Richard Litkowski

The appellant was convicted by jury of two counts of trafficking cocaine and one count of assaulting a peace officer with a weapon after police executed a search warrant on his apartment.

He appealed on the grounds that the trial judge erred in failing to instruct the jury on the defence of mistake of fact regarding the assault charge, and in failing to relate the evidence summary to material issues and the defence position.

The court found no merit in either ground, holding that the trial judge's instructions adequately required the Crown to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant knew the officer was a peace officer engaged in executing his duty, which effectively encompassed the mistake of fact defence.

The appeal from conviction was dismissed, and the sentence appeal was dismissed as abandoned.

After guilty pleas to two counts of possessing loaded prohibited firearms, the appellant sought sentence reduction and Downes credit.

The court granted leave but upheld the seven-year global sentence and dismissed the sentence appeal.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault, invitation to sexual touching, and incest against his daughter, committed between November 1998 and February 2002 when the victim was between 8 and 12 years old.

He was sentenced to 11 years' imprisonment.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the fairness of the trial based on the Crown's closing address and the reasonableness of the incest conviction.

He also appealed his sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction appeal and the sentence appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's instructions, sufficient evidence to support the incest conviction, and that the sentence was fit and warranted given the appellant's prior conviction for similar offences against a young child.

The appellant, Lawrence Allen Thompson, appealed his 10-year sentence for sexual interference, kidnapping, and abduction of a four-year-old child.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario found no error in the sentencing judge’s assessment of aggravating and mitigating factors, the fitness of the sentence, or the calculation of pre-trial credit.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Sasikaran Thanapalasingam, appealed his conviction for first-degree murder of his wife, Tharshika Jeganathan.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge’s analysis or conclusions.

The court held that the evidence overwhelmingly supported the finding that the murder was planned and deliberate, and that the appellant’s intoxication did not impair his capacity to form the requisite intent.

The trial judge’s consideration of the evidence, including the impact of alcohol and alleged mental disturbance, was thorough and appropriate.

The appellant was convicted of six counts of sexual assault involving six complainants who worked at his adult massage parlour.

The trial judge dismissed the Crown's similar act evidence application but failed to instruct the jury against propensity reasoning and the cross-count application of evidence.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that these limiting instructions were mandatory to prevent the jury from improperly using the evidence across counts.

The Court declined to apply the curative proviso, finding that even if the similar act evidence should have been admitted, the lack of proper jury instructions meant there was a reasonable possibility the verdicts would have been different.

The conviction appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for assault causing bodily harm and his designation and sentence as a dangerous offender.

He argued the trial judge failed to properly instruct the jury on the defence theory and erred in finding his conduct intractable for the dangerous offender designation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the jury charge was adequate and there was ample evidence of a repetitive pattern of intimate partner violence to support the dangerous offender designation and the resulting seven-year sentence with a ten-year long term supervision order.

The appellant was convicted of sexually assaulting a 15-year-old girl and appealed the conviction, arguing that the trial judge erred in jury instructions.

The appellant contended that the judge improperly instructed the jury to assess the complainant's evidence from an adolescent perspective and used value-laden language to characterize her testimony.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the instructions, viewed holistically, did not suggest a less stringent standard for the complainant's evidence and that the characterization of her testimony occurred within the summary of the Crown's position, which was clearly delineated for the jury.

The appellant appealed convictions for firearms possession, arguing the vehicle search was unlawful under the Liquor Licence Act (LLA), the traffic stop was a pretext, and the evidence did not prove possession beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the search lawful under the LLA, rejecting the pretext argument (including a new racial profiling claim), and affirming the trial judge's finding of possession based on ample evidence.

The appellant, Ivan McManus, appealed his dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence imposed for seven counts of robbery.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal, affirming the sentencing judge's findings that the appellant met the criteria for a dangerous offender under s. 753(1) of the Criminal Code, demonstrating a high likelihood of harmful recidivism and intractability.

The court also upheld the indeterminate sentence, finding no reasonable expectation that a lesser measure would adequately protect the public, given the appellant's extensive criminal and institutional history, psychiatric diagnoses, and consistent refusal or failure to engage in treatment programs.

The appellant, Nicholas Johnson, appealed his conviction for second-degree murder, challenging the trial judge's refusal to qualify a proposed expert mid-trial.

The expert was intended to recover access to the appellant's Google account via his cell phone to obtain location services data.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's discretionary decision, noting the lack of a proper application and insufficient evidence regarding the expert's qualifications or the admissibility of the potential data.

Steve Kavanagh appealed his conviction for child luring and making sexual material available to a child, and sought leave to appeal his sentence.

He argued the trial judge erred in directing the jury on the reasonable steps requirement for mistaken belief in age, and in denying a "lost evidence" application.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge's charge on mistaken belief in age was correct and that the "lost evidence" application was properly denied as the Charter does not generally apply to foreign officers' conduct.

The Court also granted leave to appeal sentence but dismissed the sentence appeal, upholding the trial judge's decision that a conditional sentence was inappropriate given the nature of the sexual offences against children.

The appellant, Timothy Lee, appealed his convictions for first-degree murder, manslaughter, and attempting to unlawfully cause bodily harm, stemming from a "Mr. Big" undercover operation.

He argued the trial judge erred in admitting his inculpatory "Mr. Big" statements and earlier statements about prior cocaine dealing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly applied the Hart test for Mr. Big confessions, balancing probative value against prejudicial effect, and did not err in admitting the cocaine dealing statements.

The court found the Mr. Big statements sufficiently reliable given corroborating evidence and the absence of police misconduct amounting to abuse of process, despite an undercover officer discouraging legal advice.

Two appellants were convicted of manslaughter following a group assault in which the victim was fatally stabbed by another member of the attacking group.

Both appellants appealed their convictions, arguing the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on causation in the context of co-principal liability.

The majority held that, reading the jury instructions as a whole, the jury was properly — though not perfectly — instructed on legal causation and the intervening act doctrine.

The majority further clarified that an act by a co-participant in a group assault can, in principle, trigger the intervening act doctrine, rejecting the Crown's contrary submission.

The dissent would have allowed the appeals and ordered a new trial, finding the repeated instruction that foreseeability of continuing assaults 'may be enough' to establish causation was erroneous and not cured by the remainder of the charge.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, his dangerous offender designation, and his indeterminate sentence.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding the appellant was reckless and failed to take all reasonable steps to ascertain the underage complainant's age.

The Court also upheld the trial judge's discretionary decision under the Kienapple principle to enter a conviction for sexual assault rather than sexual interference.

However, the Court admitted fresh evidence demonstrating that the Crown's psychiatric expert employed a careless practice in preparing dangerous offender reports in another case.

Because the trial judge relied heavily on this expert's apparent thoroughness to impose an indeterminate sentence, the Court allowed the sentence appeal in part and ordered a new penalty hearing with a fresh psychiatric assessment.

This is an appeal from a dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence.

The appellant, Jason Eamer, had a history of violent offenses against intimate partners.

Two psychiatrists opined that his risk of re-offence could be controlled in the community with strict measures, including a prohibition on romantic relationships.

The sentencing judge rejected this, finding the risk intractable and the proposed measures insufficient to adequately protect the public.

On appeal, Eamer argued the sentencing judge erred by not considering intractability at the designation stage (a "Boutilier" error) and by improperly departing from expert psychiatric opinions regarding risk management.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the sentencing judge's assessment of intractability or in his conclusion that the proposed community controls were not feasible or realistically capable of protecting the public, given the appellant's history of non-compliance.

The appellant was convicted of firearm offences and appealed both his convictions and sentence.

He sought a pre-trial stay of proceedings due to multiple Charter breaches (unjustified strip search, excessive force in prison, and prolonged segregation).

The trial judge found Charter breaches but denied a stay, opting to consider them at sentencing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's application of the Babos test for a stay, as an alternative remedy was available.

However, the Court granted leave to appeal sentence, finding the trial judge's reasons for the 18-month sentence reduction (for Charter breaches, Gladue factors, and Duncan credit) were conclusory and insufficient for appellate review.

Consequently, the sentence was reduced to time served.

The appellant, convicted of attempting to import cocaine and possession of proceeds of crime, appealed the dismissal of his entrapment claim.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in assessing the credibility and reliability of the police agent (PA), whose uncorroborated testimony was central to establishing reasonable suspicion for police intervention.

The court highlighted the PA's extensive criminal history, admitted lies, and substantial financial compensation ($400,000 plus monthly fees) as factors requiring a more rigorous credibility analysis.

It also found that the appellant's later eagerness to participate in the scheme did not corroborate the PA's claim that the appellant initiated the criminal activity.

The appeal was allowed, convictions quashed, and a new trial ordered solely on the entrapment issue.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, raising two grounds: an alleged error in the severance application regarding charges involving two complainants, and serious errors in the trial judge's credibility analysis.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the high deference owed to severance decisions and credibility findings.

The court found no error in the application judge's decision to not sever the charges, noting the low threshold for similar act evidence at the severance stage and the lack of injustice given the judge-alone trial and partial acquittal.

The court also upheld the trial judge's credibility assessment, finding no impermissible reasoning or unequal scrutiny.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, challenging the trial judge's credibility findings and a mid-trial ruling allowing cross-examination on text messages.

The appellant argued the trial judge failed to take a holistic view of evidence, ignored an alleged motive to fabricate, and applied uneven scrutiny.

He also contended the text messages were undisclosed, subject to a Crown undertaking not to use them, and their use constituted case-splitting.

The court dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's credibility assessments and finding no error in the admission of the text messages for impeachment and reply evidence, or in the handling of the "recent fabrication" argument.