J. Stribopoulos

The offender pled guilty to conspiracy to export cannabis, possessing cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, possessing proceeds of crime, and breaching a weapons prohibition order.

During his arrest, police used excessive force by unjustifiably tasering him, resulting in a section 7 Charter breach.

The Crown sought a 5-year sentence, while the offender sought a conditional sentence.

The court weighed the gravity of the offences, including the large quantities of drugs and sophisticated conspiracy, against mitigating factors such as the guilty pleas, house arrest bail, and the Charter breach.

The court imposed a global sentence of 4 years imprisonment.

The Crown brought an application to admit the accused's videotaped statement to police, while the accused brought an application to exclude the statement, alleging it was involuntary and obtained in violation of his s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel.

The accused, whose first language is Portuguese, argued he did not understand the police cautions due to a language barrier and intoxication.

The court found that the accused understood his right to silence after speaking with duty counsel through an interpreter.

The court dismissed the Charter application and ruled the statement voluntary and admissible, finding no oppressive circumstances or police trickery.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on a charge of failing or refusing to comply with an approved screening device (ASD) demand.

The trial judge had dismissed the charge due to a reasonable doubt about whether the delay between the initial breath demand and the arrival of the ASD was reasonably necessary, rendering the demand unlawful.

On appeal, the Crown argued the trial judge erred by focusing on the initial demand rather than a second demand made when the ASD arrived, and by applying the immediacy requirement too rigidly.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the initial demand occasioned the detention and was the correct focus of the analysis, and that the trial judge made no error in concluding the Crown failed to prove the delay was reasonably necessary.

The accused was found asleep in a stolen vehicle ten hours after it was taken in an armed robbery by four masked men.

He was in possession of a loaded prohibited handgun.

He pleaded guilty to the firearm offences but proceeded to trial on the robbery charges.

The Crown's case on identity was entirely circumstantial.

Applying the Villaroman framework, the court found that the circumstantial evidence, including discrepancies in physical descriptions and clothing, failed to negate the reasonable alternative inference that the accused came into possession of the stolen vehicle after the robbery.

The accused was acquitted of the robbery charges but convicted of the firearm offences.

The accused was charged with importing and possessing child pornography after police intercepted a child sex doll and conducted a controlled delivery to his home, followed by the execution of a search warrant.

The accused brought a Charter application alleging multiple s. 8 breaches.

The court found that while the search warrant was validly issued, the police breached s. 8 by conducting the controlled delivery without judicial authorization, as it exceeded the implied license to knock.

Furthermore, the police deliberately disregarded the search warrant's specific instructions to enter through a south-facing basement door, instead entering through the front door, conducting a safety search of the entire multi-unit home, and searching the garage.

Applying the Grant framework under s. 24(2), the court excluded the evidence, emphasizing the need to dissociate from the police's deliberate disregard for the limits of their search warrant authority.

The appellant appealed her summary conviction for having care or control of a motor vehicle while impaired.

She was found intoxicated in the driver's seat of her running vehicle after an argument with her boyfriend.

The trial judge found she failed to rebut the presumption of operation and that there was a realistic risk she would set the vehicle in motion.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge engaged in speculative reasoning and misapprehended the evidence.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's inferences were reasonable, grounded in the evidence, and that the reasons for judgment were adequate.

Three accused were tried for various drug-related offences following a controlled delivery of a package containing cocaine imported from Suriname.

The package was intercepted by the CBSA and picked up by Williams using fake identification.

Williams transferred the package to Allen, who fled from police.

Nwankwo was later arrested reaching into the trunk of Allen's car where the package was stored.

The court found Williams not guilty on all counts, as the Crown failed to prove he knew the package contained cocaine.

Nwankwo was found guilty of conspiracy to possess cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

Allen was found guilty of conspiracy to import, possession for the purpose of trafficking, and conspiracy to possess, but not guilty of a separate possession charge relating to cocaine found in his residence.

The applicant brought a motion to compel the sale of a jointly owned property in the context of ongoing family litigation.

The respondent opposed the sale, arguing it would be contrary to the children's best interests and that she wished to purchase the applicant's interest if successful in her equitable claims at trial.

The court granted the motion, finding that the property was not the principal residence of either party, the applicant was incurring significant carrying costs, and the sale would not negatively impact the children.

The court ordered the property sold and the net proceeds paid into court.

The accused brought a Charter application to exclude two handguns found in his pockets during a search incident to arrest.

The arresting officer arrested the accused based on his association with a target of a firearms investigation and his departure from an apartment building shortly after tactical officers arrived to execute a search warrant.

The court found the officer lacked reasonable and probable grounds to arrest, rendering the arrest unlawful and violating s. 9 of the Charter.

Consequently, the search incident to arrest violated s. 8.

Applying the Grant framework, the court excluded the firearms under s. 24(2), finding the police conduct was negligent and significantly impacted the accused's liberty and privacy interests.

During a trial for attempted murder and aggravated assault, a key Crown witness refused to be sworn and testify.

The Crown brought an application under section 715(1) of the Criminal Code to admit the witness's testimony from the preliminary inquiry.

The accused opposed the application, arguing he did not have a full opportunity to cross-examine the witness at the preliminary inquiry because he subsequently obtained new impeachment materials.

The court held that the accused had a full opportunity to cross-examine and that admitting the prior testimony would not occasion unfairness, provided the newly discovered impeachment materials were also admitted into evidence.

The Crown's application was granted subject to conditions.

Following a fifteen-day trial where the applicant was successful in her claims for spousal and child support, the court determined the issue of costs.

The applicant sought full recovery costs of $346,216.55 based on offers to settle that were more favourable to the respondent than the trial outcome.

The court found that the applicant's offers engaged Rule 18(14) of the Family Law Rules, entitling her to full recovery costs.

However, finding the claimed amount extraordinarily large, the court fixed costs at a fair and reasonable amount of $175,000 inclusive of disbursements and HST.

The accused, charged with sexual services offences including procuring, sought to cross-examine the complainant about her prior and subsequent involvement in the sex trade.

The Crown objected, arguing the accused must comply with the procedures in s. 276 of the Criminal Code or analogous common law rules established in Seaboyer.

The court declined to follow a recent coordinate decision that extended Seaboyer to sexual services offences, holding that such an extension would exceed the bounds of incremental common law change and circumvent Parliament's deliberate choice not to include these offences in s. 276.

The court concluded that existing rules of evidence are sufficient to protect the trial process from irrelevant and prejudicial evidence.

The Crown brought an application to admit the notes, diagrams, and Exhibit List prepared by a deceased police officer under the principled exception to the hearsay rule.

The officer had served as the Exhibit Officer during the execution of a search warrant in a child exploitation investigation.

The court found that necessity was established due to the officer's death and that threshold reliability was met given the administrative nature of the task, the officer's conscientious work habits, and the corroborative checks performed by other officers.

The application was granted and the evidence was ruled admissible.

During a trial, the Crown brought an application to admit into evidence an Agreed Statement of Facts that the accused had signed and filed in support of earlier guilty pleas which were subsequently struck.

The court dismissed the application, applying the reasoning from R. v. B.(D.M.), holding that the Agreed Statement of Facts was inextricably linked to the struck guilty pleas and fairness required it to be brought under the same protective umbrella.