Susan L. Reid

The appellant appealed his sentence imposed after pleading guilty to multiple offences including break and enter (x2), assault police with intent to resist arrest, possession of stolen property over $5,000, breach of probation, possession of counterfeit mark, and mischief to property under $5,000.

At a judicial pre-trial, the sentencing judge had indicated a range of approximately two and one-half years for the December offences.

However, at sentencing, the judge imposed a longer sentence.

The appellant argued this departure was unfair and sought reduction to 30 months for the December offences.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no evidence that the appellant relied on the pre-trial remarks in entering his guilty plea and distinguishing the case from R. v. O'Quinn.

The court granted leave to appeal sentence and set aside victim fine surcharges by agreement with the Crown.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder following a fatal stabbing outside an Ottawa nightclub.

The Court of Appeal considered whether the conviction was unreasonable, focusing on whether the evidence supported the finding of planning and deliberation required for first degree murder.

The court found that while the appellant's guilt of murder was established, the evidence did not support the conclusion that the killing was planned and deliberate.

The court substituted a conviction for second degree murder, finding that the attack appeared impulsive rather than the product of a calculated scheme.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder at retrial following an earlier appeal that resulted in a new trial.

The Crown's theory was that the appellant arranged for someone, likely Daniel Di Trapani, to murder her husband.

The appellant challenged the trial judge's instructions to the jury, the alternative theory of liability permitting conviction based on an unknown killer, and the treatment of evidence from Teresa Mascia, a Crown witness who was declared adverse and cross-examined.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge adequately related evidence to legal issues, the alternative theory had an air of reality, and the treatment of Mascia's evidence, while containing minor errors, did not render the trial unfair.

A Toronto police officer was convicted of attempted murder for firing a second volley of six shots at a knife-wielding man lying on a streetcar floor, 5.5 seconds after an initial volley that had fatally wounded the victim.

The officer was acquitted of second-degree murder.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction and the six-year sentence, finding the verdicts were not inconsistent and that the mandatory minimum sentences for attempted murder with a firearm do not violate the Charter.

The court rejected the officer's constitutional challenges under sections 7 and 12 of the Charter and dismissed his application to adduce fresh evidence on appeal.

The appellant, a police officer convicted of attempted murder, applied for release from custody pending his appeal.

The Crown conceded the appeal was not frivolous and the appellant would surrender into custody, but argued his detention was necessary in the public interest.

The Court of Appeal granted the application, finding that the merits of the appeal regarding inconsistent verdicts shifted the balance in favour of reviewability, and that a fully informed public would not find his release contrary to the public interest.

The Crown brought a motion to remove two lawyers and their firm from the record due to a conflict of interest.

The lawyers, partners in the same firm, were representing two co-accused charged with sexual assault.

The respondents opposed the motion, asserting solicitor-client privilege over their defence positions and formally waiving any conflict.

The court addressed threshold procedural issues regarding the review of sealed affidavit evidence and the concept of waiver of solicitor-client privilege.

The court found that a judge's review of privileged information for adjudication purposes does not destroy or waive the privilege.

However, considering the differing DNA evidence for the co-accused, the court concluded there was a substantial and realistic risk that their defence positions would diverge, creating conflicting duties of loyalty for their counsel.

Despite the clients' waivers, the interests of justice, including the integrity of the trial process, predominated.

The motion to disqualify and remove counsel was granted.

Three Toronto police officers charged with sexual assault sought a publication ban on investigative materials filed by the Crown in a related application to remove counsel.

The court applied the Dagenais/Mentuck test, finding a real and substantial risk to trial fairness due to potential juror stigmatization and witness tainting, especially given the salacious nature of the allegations against police officers.

While acknowledging the public interest in scrutiny, the court determined that allowing media access to the information (without publication) and expert commentary provided a sufficient substitute for full public disclosure.

The publication ban was granted, prohibiting publication until the jury retires or the charge is withdrawn/dismissed.

The appellants were convicted of first degree murder in a gang-related shooting.

At their joint trial, they advanced cut-throat defences, each blaming the other.

On appeal, they raised numerous grounds relating to the jury charge, including instructions on eyewitness description evidence, bad character evidence, party liability, and the W.D. framework.

They also challenged the admission of gang expert opinion evidence that relied on confidential informants and the trial judge's refusal to review the informant files.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, finding no reversible errors in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings or jury instructions.

The appellant appealed his sentence, seeking a reduction based on fresh evidence including his assertion of Métis status, rehabilitation efforts, and time spent on bail pending appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the fresh evidence did not warrant a reduction.

The court noted that Aboriginal Legal Services could not confirm his status, his troubled background was already considered, and the sentence imposed for violent and sexually exploitative crimes was already at the low end of the range.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder after the victim was beaten to death with a baseball bat in the appellant's home.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in his jury instructions regarding joint involvement, the Vetrovec warning for an unsavoury witness, the W.(D.) instruction, and post-offence conduct.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that while the trial judge could have given a joint party liability instruction, the failure to do so did not result in a miscarriage of justice and was cured by the proviso.

The court also found the Vetrovec, W.(D.), and post-offence conduct instructions were sufficient.

The sentence appeal regarding the 13-year parole ineligibility period was also dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder following a street fight in which the victim was fatally stabbed.

On appeal, the appellant argued that the trial judge's verdict was unreasonable due to reliance on unreliable eyewitness evidence identifying her as the person who brought the knife to the fight, and that the trial judge misapprehended exculpatory evidence by failing to consider other participants as the possible stabber.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge was alive to the frailties of eyewitness identification, his factual findings were amply supported by the evidence, and he did not misapprehend the evidence regarding alternate suspects.

The youth appellant was convicted of sexually assaulting a five-year-old child.

At trial, credibility was the central issue, and the appellant denied the allegations.

The trial judge convicted the appellant, finding the complainant's evidence compelling and rejecting the appellant's denial as one of convenience.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found the trial judge's reasons inadequate.

The reasons failed to explain how the trial judge reconciled problems with the complainant's evidence or why the appellant's evidence did not raise a reasonable doubt.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The applicant, convicted of first-degree murder, applied for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.

Ancillary to his leave application, he brought a motion for the release of trial exhibits (hair clippings) for forensic testing to determine if they were scalp or facial hair, which could support a fresh evidence application regarding his unreasonable verdict argument.

The Court held it had jurisdiction to make the order under the Criminal Code and the Supreme Court Act, and concluded it was in the interests of justice to allow the testing.

The appellant appealed his convictions for dangerous driving and drug offences.

On the dangerous driving conviction, the Court of Appeal admitted fresh evidence regarding a police officer's misconduct record but found it would not have affected the trial judge's credibility assessment.

On the drug convictions, the court declined to enter acquittals, finding there was some evidence of continuity, and upheld the summary conviction appeal court's order for a new trial.

The appellants were convicted of first degree murder and attempted murder following a shooting at a Toronto nightclub.

On appeal, they argued that the verdicts were unreasonable and that the trial judge erred in his instructions to the jury regarding eye-witness identification, post-offence conduct, and planning and deliberation.

The Court of Appeal found that the eye-witness testimony, combined with confirmatory physical evidence such as gunshot residue and hidden bullets, was sufficient to support the convictions.

The court also held that the trial judge's jury instructions were fair, balanced, and legally correct.

The appeals were dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of first-degree murder after the deceased was found in a submerged vehicle.

At trial, the Crown relied on unchallenged toxicology evidence suggesting the deceased died within 15 to 20 minutes of his last drink, supporting the theory of a planned murder.

On appeal, the appellant sought to introduce fresh toxicology evidence, conceded as correct by the Crown, showing the trial expert's time estimate was scientifically unsound.

The Court of Appeal applied the Palmer test and admitted the fresh evidence, finding it could reasonably be expected to have affected the jury's verdict.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his sentence of two years less a day and three years' probation for sexual assault and uttering threats.

He argued the sentencing judge erred in finding him a danger to the community and failing to impose a conditional sentence.

The Court of Appeal found the sentence was not demonstrably unfit given the violence of the assault and the subsequent threats, which required denunciation and deterrence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants were convicted of second degree murder and manslaughter, respectively, following the fatal beating of a homeless man.

They appealed their convictions, and one appealed his sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding no error in the trial judge's refusal to grant an adjournment for a challenge for cause, upholding the constitutionality of the peremptory challenge allocation in s. 634(2) of the Criminal Code, and finding the jury instructions regarding co-accused testimony, the failure to testify, and the review of evidence to be balanced and legally correct.

The sentence of life imprisonment with 12 years parole ineligibility was also upheld.

The accused, charged with arson, retained out-of-town counsel under a legal aid certificate.

Legal Aid Ontario refused to authorize travel expenses or junior counsel.

Shortly before trial, the accused successfully applied for a 'Fisher' order requiring Legal Aid or the Crown to pay these expenses to ensure a fair trial.

The Crown and Legal Aid appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and quashed the order, holding that the state has no positive obligation to fund counsel of choice except in rare circumstances where a fair trial is otherwise impossible.

The court found no evidence that local competent counsel were unavailable or that the accused's right to a fair trial was imperilled.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual interference and sought leave to appeal his sentence of two years less a day.

He argued the trial judge erred in admitting similar act evidence, failing to resolve an alleged recantation by a witness, and failing to properly consider collusion.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the admission of the similar act evidence and noting the verdict was amply supported by the uncontradicted evidence of the complainant.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the appellant was in a position of trust, the abuse occurred over six years, and he had a prior criminal record.