Susan L. Reid

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder for shooting and killing Ryan Kabuya-Ntumba during a confrontation in Ottawa's ByWard Market on July 1, 2019.

The central issue at trial was whether the appellant acted in self-defence.

The jury rejected the self-defence claim and convicted the appellant, who was sentenced to life imprisonment with no parole eligibility for 14 years.

On appeal, the appellant sought to introduce fresh evidence from an eyewitness and challenged the trial judge's jury instructions on self-defence and post-offence conduct.

The majority dismissed the motion to admit fresh evidence, finding it not reasonably capable of belief, and dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals.

Justice Copeland dissented on the fresh evidence issue, concluding the evidence was reasonably capable of belief and warranted a new trial.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the Crown's appeal from a directed verdict of acquittal on a charge of accessory after the fact to murder.

The court found that the evidence did not support leaving the charge to the jury on the basis of wilful blindness, as there was no basis for a reasonable jury to find that the respondent knew or was wilfully blind to the fact that the victim had died.

The court also held there was no air of reality to the included offence of being an accessory after the fact to attempted murder, as the evidence established the victim died and there was no live issue as to causation.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the Crown's appeal from a directed verdict of acquittal for Abdullahi Osman, who was charged as an accessory after the fact to murder.

The court held that, although attempted murder can in rare cases be an included offence to murder, there was no air of reality to the included offence of being an accessory after the fact to attempted murder in this case, as the evidence was clear that the principal's acts caused the victim's death.

The decision clarifies the law on included offences, the requirements for accessory after the fact liability, and the rare circumstances in which attempted murder may be left to a jury as an included offence where the victim dies.

The applicant, Emmanuel Pinard, sought bail pending his conviction and sentence appeals for possessing a firearm contrary to a prohibition order.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario, through Lauwers J.A., applied the three-part test under s. 679(3) of the Criminal Code, focusing on the public interest component, specifically public confidence in the administration of justice.

The court weighed the enforceability interest (seriousness of gun crime) against the reviewability interest (strength of appeal grounds).

The court found the conviction and sentence appeal grounds to be arguable but not clearly surpassing the 'not frivolous' criterion.

Consequently, the application for bail pending appeal was dismissed, as releasing the applicant would undermine public confidence given the seriousness of the crime and the weakness of the appeal.

The appellant, Timothy Lee, appealed his convictions for first-degree murder, manslaughter, and attempting to unlawfully cause bodily harm, stemming from a "Mr. Big" undercover operation.

He argued the trial judge erred in admitting his inculpatory "Mr. Big" statements and earlier statements about prior cocaine dealing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly applied the Hart test for Mr. Big confessions, balancing probative value against prejudicial effect, and did not err in admitting the cocaine dealing statements.

The court found the Mr. Big statements sufficiently reliable given corroborating evidence and the absence of police misconduct amounting to abuse of process, despite an undercover officer discouraging legal advice.

The appellant was convicted of two counts of first degree murder and appealed on the basis that the trial judge erred by charging the jury on party liability.

The Supreme Court unanimously held that party liability was properly left with the jury as the evidence provided it with an air of reality.

The Court agreed with the dissenting judge below that the trial judge erred in his instructions on party liability, finding that the jury was never clearly told the appellant would have needed to know the principal intended to kill the victims in a planned and deliberate manner to be liable as an aider.

Nonetheless, the curative proviso under s. 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code applied because the errors were harmless and there was no reasonable possibility the jury would have reached a different verdict.

Appeal dismissed and convictions upheld.

The appellants, convicted of first-degree murder and attempted murder, appealed their convictions and sentences.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeals for first-degree murder convictions, ordering a new trial due to the trial judge's error in restricting routes to liability and failing to leave included offenses (second-degree murder and manslaughter) to the jury.

The court found that the murder and attempted murder charges were not inextricably linked.

The appeals on the attempted murder convictions were dismissed, and leave to appeal the life sentences for attempted murder was granted but the appeals were dismissed, finding no error in principle in the sentencing.

The appellant, Yasin Abdulle, appealed his conviction for second-degree murder and his 15-year parole ineligibility period.

The conviction appeal challenged the admission of evidence regarding prior violent incidents between rival gangs and the use of rap music lyrics during cross-examination.

The sentence appeal argued that the trial judge erred by minimizing the impact of systemic anti-Black racism on the appellant's moral culpability.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, finding no error in the admission of prior incident evidence or the use of rap lyrics for cross-examination.

While acknowledging the trial judge's error in dismissing evidence of anti-Black racism, the Court found this error did not impact the fit sentence, given the seriousness of the "near first-degree murder" offence and the need for denunciation and deterrence.

The appellant was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder after a retrial.

He appealed his conviction on three grounds: the application judge erred by dismissing the application to admit hearsay for a third-party suspect, the trial judge failed to give a sufficient corrective instruction regarding the Crown’s prejudicial closing argument, and the trial judge erred by charging the jury on party liability without factual foundation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the application judge's hearsay ruling, the trial judge's handling of the Crown's closing, or the party liability instruction, which was found to have an evidentiary basis and was akin to co-principal liability.

A dissenting judge would have allowed the appeal on the party liability issue, arguing insufficient evidentiary foundation and inadequate jury instructions.

The appellant was acquitted by jury of second degree murder after shooting a man he found breaking into his truck, claiming self-defence.

The trial judge failed to instruct the jury to consider the appellant's role in the incident under s. 34(2)(c) of the Criminal Code as a factor bearing on the reasonableness of his use of lethal force.

The majority held that the phrase 'the person's role in the incident' in s. 34(2)(c) captures the accused's conduct throughout the incident from beginning to end, without requiring that the conduct be unlawful, provocative or morally blameworthy.

The omission of this instruction was a material error that had a bearing on the acquittal, warranting a new trial.

The appeal was dismissed with Côté J. dissenting on the question of materiality.

The applicant sought bail pending leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, challenging his assault conviction and nine-month sentence.

The grounds for appeal included the trial judge's use of social context in credibility assessments and sentencing, alleged misapprehension of evidence, and whether simple assault is a lesser and included offense of aggravated assault.

The court denied bail, finding the grounds for leave to appeal were not frivolous but did not clearly surpass the minimal threshold, and that continued detention was necessary in the public interest, balancing enforceability and reviewability.

Michael Theriault appealed his conviction for common assault and his nine-month sentence, stemming from an altercation where he, an off-duty police officer, and his brother assaulted Dafonte Miller, a young Black man, after catching him stealing from their truck.

The trial judge had acquitted the brothers of aggravated assault and obstruction of justice but convicted Michael of common assault for striking Miller with a pipe when Miller was retreating.

The Court of Appeal dismissed Michael Theriault's appeal, upholding the conviction and sentence.

The Crown's cross-appeal against the acquittals was also dismissed without addressing its merits, as the Crown had indicated they would not pursue a new trial if Michael Theriault's common assault conviction was upheld.

The appellants, Brandon Barreira, Joshua Barreira, and Chad Davidson, appealed their convictions for first-degree murder.

Davidson had admitted to shooting the victim, Tyler Johnson, but claimed manslaughter, while the other appellants denied party liability.

The appeal primarily focused on the trial judge's jury instructions, arguing a failure to adequately relate the evidence to the issues, and the unreasonableness of the first-degree murder verdict.

The Court of Appeal found the jury instructions inadequate for failing to properly summarize and relate the evidence to the specific elements of the offence and party liability.

While the court determined that the first-degree murder verdict was not unreasonable given the evidence, the instructional errors necessitated a new trial.

The appeals were allowed, and a new trial on the charge of first-degree murder was ordered for all appellants.

This is an appeal from convictions for breach of trust against an Ontario Provincial Police officer, Cst.

Kara Darnley, related to two incidents: the "witness record incident" and the "drug investigation file incidents." The Crown alleged Cst.

Darnley abused her position out of loyalty to her fiancé.

The trial judge convicted her of breach of trust for both incidents but acquitted her of obstruction of justice for the witness record incident.

Cst.

Darnley appealed, citing errors in jury directions on reasonable doubt and the "public good" element of breach of trust, inconsistent verdicts, and misapplication of the entrapment defence.

The Court of Appeal found significant errors in the reasonable doubt instruction and that the verdicts for the witness record incident were inconsistent.

It also found errors in the entrapment analysis, specifically regarding the "average person" test and the elevation of moral standards for police officers.

The appeal was allowed, with an acquittal substituted for the witness record breach of trust conviction and a new trial ordered for the drug investigation file breach of trust conviction.

The appellant appealed his sentence of 10 years' imprisonment imposed following his guilty plea to two counts of operating a motor vehicle while impaired and causing death, two counts of criminal negligence causing death, two counts of operating a motor vehicle while impaired and causing bodily harm, and two counts of criminal negligence causing bodily harm.

The collision occurred when the appellant, heavily intoxicated and driving at 187 km/hr, ran a red light and struck another vehicle, killing two passengers and seriously injuring two others.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and reduced the sentence to seven years, finding the original sentence demonstrably unfit.

The court also set aside victim surcharges and varied the driving prohibition to eight years commencing at the end of imprisonment.

A dissenting opinion would have reduced the sentence to six years, placing greater weight on Gladue factors relating to intergenerational trauma.

The appellant appealed his conviction for numerous firearms offences arising from an incident in downtown Toronto where he attempted to discard a loaded handgun.

He challenged the conviction on the basis that the trial judge erred in failing to grant a stay of proceedings based on the failure of police to preserve CCTV footage, contrary to section 7 of the Charter.

The trial judge applied the framework from established case law and found no breach of section 7.

The appellant received a remedy through a jury instruction regarding the failure to preserve evidence.

The conviction appeal was dismissed.

The sentence appeal was rendered moot as the appellant had already served his sentence, and leave to appeal sentence was refused.

The appellant appealed his sentence imposed after pleading guilty to multiple offences including break and enter (x2), assault police with intent to resist arrest, possession of stolen property over $5,000, breach of probation, possession of counterfeit mark, and mischief to property under $5,000.

At a judicial pre-trial, the sentencing judge had indicated a range of approximately two and one-half years for the December offences.

However, at sentencing, the judge imposed a longer sentence.

The appellant argued this departure was unfair and sought reduction to 30 months for the December offences.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no evidence that the appellant relied on the pre-trial remarks in entering his guilty plea and distinguishing the case from R. v. O'Quinn.

The court granted leave to appeal sentence and set aside victim fine surcharges by agreement with the Crown.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder following a fatal stabbing outside an Ottawa nightclub.

The Court of Appeal considered whether the conviction was unreasonable, focusing on whether the evidence supported the finding of planning and deliberation required for first degree murder.

The court found that while the appellant's guilt of murder was established, the evidence did not support the conclusion that the killing was planned and deliberate.

The court substituted a conviction for second degree murder, finding that the attack appeared impulsive rather than the product of a calculated scheme.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder at retrial following an earlier appeal that resulted in a new trial.

The Crown's theory was that the appellant arranged for someone, likely Daniel Di Trapani, to murder her husband.

The appellant challenged the trial judge's instructions to the jury, the alternative theory of liability permitting conviction based on an unknown killer, and the treatment of evidence from Teresa Mascia, a Crown witness who was declared adverse and cross-examined.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge adequately related evidence to legal issues, the alternative theory had an air of reality, and the treatment of Mascia's evidence, while containing minor errors, did not render the trial unfair.

A Toronto police officer was convicted of attempted murder for firing a second volley of six shots at a knife-wielding man lying on a streetcar floor, 5.5 seconds after an initial volley that had fatally wounded the victim.

The officer was acquitted of second-degree murder.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction and the six-year sentence, finding the verdicts were not inconsistent and that the mandatory minimum sentences for attempted murder with a firearm do not violate the Charter.

The court rejected the officer's constitutional challenges under sections 7 and 12 of the Charter and dismissed his application to adduce fresh evidence on appeal.