Jessica Zita

The defendants brought applications for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging unreasonable delay of up to 44 months from arrest to the anticipated completion of their five-week trial.

The court dismissed the applications, finding that the delay, while exceeding the presumptive 30-month Jordan ceiling, was justified by exceptional circumstances.

These circumstances included the particular complexity of the multi-accused kidnapping case, which involved extensive investigation, disclosure, and coordination of multiple counsel, and the systemic disruptions caused by the Covid-19 pandemic, which profoundly impacted court operations and created significant backlogs.

The court concluded that the Crown and the justice system took all reasonable steps to mitigate delay, and the time taken would not violate the applicants' constitutional right to a trial within a reasonable time.

The appellant sought a reduction in his six-and-a-half-year sentence for possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking.

He argued the trial judge failed to adequately consider his difficult upbringing, that the sentence was comparatively too high, and that the lack of cash seized indicated his motivation was addiction rather than profit.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's reasons, noting the admitted quantity of fentanyl supported an inference of trafficking, including a financial motive, and that the sentence was within the appropriate range.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of possessing fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking.

The police arrested him based on a mistaken identity, relying partly on observations from a warrantless covert hallway camera.

The Crown conceded breaches of the appellant's Charter rights (ss. 8 and 9) due to the unlawful camera installation and subsequent arrest and search, as well as a late Report to Justice.

The trial judge admitted the fentanyl evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, finding that the police acted in good faith based on their understanding of the law at the time.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings that the police's mistaken belief as to the appellant's identity did not, in itself, render the arrest unlawful, and that the s. 24(2) analysis for admitting the evidence was sound, particularly regarding police good faith.

The appellant, Ivan David Lira, appealed his convictions for robbery and firearms offences, and his sentence.

The conviction appeal centered on an alleged s. 10(b) Charter breach due to delayed access to counsel.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the delay was justified under the *Rover* exception due to police and public safety concerns and preservation of evidence, and that even if there was a breach, the evidence seized prior to the delay would not be excluded under s. 24(2) due to lack of causal link.

The sentence appeal argued insufficient credit for harsh pre-sentence confinement conditions.

The Court affirmed the trial judge's approach of applying 1.5:1 *Summers* credit and treating harsh conditions as a mitigating factor in the global sentence calculation, consistent with *Marshall*, without a specific mathematical quantification.

Both the conviction and sentence appeals were dismissed.

The appellants, convicted of first-degree murder and attempted murder, appealed their convictions and sentences.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeals for first-degree murder convictions, ordering a new trial due to the trial judge's error in restricting routes to liability and failing to leave included offenses (second-degree murder and manslaughter) to the jury.

The court found that the murder and attempted murder charges were not inextricably linked.

The appeals on the attempted murder convictions were dismissed, and leave to appeal the life sentences for attempted murder was granted but the appeals were dismissed, finding no error in principle in the sentencing.

This appeal concerned convictions for second-degree murder and discharge of a firearm with intent.

The appellant argued that the trial judge's jury charge was unfair and unbalanced due to alleged errors in presenting evidence and failing to adequately relate evidence to the defence theory.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's instructions.

The court concluded that the charge, read as a whole, was fair and adequately conveyed the defence's position and the relevant legal principles, upholding the convictions.

Shamar Bailey, charged with first-degree murder, sought to exclude his video-recorded statement to homicide officers under section 24(2) of the Charter, arguing that two strip searches conducted after his arrest violated his section 8 Charter rights.

The court found that the second strip search, conducted at 42 Division, was unconstitutional as it lacked objective justification, being based solely on the officer-in-charge's lack of knowledge about the thoroughness of the initial search.

Applying the Grant factors for section 24(2) exclusion, the court found the Charter-infringing conduct serious, the impact on the accused's privacy significant, and the utility of the evidence for the prosecution marginal.

Consequently, the court excluded the statement, concluding that its admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The Crown sought to admit extrinsic discreditable conduct evidence against the accused, Shamar Bailey and Kwami Garwood, in a first-degree murder trial.

The evidence included a prior incident involving a firearm (Tragunna Lane Incident), firearm photographs found on a co-perpetrator's cellphone, a booking/release video of one accused, and ammunition found in another accused's residence.

The court applied the balancing test of probative value versus prejudicial effect for each item.

The Tragunna Lane Incident, firearm photographs, and ammunition were found admissible.

The booking/release video was admissible only as edited still images to mitigate prejudice.

The defendant, Shamar Bailey, brought a motion to exclude statements made to a police sergeant, alleging violations of his Charter rights under sections 9 (arbitrary detention) and 10(b) (right to counsel).

Bailey argued that a traffic stop conducted by Sgt. Lawson was a pretext or ruse to further a homicide investigation, rather than a legitimate Highway Traffic Act (HTA) stop.

The court found that Sgt. Lawson had a legitimate road safety purpose for the stop, based on information about erratic driving and a dangling fuel cap, even though there was also a dominant criminal investigative purpose.

The court reiterated that a dual purpose does not invalidate a stop if a legitimate regulatory purpose exists.

Consequently, the detention was found to be lawful under the HTA, and thus, the right to counsel was suspended.

The application to exclude the statements was dismissed.

The defendants, facing a first-degree murder charge, applied for a challenge for cause based on racial and unconscious bias during jury selection.

The court found the threshold for such a challenge was met, acknowledging the necessity of questioning jurors on these biases.

The ruling addresses the specific questions to be posed to potential jurors, refining the defence's proposed questions.

The judge emphasized that the key is a juror's commitment to setting aside biases to render an impartial verdict, rather than merely identifying the existence of bias.

A specific preamble and four questions were approved for the challenge for cause.

The defendant, Mark Taylor, who was convicted of human trafficking and related charges, brought an application under section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms to stay the proceedings due to alleged unreasonable judicial delay in the delivery of the trial judge's reasons.

The trial judge had reserved her decision for 6 months and 9 days.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the deliberation time, while slightly exceeding the 6-month guideline, was not "markedly longer" than reasonably required given the complexity of the case, which involved multiple counts, seven complainants, two former co-accused, and a four-week trial.

The court also noted the trial judge's competing responsibilities and the defence's failure to proactively seek an earlier return date for the 11(b) application.

This criminal trial concerned one count of sexual assault.

The prosecution alleged the defendant sexually assaulted the complainant in a washroom stall at a wedding reception.

Both the complainant and defendant provided conflicting accounts of the events.

The court found that the prosecution failed to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the complainant did not consent to the sexual activity, leading to an acquittal.

The decision emphasizes that a finding of reasonable doubt about consent is not a positive finding of consent, and the burden of proof remains with the prosecution.

The appellant, Jamie Dunlop, appealed his conviction for aggravated assault and the indeterminate sentence imposed after being declared a dangerous offender.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals.

The conviction appeal argued the trial judge erred in assessing witness credibility regarding the extent of the appellant's participation in the assault.

The sentence appeal contended the sentencing judge erred by not acknowledging an accomplice's role and by focusing on general future harm rather than specific serious personal injury offences.

The Court found the trial judge's findings on the appellant's role were supported by evidence and that the sentencing judge correctly applied the dangerous offender test, despite not explicitly mentioning the accomplice.

The appellant, Julie Menard, appealed her conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal against conviction, finding no basis to interfere with the trial judge's thorough reasons regarding witness credibility and reliability.

The appeal against sentence was also dismissed, with the exception of a consensual reduction of the Sex Offender Information Registration Act (SOIRA) order from lifetime to 20 years, in light of the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in R. v. Ndhlovu.

The appellant, Dhandev Sandhu, appealed his conviction for sexual assault.

The appeal primarily challenged the adequacy of the jury charge regarding the timeframe of the offence and the trial judge's caution concerning a complainant's prior inconsistent statement made under oath.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the jury instructions adequately conveyed the essential elements of the offence, the defence position, and the credibility issues, including the discrepancy in the complainant's sworn statements.

The court affirmed that a special instruction on the significance of a prior inconsistent sworn statement was not mandatory in this case, and the jury was fully aware of the credibility issues.

The appellant, M.V., appealed a sexual assault sentence, arguing for enhanced credit for time served in federal custody after his initial conviction was overturned and a new trial ordered.

The trial judge had granted 1:1 credit for this period, reasoning that the appellant had access to federal programs.

The Court of Appeal found this to be an error in principle, as the trial judge failed to consider that this time would not count towards parole eligibility and statutory release for the new sentence.

The appeal was allowed, and the appellant was granted an additional 368 days of credit, reducing his net sentence from two years to one year.

The accused and a co-accused were convicted of first degree murder by a jury.

The accused appealed on the basis that the trial judge's failure to leave included offences with the jury with respect to the co-accused undermined his defence and tainted the verdict.

The majority of the Court of Appeal held that the trial judge's error narrowed the jury instructions in the case of the accused and set aside the conviction, ordering a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that the trial judge's instructions properly left the reasonably available verdicts with the jury, and that the trial judge had explicitly instructed the jury to consider the accused's case separately from the co-accused's.

Applying the presumption that juries follow explicit instructions, the conviction for first degree murder was restored.

This is an appeal from convictions for two counts of robbery and one count of forcible confinement.

The appellant argued that the trial judge subjected his evidence to uneven scrutiny, reversing the burden of proof, and failed to adequately assess the elements of forcible confinement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly assessed credibility, did not shift the burden of proof, and provided sufficient reasons for the forcible confinement conviction, which was supported by the evidence.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the verdict was unreasonable as the only direct evidence was his fingerprint on a stolen Bluetooth speaker.

He contended the trial judge over-emphasized this evidence and failed to consider the speaker's portability, access by roommates, and alternative perpetrator theories.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the fingerprint evidence was bolstered by the complainant's testimony that he saw the perpetrator touch the speaker without gloves, lived alone, regularly disinfected the speaker, and that roommates had not been present for a month.

The court deemed alternative theories speculative.

The appellants, Jasmine and Richard Doxtator, appealed their first-degree murder convictions.

Their primary argument was that the trial judge erred by not instructing the jury on the included offences of second-degree murder and manslaughter for Jasmine Doxtator, which they argued also impacted Richard Doxtator's trial.

The Court of Appeal, in a majority decision, agreed that there was an "air of reality" to the lesser included offences for Jasmine Doxtator, and the trial judge's failure to leave these options to the jury constituted a legal error that tainted the verdict for both appellants.

The court rejected the Crown's argument to apply the curative proviso.

Consequently, the appeals were allowed, and a new trial was ordered for both Jasmine and Richard Doxtator.