on the accused's life.

A total sentence of 27 months imprisonment was imposed (24 months for the firearm offence, 3 months consecutive for cocaine possession, and 3 months concurrent for marijuana possession), reduced to an effective 18 months after 9 months credit for stringent pre-trial house arrest.

Ancillary orders included a 10-year/life weapons prohibition and a DNA order.