Steve Coroza

Media organizations challenged the constitutionality of the mandatory publication ban on bail hearing information under s. 517 of the Criminal Code, arguing it unjustifiably infringed freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada upheld the constitutionality of the provision.

The Court found that while the mandatory ban limits freedom of expression, it is justified under s. 1 of the Charter.

The ban's objectives of safeguarding the right to a fair trial and ensuring expeditious bail hearings are pressing and substantial.

The mandatory nature of the ban is rationally connected to these objectives, minimally impairs freedom of expression given its temporary nature and limited scope, and its salutary effects outweigh its deleterious effects.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentence for trafficking in cocaine, possession of the proceeds of crime, offering to sell cocaine, and possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

At trial, the appellant's primary defence was mistaken identification, claiming he did not sell drugs to the undercover officer and offering exculpatory explanations for circumstantial evidence.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's appreciation of the evidence or legal analysis, noting the trial judge's conclusions were reasonable and grounded in the evidence.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the sentence was appropriate given the seriousness of the offences, the appellant's lengthy record, and the paramount considerations of denunciation and deterrence.

The Crown appealed the 18-month sentences imposed on the respondents for money laundering offences.

The Court of Appeal found that while the sentencing judge erred by criticizing the police sting aspect of the case, this error did not detract from his careful review of the aggravating and mitigating factors.

The court concluded that the sentences were not manifestly unfit and dismissed the appeal.

Media organizations appealed orders upholding a mandatory publication ban imposed under s. 517 of the Criminal Code during terrorism-related bail proceedings and interpreting the ban to apply to all jointly charged accused when requested by one accused.

The Court of Appeal held the appeal should be heard despite mootness because the issue was recurring, evasive of review, and remained adversarial.

A majority held that the mandatory ban infringed s. 2(b) of the Charter and was justified under s. 1 only where the charges may be tried by a jury; the provision was therefore read down to that extent.

The interpretation ruling applying the ban to all jointly charged accused was upheld, and no costs were awarded.

The appellant was convicted of importing cocaine and sentenced to five years and four months imprisonment.

Following the verdict, a juror approached court officers expressing fear of retaliation from other jurors.

The trial judge held a brief recorded meeting with the officers in the absence of the accused and counsel, later providing them with the transcript.

On appeal, the appellant argued this violated her right to be present at her trial under s. 650(1) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the initial meeting was not part of the trial and the trial judge acted appropriately.

The Court also rejected arguments regarding fresh evidence of jury impropriety, evidence of impecuniosity, jury instructions, and the sentence imposed.

The appellant appealed his drug-related conviction on the sole ground that the trial judge failed to warn the jury not to engage in propensity reasoning.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that since identity was the sole issue and all evidence was admissible on all counts, the requested warning would have confused the jury and would not have benefited the appellant.

The Crown appealed the sentences imposed on three respondents.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the sentences for Robert Thiffeault Jr. and Robert Thiffeault Sr. given their minor involvement and mitigating factors.

For Donald Harrison, the Court found the trial judge erred as his role was more significant and warranted a reformatory sentence.

However, based on fresh evidence and his compliance with his conditional sentence, the Court declined to incarcerate him.

The appeals were dismissed.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on a charge of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

At trial, the judge excluded hearsay statements made by a drug dealer to an alleged supplier, finding that a buyer and seller do not share a common purpose under the first step of the Carter test for the joint venturer exception.

The respondent conceded this was an error of law.

The Court of Appeal held that the relationship between a buyer and seller of drugs is capable of giving rise to a finding of common purpose.

The appeal was allowed, the acquittal set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence.

Based on a concession by the Crown, which the Court of Appeal found to be proper and correct, the appeal was allowed, the conviction was quashed, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for possession for the purpose of trafficking, arguing that the offence was not known to law.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting that previous binding decisions had already rejected this argument and confirmed the offence remained in full force and effect.

The court also found no merit in the appellant's arguments regarding the Crown's exercise of discretion and the trial judge's refusal to hear a late Charter argument.

The appellants appealed their convictions for production and possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking, arguing that the prohibitions were invalid and inoperative.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, noting that previous jurisprudence, including R. v. Turmel and Hitzig v. Canada, had already rejected the argument that section 5(2) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act was invalid.

Any constitutional invalidity regarding medical access had been remedied by the Marihuana Medical Access Regulations.

The appellant was convicted of two counts of trafficking cocaine based on police eyewitness identification.

He appealed the convictions, arguing the trial judge's charge to the jury was deficient.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding the trial judge erred by failing to instruct the jury to consider the identification evidence for each count separately, and by failing to relate the general caution on eyewitness identification to the specific weaknesses in the evidence raised by the defence.

The appellant appealed his convictions for importing narcotics, arguing that the trial judge erred in his jury instructions regarding the assessment of witness credibility, the appellant's videotaped statement, and the position of the defence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the instructions on credibility and the videotaped statement were fair and did not subject the appellant's statement to special scrutiny.

Although the trial judge's summary of the defence position was brief, the single issue of lack of knowledge was made crystal clear to the jury throughout the charge.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed by the trial judge, arguing that the judge erred in departing from a joint submission.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge articulated the proper test for departing from a joint submission and correctly concluded that the proposed sentence was wholly inadequate given the appellant's two prior recent convictions for the same offence.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge misapprehended evidence, gave insufficient reasons, and erred in admitting evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge's reasons for rejecting the appellant's evidence were cogent and sufficient.

The Court also held that any Charter breach was minor and admission of the evidence would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed her conviction, arguing the trial judge failed to provide adequate reasons.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding the one-page judgment insufficient for a serious charge resulting in a 15-month sentence.

The trial judge failed to adequately explain why he disbelieved the appellant, contrary to the requirements in R. v. Sheppard, and failed to address relevant evidence.

The appeal was allowed and the conviction quashed.

Given the frail Crown case and that the sentence had been fully served, the Court stayed the charge rather than ordering a new trial.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of crack cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and his sentence of two and a half years.

He argued his rights under sections 8 and 9 of the Charter were violated during his arrest.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, agreeing with the trial judge that the officers had a legitimate reason to investigate the appellant.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the sentence was within the appropriate range and no error in principle was made.

The appellant was convicted of importing cocaine after it was found in her luggage at Pearson Airport.

She appealed, arguing the trial judge made errors in the jury charge.

The Court of Appeal found two errors: the trial judge improperly instructed the jury that they could only draw inferences from evidence they accepted as fact, which shifted the burden of proof, and improperly instructed them that there was no evidence the cocaine was part of someone else's project, which undermined the core of the defence.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of marijuana for the purposes of trafficking and his 22-month sentence.

He argued that he was arbitrarily detained, unreasonably searched, and that his s. 10(b) Charter rights were breached.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding that the police had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest based on intercepted communications and observations, and that the trial judge properly admitted the evidence despite a marginal s. 10(b) breach.

However, the Court allowed the sentence appeal, reducing the sentence to 18 months to credit the appellant for time served on subsequent charges that were withdrawn.

The appellant appealed his convictions, challenging the trial judge's dismissal of his application under ss. 8 and 9 of the Charter and her handling of a juror's reaction during cross-examination.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's factual findings regarding police testimony and her conclusion that no Charter violations occurred.

The Court also found that the trial judge's mid-trial instructions were a suitable response to the juror's conduct, noting that defence counsel had not sought a mistrial.

The appeal was dismissed.