Gillian Roberts

The respondents were charged with multiple counts of fraud and conspiracy relating to an investment scam.

The trial judge granted a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter, finding unreasonable delay.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge erred in his allocation of the delay, his determination of prejudice, and his balancing of the accused's rights against the societal interest in having serious charges tried.

The stay was set aside and the matter was ordered to proceed to trial.

The appellant appealed his convictions for multiple sexual assaults and his designation as a dangerous offender.

He argued that a saliva sample used for DNA comparison was obtained in violation of his Charter rights under s. 8 and s. 10(b).

The Court of Appeal held that the appellant provided a valid, informed waiver that severed any connection between the prior s. 10(b) breach and the taking of the sample.

The court also found no error in the jury instructions regarding expert DNA evidence or in the trial judge's dangerous offender designation, which properly assessed the appellant's treatability and risk to the community.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexually assaulting his young son, arguing his guilty pleas should be set aside because a major depressive disorder undermined their voluntariness.

The Court of Appeal held that the 'limited cognitive capacity' standard applies to determine whether a mental disorder affects the voluntariness of a guilty plea.

Applying this standard, the court preferred the Crown's expert evidence and found the appellant understood the process and made a conscious, volitional decision.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his sentence of 35 months (plus 61 months pre-trial custody credit) for aggravated assault and use of a firearm.

He had used a handgun to threaten a 12-year-old boy who provided information to police, firing the gun and severely injuring the boy via ricochet.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred by taking judicial notice of the prevalence of witness intimidation and by failing to properly consider his youth.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the facts of the offence spoke for themselves regarding intimidation, and the trial judge properly weighed the appellant's youth against his extensive record and the gravity of the offence.

The appellant appealed his convictions for attempted murder and related offences arising from a shooting in a high school gymnasium, as well as his 18-year sentence.

He argued the trial judge erred in refusing expert evidence on eyewitness identification, admitting in-dock identification, and in the jury instructions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings or jury instructions.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the 18-year sentence was manifestly fit given the aggravating factors, including the appellant's record and the danger posed to bystanders.

The respondents were convicted of extortion with a firearm and other offences, which carry mandatory minimum sentences.

The trial judge gave the respondents credit for time spent on strict pre-trial bail (house arrest), reducing their sentences below the statutory minimums.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that while time spent in pre-sentence custody can be credited against a mandatory minimum sentence, time spent on strict bail does not constitute a 'punishment of imprisonment' under the Criminal Code and cannot be used to reduce a mandatory minimum sentence.

The Crown appealed an order staying a charge of rape against the respondent due to late disclosure of threatening phone messages left by a witness for the complainant.

The trial judge granted the stay before trial, finding the delay caused prejudice because the witness had an apparent memory lapse.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and set aside the stay, holding that the trial judge erred by not waiting until the conclusion of the trial to assess actual prejudice, as the evidence of prejudice on the pre-trial record was speculative.

The Court also found that the Crown's overzealous interpretation of a no-contact order did not amount to an abuse of process warranting a stay.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed by the trial judge, arguing that the trial judge erred in principle with respect to a joint submission.

The Court of Appeal found no error, noting that the trial judge effectively applied the required test and correctly concluded that the proposed sentence, including three years of probation, would be insufficient to protect the public interest given the appellant's history of breaching probation orders on at least six other occasions.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was pulled over for driving without illuminated tail lights and subsequently arrested for attempting to mislead police about his identity.

Upon arrest, police discovered he was wearing two bulletproof vests and searched his vehicle, finding a semi-automatic pistol and a revolver.

The trial judge found the search violated section 8 of the Charter but admitted the firearms under section 24(2).

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in finding a section 8 breach, concluding the search was a valid search incident to arrest.

The appeal from conviction was dismissed.

The appellants, who were 16 years old at the time of the offences, pleaded guilty to six violent convenience store robberies.

The Crown successfully applied to have them sentenced as adults under the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

The sentencing judge imposed five-year sentences in addition to three years' credit for pre-sentence custody, and ordered both to serve their sentences in adult penitentiaries.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the adult sentences and the quantum of the sentences, finding no error in the judge's approach to accountability, rehabilitation, or pre-sentence custody credit.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part regarding the placement of one appellant, finding the sentencing judge failed to properly evaluate expert evidence recommending he remain in a youth facility, and ordered a new placement hearing for that appellant.

The appellant appealed his convictions for robbery with a firearm and aggravated assault, as well as his sentence.

The charges arose from a group attack where the victim was shot and paralyzed.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in assessing evidence of his finger wound, relying on a co-accused's statement, and finding he knew a real firearm was used.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge's conclusions were supported by the accumulation of evidence and the error regarding the co-accused's statement was harmless.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed due to the severe aggravating factors.

The appellant pleaded guilty to unlawful confinement, assault, and robbery after luring the complainant into a car, beating her, and robbing her.

She appealed her nine-month custodial sentence, arguing it created an unjustified disparity with her co-accused and that a conditional sentence should have been imposed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding ample basis for a harsher sentence given the appellant's leadership role, the extent of the violence she inflicted, her age relative to the co-accused, and her prior criminal record for violent offences.

The appellant appealed his convictions and 11-year sentence for a series of violent robberies.

He argued that the 16.5-month delay to trial violated his s. 11(b) Charter rights and that the trial judge misapprehended DNA evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the delay was not exceptional and there was no misapprehension of evidence.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the 11-year sentence was fit given the gratuitous violence, the vulnerability of the victims, and the appellant's prior record.

The appellant appealed his convictions for arson-related offences and his sentence as a dangerous offender.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions, noting the appellant conceded causing fire damage to four properties and was inevitably reckless as to whether the residential properties were inhabited.

The Court also dismissed the sentence appeal, finding ample evidence to support the dangerous offender designation given the intractability of the appellant's pyromania and his lack of motivation for treatment.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred by failing to fairly outline the position of the defence in the jury charge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the charge was perfunctory, the failure to detail the evidence did not amount to reversible error.

The case turned entirely on credibility, as the evidence of the appellant and police officers were diametrically opposed, and the trial judge gave a proper W.D. instruction.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder, arguing that the trial judge erred in admitting post-hypnosis identification evidence, failed to properly instruct the jury on eyewitness identification and alibi evidence, and delivered an unbalanced charge that favoured the Crown.

The Court of Appeal found that while the post-hypnosis evidence was properly admitted, the trial judge committed serious errors in his jury instructions regarding the frailties of the identification evidence and the requirements for finding a fabricated alibi.

Furthermore, the jury charge lacked fairness and balance, compromising the appellant's right to a fair trial.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The Crown appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice that overturned a summary conviction judge's ruling.

The summary conviction judge had held that he lacked jurisdiction to hear a freestanding application for costs based on alleged Charter breaches after the Crown withdrew the charges prior to arraignment and plea.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and restored the summary conviction judge's ruling.

The Court held that absent abuse of process or flagrant impropriety by the Crown, the summary conviction court's jurisdiction ends when charges are withdrawn, and it cannot hold a freestanding hearing on costs.

The respondent's remedy lies in a civil action.

The Crown appealed an order upholding a summary conviction court's decision to proceed with an application for costs after charges against the respondent were withdrawn.

Relying on the companion appeal of R. v. Fach, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, quashed the lower court's decision, and prohibited the summary conviction court from proceeding with the costs application.

The Court also rejected the respondent's allegations of abuse of process by the Crown in withdrawing the charges.

The appellant appealed his convictions for unlawful confinement and sexual assault, as well as his sentence.

He argued the unlawful confinement verdict was inconsistent with a co-accused's acquittal and unreasonable, and maintained his innocence regarding the sexual assault.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the verdicts were supported by the evidence and the sentence was within the appropriate range.

The appellant appealed his convictions for aggravated assault and discharging a firearm with intent to endanger life.

He argued that the trial judge erred by precluding him from eliciting exculpatory parts of his statement and by permitting the Crown to cross-examine him on a previous shooting incident.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's ruling did not prevent the appellant from leading the exculpatory parts in re-examination, and that the previous incident was relevant to his knowledge of the other men involved.

The court concluded that any prejudice was minimal and caused no substantial wrong.