Jessica Zita

The defendants brought applications for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging unreasonable delay of up to 44 months from arrest to the anticipated completion of their five-week trial.

The court dismissed the applications, finding that the delay, while exceeding the presumptive 30-month Jordan ceiling, was justified by exceptional circumstances.

These circumstances included the particular complexity of the multi-accused kidnapping case, which involved extensive investigation, disclosure, and coordination of multiple counsel, and the systemic disruptions caused by the Covid-19 pandemic, which profoundly impacted court operations and created significant backlogs.

The court concluded that the Crown and the justice system took all reasonable steps to mitigate delay, and the time taken would not violate the applicants' constitutional right to a trial within a reasonable time.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder after shooting his drug dealing partner.

At trial, he claimed self-defence, abandoning his initial statements to police that the victim was killed during a robbery by unknown intruders.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in dismissing his s. 11(b) Charter delay application, excluding expert evidence on 'fight or flight' syndrome, and admitting statements made to police.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the delay or expert evidence rulings, but held that the appellant was psychologically detained at the police station earlier than the trial judge found.

The failure to advise him of his right to counsel violated ss. 9 and 10 of the Charter, requiring exclusion of the statements under s. 24(2).

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant sought a reduction in his six-and-a-half-year sentence for possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking.

He argued the trial judge failed to adequately consider his difficult upbringing, that the sentence was comparatively too high, and that the lack of cash seized indicated his motivation was addiction rather than profit.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's reasons, noting the admitted quantity of fentanyl supported an inference of trafficking, including a financial motive, and that the sentence was within the appropriate range.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of possessing fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking.

The police arrested him based on a mistaken identity, relying partly on observations from a warrantless covert hallway camera.

The Crown conceded breaches of the appellant's Charter rights (ss. 8 and 9) due to the unlawful camera installation and subsequent arrest and search, as well as a late Report to Justice.

The trial judge admitted the fentanyl evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, finding that the police acted in good faith based on their understanding of the law at the time.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings that the police's mistaken belief as to the appellant's identity did not, in itself, render the arrest unlawful, and that the s. 24(2) analysis for admitting the evidence was sound, particularly regarding police good faith.

The appellant, Ivan David Lira, appealed his convictions for robbery and firearms offences, and his sentence.

The conviction appeal centered on an alleged s. 10(b) Charter breach due to delayed access to counsel.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the delay was justified under the *Rover* exception due to police and public safety concerns and preservation of evidence, and that even if there was a breach, the evidence seized prior to the delay would not be excluded under s. 24(2) due to lack of causal link.

The sentence appeal argued insufficient credit for harsh pre-sentence confinement conditions.

The Court affirmed the trial judge's approach of applying 1.5:1 *Summers* credit and treating harsh conditions as a mitigating factor in the global sentence calculation, consistent with *Marshall*, without a specific mathematical quantification.

Both the conviction and sentence appeals were dismissed.

The appellants, Demitry Papasotiriou and Mladen Ivezic, appealed their convictions for the first-degree murder of Mr. Papasotiriou's husband.

The Crown's theory was that the appellants, who were lovers, conspired to kill the victim for financial gain, with Mr. Ivezic committing the physical act while Mr. Papasotiriou was in Greece.

Mr. Papasotiriou argued the verdict was unreasonable and that his co-accused's self-represented conduct rendered the trial unfair.

Mr. Ivezic raised issues regarding alternate suspect evidence, lifestyle evidence, DNA disclosure, jury instructions, and ineffective assistance of pretrial counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, finding the verdict reasonable, the trial fair, and no reversible errors in the trial judge's rulings or jury instructions.

The appellants, convicted of first-degree murder and attempted murder, appealed their convictions and sentences.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeals for first-degree murder convictions, ordering a new trial due to the trial judge's error in restricting routes to liability and failing to leave included offenses (second-degree murder and manslaughter) to the jury.

The court found that the murder and attempted murder charges were not inextricably linked.

The appeals on the attempted murder convictions were dismissed, and leave to appeal the life sentences for attempted murder was granted but the appeals were dismissed, finding no error in principle in the sentencing.

This appeal concerned convictions for second-degree murder and discharge of a firearm with intent.

The appellant argued that the trial judge's jury charge was unfair and unbalanced due to alleged errors in presenting evidence and failing to adequately relate evidence to the defence theory.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's instructions.

The court concluded that the charge, read as a whole, was fair and adequately conveyed the defence's position and the relevant legal principles, upholding the convictions.

The defendants, facing a first-degree murder charge, applied for a challenge for cause based on racial and unconscious bias during jury selection.

The court found the threshold for such a challenge was met, acknowledging the necessity of questioning jurors on these biases.

The ruling addresses the specific questions to be posed to potential jurors, refining the defence's proposed questions.

The judge emphasized that the key is a juror's commitment to setting aside biases to render an impartial verdict, rather than merely identifying the existence of bias.

A specific preamble and four questions were approved for the challenge for cause.

The Crown sought to admit extrinsic discreditable conduct evidence against the accused, Shamar Bailey and Kwami Garwood, in a first-degree murder trial.

The evidence included a prior incident involving a firearm (Tragunna Lane Incident), firearm photographs found on a co-perpetrator's cellphone, a booking/release video of one accused, and ammunition found in another accused's residence.

The court applied the balancing test of probative value versus prejudicial effect for each item.

The Tragunna Lane Incident, firearm photographs, and ammunition were found admissible.

The booking/release video was admissible only as edited still images to mitigate prejudice.

The defendant, Shamar Bailey, brought a motion to exclude statements made to a police sergeant, alleging violations of his Charter rights under sections 9 (arbitrary detention) and 10(b) (right to counsel).

Bailey argued that a traffic stop conducted by Sgt. Lawson was a pretext or ruse to further a homicide investigation, rather than a legitimate Highway Traffic Act (HTA) stop.

The court found that Sgt. Lawson had a legitimate road safety purpose for the stop, based on information about erratic driving and a dangling fuel cap, even though there was also a dominant criminal investigative purpose.

The court reiterated that a dual purpose does not invalidate a stop if a legitimate regulatory purpose exists.

Consequently, the detention was found to be lawful under the HTA, and thus, the right to counsel was suspended.

The application to exclude the statements was dismissed.

Shamar Bailey, charged with first-degree murder, sought to exclude his video-recorded statement to homicide officers under section 24(2) of the Charter, arguing that two strip searches conducted after his arrest violated his section 8 Charter rights.

The court found that the second strip search, conducted at 42 Division, was unconstitutional as it lacked objective justification, being based solely on the officer-in-charge's lack of knowledge about the thoroughness of the initial search.

Applying the Grant factors for section 24(2) exclusion, the court found the Charter-infringing conduct serious, the impact on the accused's privacy significant, and the utility of the evidence for the prosecution marginal.

Consequently, the court excluded the statement, concluding that its admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The defendant, Mark Taylor, who was convicted of human trafficking and related charges, brought an application under section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms to stay the proceedings due to alleged unreasonable judicial delay in the delivery of the trial judge's reasons.

The trial judge had reserved her decision for 6 months and 9 days.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the deliberation time, while slightly exceeding the 6-month guideline, was not "markedly longer" than reasonably required given the complexity of the case, which involved multiple counts, seven complainants, two former co-accused, and a four-week trial.

The court also noted the trial judge's competing responsibilities and the defence's failure to proactively seek an earlier return date for the 11(b) application.

This criminal trial concerned one count of sexual assault.

The prosecution alleged the defendant sexually assaulted the complainant in a washroom stall at a wedding reception.

Both the complainant and defendant provided conflicting accounts of the events.

The court found that the prosecution failed to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the complainant did not consent to the sexual activity, leading to an acquittal.

The decision emphasizes that a finding of reasonable doubt about consent is not a positive finding of consent, and the burden of proof remains with the prosecution.

The appellants appealed their convictions for second-degree murder and manslaughter arising from a fatal group assault.

The primary appellant, convicted of murder as the stabber, sought to introduce fresh expert evidence and challenged the trial judge's instructions on identification and a key witness.

The co-appellants, convicted of manslaughter, argued the trial judge misdirected the jury on causation, specifically regarding whether the stabbing was an intervening act that broke the chain of causation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all appeals, finding the jury instructions, when read as a whole, properly conveyed the law of causation and the requirements for assessing witness credibility.

The appellant, Jamie Dunlop, appealed his conviction for aggravated assault and the indeterminate sentence imposed after being declared a dangerous offender.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals.

The conviction appeal argued the trial judge erred in assessing witness credibility regarding the extent of the appellant's participation in the assault.

The sentence appeal contended the sentencing judge erred by not acknowledging an accomplice's role and by focusing on general future harm rather than specific serious personal injury offences.

The Court found the trial judge's findings on the appellant's role were supported by evidence and that the sentencing judge correctly applied the dangerous offender test, despite not explicitly mentioning the accomplice.

The accused was charged with aggravated assault after striking the victim in the head with a bottle at a nightclub.

The victim had initiated an unprovoked attack by punching the accused several times.

The accused claimed self-defence.

The court applied the self-defence framework under section 34 of the Criminal Code and found that while the accused was defending himself, his response of swinging a bottle in an overhand motion was disproportional to the threat, as the victim's punches did not injure him or knock him off balance.

The accused was found guilty of aggravated assault.

The appellant, Julie Menard, appealed her conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal against conviction, finding no basis to interfere with the trial judge's thorough reasons regarding witness credibility and reliability.

The appeal against sentence was also dismissed, with the exception of a consensual reduction of the Sex Offender Information Registration Act (SOIRA) order from lifetime to 20 years, in light of the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in R. v. Ndhlovu.

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault causing bodily harm and forcible confinement against his spouse, as well as his sentence of 7 months' incarceration.

The trial judge had accepted the complainant's evidence over the appellant's, finding the appellant not credible.

The Court of Appeal found no error of law or palpable and overriding error of fact in the trial judge's credibility assessments or treatment of the evidence.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge properly weighed the aggravating and mitigating factors for a serious domestic assault.

The appellant, Dhandev Sandhu, appealed his conviction for sexual assault.

The appeal primarily challenged the adequacy of the jury charge regarding the timeframe of the offence and the trial judge's caution concerning a complainant's prior inconsistent statement made under oath.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the jury instructions adequately conveyed the essential elements of the offence, the defence position, and the credibility issues, including the discrepancy in the complainant's sworn statements.

The court affirmed that a special instruction on the significance of a prior inconsistent sworn statement was not mandatory in this case, and the jury was fully aware of the credibility issues.