Emily Morton

The appellant, a 43-year-old Aboriginal man, appealed his sentence of two years less a day followed by two years' probation for possession for the purpose of trafficking in heroin and oxycodone.

The appellant argued for a reduction based on pre-trial custody credit.

The Court of Appeal found no error in principle, noting the offences involved commercial trafficking in Schedule 1 drugs by an addict to support his habit.

The appeal was dismissed, with the court reiterating the trial judge's recommendation that the sentence be served at the Ontario Correctional Institute.

The appellant appealed his four-year global sentence for gun and drug offences.

Relying on the recent decision in R. v. Nur, the Court of Appeal reconsidered the sentence but concluded that the four-year term remained fit, noting that the combination of gun and drug offences poses a pernicious threat to public safety.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed a stay of proceedings entered on the basis of unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter in a drug prosecution arising from a residential grow operation.

The court held that the application judge mischaracterized part of the delay associated with a joint adjournment of a judicial pre-trial and part of the post-assignment period before trial, both of which should have been treated as inherent delay rather than Crown or institutional delay.

With those deductions, the net Crown and institutional delay fell at the low end of the Morin guidelines.

Given the seriousness of the charges, the societal interest in a trial on the merits, and the weak evidence of actual prejudice, the delay was not unreasonable.

The appellant appealed his conviction for robbery and his sentence.

He argued that he did not possess a needle during the incident and that his trial was unfair.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, noting that the trial judge accepted the victim's evidence regarding the needle and that the record did not support the claim of an unfair trial.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge gave appropriate weight to the appellant's aboriginal heritage, difficult childhood, and addiction issues, finding no error in principle and that the sentence was fit.

The appellant appealed his conviction and four-year sentence for sexual assault and breach of probation.

The appellant argued the trial judge failed to adequately address a gap in the complainant's memory shortly before the assault.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge's reasons sufficiently addressed the live issues of credibility and reliability, noting that the complainant clearly expressed her lack of consent during the sexual acts regardless of any prior memory gap.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed as the four-year term was within the appropriate range given the appellant's prior record and the circumstances of the offence.

The appellant appealed his conviction for aggravated assault, arguing the trial judge erred in a Corbett application by allowing cross-examination on his entire criminal record, including the underlying facts of prior assault convictions.

The trial judge also instructed the jury that they could use the prior convictions to determine who was the aggressor.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in both the Corbett ruling and the jury instructions, as prior convictions under s. 12 of the Canada Evidence Act go only to credibility unless they meet the similar fact evidence test.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellants were convicted of second degree murder following a fatal beating.

On appeal, they argued that the trial judge made errors in his charge to the jury.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding a statement allegedly made by one appellant, which was crucial to determining his intent.

For the other appellant, the trial judge failed to properly instruct the jury on how to apply the concept of reasonable doubt to his exculpatory statements and to eyewitness identification evidence that excluded him as the primary attacker.

The appeals were allowed, the convictions quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his firearm convictions, arguing that the police violated his rights under sections 8 and 9 of the Charter.

The police had detained the appellant after observing suspicious movements in a parked car and recalling an officer safety alert indicating he might be armed and wearing a bulletproof vest.

After a pat-down search revealed a bulletproof vest, the police searched a bag in the vehicle and found a handgun, which the appellant had abandoned before fleeing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the investigative detention lawful, that the appellant lacked standing to challenge the search due to abandonment, and that the search of the bag was justified for officer safety.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting expert police evidence regarding a 'code of silence' in the community where the shooting occurred.

The Crown introduced this evidence to explain why the sole eyewitness initially lied to police about witnessing the murder.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the evidence was relevant and necessary to provide context for the witness's behaviour, and that the trial judge implemented extraordinary safeguards to prevent prejudice, including prohibiting the word 'gang' and providing clear limiting instructions to the jury.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first degree murder, arguing the trial judge made several errors in his charge to the jury.

The appellant contended the trial judge failed to review the position of the defence, erred in responding to a jury question about an alternative suspect, introduced a speculative theory of planning and deliberation, and gave an inadequate Vetrovec warning regarding the key Crown witness.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the trial judge's failure to explicitly set out the defence position was ill-advised, the charge as a whole conveyed a sufficient understanding of the issues.

The court also found no reversible errors in the response to the jury question, the instructions on planning and deliberation, or the Vetrovec warning.

The appellants, grandparents and legal guardians of the victims, appealed their convictions for second degree murder and forcible confinement, as well as their respective parole ineligibility periods of 22 and 20 years.

The victims, a five-year-old boy and his six-year-old sister, were subjected to prolonged starvation, abuse, and confinement in a squalid room, resulting in the boy's death.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding that the trial judge properly inferred the requisite mens rea for murder from the prolonged course of conduct and correctly rejected the defence's expert evidence on diminished capacity.

The court also upheld the admission of police statements and found the confinement vastly exceeded any lawful parental authority.

The sentence appeals were dismissed, with the court affirming that the extreme cruelty and inhumanity of the offences justified the lengthy parole ineligibility periods.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first-degree murder, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting evidence of his alleged sexual assault on the victim's best friend and the victim's ante mortem statements expressing hostility toward him.

The appellant also sought to introduce fresh evidence regarding a witness's relationship with an alternate suspect.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's admission of the bad character and hearsay evidence, concluding the probative value outweighed any prejudicial impact.

The application to admit fresh evidence was denied as it could not reasonably be expected to have affected the result.

The appeal was dismissed.

The respondents were convicted of extortion with a firearm and other offences, which carry mandatory minimum sentences.

The trial judge gave the respondents credit for time spent on strict pre-trial bail (house arrest), reducing their sentences below the statutory minimums.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that while time spent in pre-sentence custody can be credited against a mandatory minimum sentence, time spent on strict bail does not constitute a 'punishment of imprisonment' under the Criminal Code and cannot be used to reduce a mandatory minimum sentence.

The appellant appealed his convictions for break and enter, sexual assault, forcible confinement, and dangerous operation of a motor vehicle.

During jury selection, the trial judge departed from the statutorily mandated procedure under s. 640(2) of the Criminal Code by having the first two jurors act as triers for the challenge for cause for the entire panel, rather than rotating them.

The Court of Appeal held that this was a fundamental jurisdictional error that resulted in an improperly constituted court.

The error could not be cured by the proviso in s. 686(1)(b)(iv).

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual offences, arguing the trial judge erred in her use of the complainant's prior consistent statements, shifted the burden of proof, and subjected his evidence to a higher level of scrutiny.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge did not use the statements for the truth of their contents, properly assessed credibility, and gave exemplary reasons for rejecting the appellant's evidence and accepting the complainant's evidence.

The applicant sought judicial review of the Ministry of Transportation's decision to deny him a religious exemption from the requirement to have a digital photograph on his driver's licence.

He argued the requirement violated his freedom of religion under s. 2(a) of the Charter, citing beliefs based on the Book of Revelations and the Second Commandment.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the applicant failed to establish that his objection was based on a sincere religious belief, noting inconsistencies in his practices and evidence that his true concerns were secular privacy issues.