Katie Beaudoin

The appellant was convicted of six counts of sexual assault involving six complainants who worked at his adult massage parlour.

The trial judge dismissed the Crown's similar act evidence application but failed to instruct the jury against propensity reasoning and the cross-count application of evidence.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that these limiting instructions were mandatory to prevent the jury from improperly using the evidence across counts.

The Court declined to apply the curative proviso, finding that even if the similar act evidence should have been admitted, the lack of proper jury instructions meant there was a reasonable possibility the verdicts would have been different.

The conviction appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

This is an appeal from a dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence.

The appellant, Jason Eamer, had a history of violent offenses against intimate partners.

Two psychiatrists opined that his risk of re-offence could be controlled in the community with strict measures, including a prohibition on romantic relationships.

The sentencing judge rejected this, finding the risk intractable and the proposed measures insufficient to adequately protect the public.

On appeal, Eamer argued the sentencing judge erred by not considering intractability at the designation stage (a "Boutilier" error) and by improperly departing from expert psychiatric opinions regarding risk management.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the sentencing judge's assessment of intractability or in his conclusion that the proposed community controls were not feasible or realistically capable of protecting the public, given the appellant's history of non-compliance.

The appellant, designated a dangerous offender and sentenced to indeterminate imprisonment for sexual assault and other offences, appealed his sentence and sought to introduce fresh evidence.

He argued the trial judge erred in applying Gladue principles by requiring a causal link between his Indigenous ancestry and offending behaviour.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the fresh evidence motion, finding it unreliable and insufficient to undermine the sentencing decision.

The court also dismissed the sentence appeal, affirming that the trial judge correctly applied Gladue principles, finding no direct link between the appellant's Indigenous background (discovered later in life) and his moral culpability, and that public protection remained the paramount objective justifying an indeterminate sentence.

The appellants, C.I. and M.G., appealed their convictions for sexual assault.

The appeal raised four grounds: improper leading questions during examination-in-chief of the complainant, denial of cross-examination of a co-accused, failure to properly instruct the jury on the limited use of the complainant's prior consistent statements, and erroneous exclusion of video and photographic evidence under s. 278.92 of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while some procedural errors occurred, they did not result in a miscarriage of justice, and the trial judge's exclusion of the video and photographs was proper given their minimal probative value and significant prejudicial effect on the complainant's dignity and privacy.

The Crown conceded the conviction appeal, acknowledging that the verdicts were unreasonable due to reliance on inadmissible evidence.

The Court of Appeal accepted the concession, setting aside the convictions and entering acquittals.

The applicant, Mitchell Dubros, a private investigator, sought an order of certiorari to quash a committal order for attempting to obstruct justice.

The charge arose from his alleged attempts to dissuade witnesses (Cynthia Mulligan, Pam Seatle, James Tumelty) from testifying in a criminal harassment case against Mike Bullard, by threatening to harm their reputations.

The court reviewed the preliminary inquiry judge's decision, applying the "scintilla of evidence" test for jurisdictional error.

It found that the preliminary inquiry judge did not err in committing the applicant to stand trial, as there was sufficient evidence that the applicant sought to dissuade Ms. Mulligan from testifying using threats and other corrupt methods.

The application for certiorari was dismissed.