Jessica Zita

The accused was charged with possession of cannabis for the purpose of export after 24.5 kilograms of cannabis were found in two pieces of luggage bearing her name and flight information.

The Crown's case relied entirely on circumstantial evidence to prove constructive possession.

The court found that the defence's alternative theory of 'tag switching' by airport workers was plausible and grounded in the evidence, including the lack of surveillance footage, forensic evidence, and investigation into the tracking devices found in the luggage.

As guilt was not the only reasonable inference, the accused was acquitted.

The appellant appealed her conviction for second degree murder arising from a home invasion during which her uncle was fatally stabbed.

The Crown's theory was that the appellant organized the break-in intending for the deceased to be killed by her co-accused.

The Court of Appeal found two errors in the jury charge: first, the jury was not adequately instructed about the limited probative value of the appellant's after-the-fact conduct if they rejected the Crown's theory that the killing was planned; second, the jury was not properly instructed that the appellant's partially exculpatory police statements could contribute to a reasonable doubt even if not affirmatively believed.

The curative proviso was not applied, as the Crown's case on murder was not overwhelming.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial on second degree murder was ordered.

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault, sexual assault, and sexual exploitation of his daughter.

The trial judge was Justice Fletcher Dawson, sitting with a jury.

The appellant raised three grounds of appeal: (1) that the trial judge erred in permitting cross-examination of the complainant's mother and sisters regarding uncharged abusive conduct; (2) that the trial judge made a section 276 error regarding evidence of the complainant's sexual activity; and (3) that the trial judge made a Browne v. Dunn error by failing to ensure that contradictory evidence was put to the complainant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all three grounds of appeal and upheld the convictions.

The appellant appealed his convictions for production of methamphetamine, possession for the purpose of trafficking of methamphetamine, and possession of proceeds of crime over $5,000.

The primary issue on appeal was whether the pre-trial application judge erred in finding that the Crown had justified a no-knock entry to the appellant's home during the execution of a search warrant, and whether this constituted a violation of s. 8 Charter rights.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's findings, concluding that the no-knock entry was justified based on reasonable police concerns for safety, including the simultaneous execution of multiple search warrants, potential presence of weapons, the volatile nature of methamphetamine laboratories, and evidence preservation concerns.

The conviction appeal was dismissed, and the sentence appeal was dismissed as abandoned.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario allowed the conviction appeals of William McDonald (second-degree murder) and Thomas Lako (manslaughter) arising from the 2012 shooting death of Jonathan Zak.

The court found that the trial judge erred in admitting a hearsay police statement from a deceased witness for the truth of its contents and in failing to adequately caution the jury regarding discreditable conduct evidence.

The court ordered new trials for both appellants.

The appellant, J.E., appealed his conviction for sexual interference.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge made three significant legal errors in assessing the evidence of a defence witness (the complainant's mother).

These errors included applying the criminal standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt to individual items of evidence, effectively reversing the burden of proof on the defence, and requiring independent corroboration for defence testimony.

The Court held that these errors were not inconsequential, as the defence witness's testimony, though peripheral, could have contributed to a reasonable doubt regarding the complainant's credibility or reliability.

Consequently, the conviction appeal was allowed, and a new trial was ordered.

The Crown brought a motion for a stay and temporary publication ban pending a proposed application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The motion concerned two prior decisions of the Court of Appeal: one setting aside sexual assault convictions and ordering a new trial, and another declining a discretionary publication ban.

The Crown sought a partial stay of the publication ban decision, allowing a temporarily redacted version of the substantive judgment (with verbatim sexualized text messages removed) to be publicly released.

Applying the three-part test for a stay (serious issue, irreparable harm, balance of convenience), the court found that the Crown met the criteria, particularly given the public interest in protecting complainants and the arguable merit of the Crown's appeal regarding the scope of discretionary publication bans.

The motion was granted, ordering a partial stay and redaction of specific paragraphs, a temporary publication ban on certain information, and the sealing of the Crown's motion record.

The appellant, convicted of first-degree murder, appealed on three grounds: the trial judge's failure to provide a standalone instruction on collusion, the admission of in-dock identification evidence from an eyewitness who previously failed to identify him, and the refusal to grant a mistrial following prejudicial remarks by the Crown in closing arguments.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's general cautions on witness credibility were sufficient to address collusion concerns, the discretionary decision to admit in-dock identification evidence was not erroneous given the strong corrective instructions provided, and the Crown's improper remarks did not warrant a mistrial as they were adequately cured by the trial judge's clear instructions to the jury.

The Crown sought to admit evidence of the accused's other discreditable conduct, specifically the discovery of a handgun and unique ammunition in his car, in a first-degree murder trial where identity was a key issue.

The court applied the framework for admissibility of similar fact evidence, assessing probative value against prejudicial effect.

The court ruled that the evidence of the unique combination of ammunition found in the accused's car was admissible due to its high probative value in establishing identity, outweighing its prejudicial effect.

However, the evidence of the firearm itself was deemed inadmissible due to low probative value and higher prejudicial risk, unless the accused denied association with the ammunition.

The appellant, Sukhchain Brar, appealed his conviction for first-degree murder of his wife, Gurpreet Brar.

He admitted the killing but sought a manslaughter conviction based on lack of mens rea or provocation.

The appeal raised constitutional challenges to s. 232(2) of the Criminal Code, which defines the partial defence of provocation, arguing it infringes s. 7 of the Charter by being arbitrary and overbroad.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the constitutional challenge, finding the purpose of the amendment was to limit provocation to serious unlawful conduct, not just to address "honour killings." The court also dismissed other non-constitutional grounds of appeal related to jury instructions on provocation, cultural/religious motive, ante-mortem statements, and after-the-fact conduct.

The appellant, a former law firm employee, appealed her convictions for fraud over $5,000 and uttering a forged document, and her total 18-month imprisonment sentence.

The convictions stemmed from unauthorized cheques totaling nearly $100,000 and a fraudulent divorce order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no material misapprehension of evidence or error in assessing motive or credibility.

The court also dismissed the sentence appeal, concluding that the trial judge's mistaken belief that the appellant was a licensed paralegal did not impact the fitness of the sentence, as the breach of trust and abuse of position within a law firm were the primary aggravating factors.

The sentence was found to be within the appropriate range.

The offender pleaded guilty to one count of kidnapping after playing a minimal role in the confinement of an international student for ransom.

The Crown sought 10 to 12 years' imprisonment, while the defence sought a conditional sentence.

The court considered the offender's minimal participation, her status as a first offender, her history of trauma, and her diagnoses including Borderline Personality Disorder.

Emphasizing proportionality and rehabilitation, the court imposed a 22-month conditional sentence followed by three years of probation.

The appellant, F.C., appealed convictions for 12 sex-related offences, raising two grounds: the trial judge's denial of a severance motion and an alleged improper jury charge on the human trafficking offence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's holistic application of the R. v. Last factors for severance, nor in the jury instruction on human trafficking, which was deemed sufficient given the factual context and absence of trial counsel objection.

The appellant, Romaine McBean, appealed convictions for assault, uttering threats, and sexual assault.

The appellant argued that the trial judge erred by stating that the appellant compelled the complainant to engage in sexual touching by abusing a position of power and authority, claiming there was no basis for such a finding.

The Court of Appeal clarified that the trial judge's reasons did not hinge on the complainant's inability to consent due to a power imbalance, but rather on the complainant's subjective lack of consent stemming from fear induced by the appellant's actions, including preventing her from leaving, threatening her, and making demands for sexual activity.

The Court found no error in the trial judge's approach to consent and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant, Dinis DaSilva, appealed his conviction for sexual assault and sentence, which included a lifetime SOIRA order.

The appeal against conviction argued that the trial judge misapplied the burden of proof by neglecting the R. v. W.(D.) analysis, particularly concerning the complainant's inconsistent testimony (a five-year-old's police statement versus an eight-year-old's trial testimony).

The court found that the trial judge properly applied the criminal standard of proof and adequately addressed the inconsistencies, concluding that the conviction was reasonable.

The appeal against sentence challenged the lifetime SOIRA order, arguing it should have been for ten years given the summary prosecution.

The court dismissed the appeal against conviction but allowed the appeal against sentence, quashing the lifetime SOIRA order and replacing it with a 10-year order.

The appellant, Kalen Schlatter, appealed his conviction for first-degree murder.

The Crown's case included strong circumstantial evidence, DNA, and testimony from undercover officers and a jailhouse informant.

The defence argued a 'third party suspect' and challenged the trial judge's rulings on witness questioning, jury instructions, Vetrovec warning, after-the-fact conduct, and admissibility of undercover agent testimony.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's control of witness questioning, jury instructions, or the Vetrovec warning.

The court also upheld the admissibility of the undercover officers' testimony, finding no breach of the appellant's Charter rights.

The accused was charged with first-degree murder in the death of her 16-year-old daughter, who suffered from severe cerebral palsy.

The Crown alleged the accused smothered the victim and staged a home invasion to cover it up.

The accused testified that two armed intruders entered the home searching for a package, and that one of them remained with the victim while the other searched the house.

The court applied the W.(D.) principles and found that the evidence of the home invasion, while containing some inconsistencies, raised a reasonable doubt.

The court also acquitted the accused of manslaughter, finding insufficient evidence that she was capable of assisting the victim after the intruders left.

The accused was acquitted of all charges.

The appellant, designated a dangerous offender and sentenced to indeterminate imprisonment for sexual assault and other offences, appealed his sentence and sought to introduce fresh evidence.

He argued the trial judge erred in applying Gladue principles by requiring a causal link between his Indigenous ancestry and offending behaviour.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the fresh evidence motion, finding it unreliable and insufficient to undermine the sentencing decision.

The court also dismissed the sentence appeal, affirming that the trial judge correctly applied Gladue principles, finding no direct link between the appellant's Indigenous background (discovered later in life) and his moral culpability, and that public protection remained the paramount objective justifying an indeterminate sentence.

The appellant appealed his convictions for various offences, including robbery and theft, and challenged the trial judge's finding that his Charter rights (ss. 10(a) and 10(b)) were not breached upon arrest.

He also argued procedural unfairness because the trial judge did not accept the Crown's concession regarding a Charter breach.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no breach of natural justice, no error in the trial judge's determination that physical evidence was not obtained in a Charter-infringing manner, and no error in the alternative s. 24(2) analysis for admitting the evidence.

The appellant, D.W., appealed his conviction for sexual assault, sexual interference, and uttering a threat, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting improper reply evidence.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's decision to admit the reply evidence.

The court held that the appellant's testimony regarding compliance with bail conditions took on added significance, justifying the Crown's reply evidence.