Steve Coroza

The appellant was convicted of importing 603 grams of heroin and a switch blade into Canada.

He appealed his convictions and sentences.

On the conviction appeal, he argued the trial judge erred in admitting evidence of a narcotics identification kit (N.I.K.) test.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the evidence flowed naturally from cross-examination and the jury was properly instructed not to use the N.I.K. results to resolve the issue of continuity.

On the sentence appeal, the Court found the trial judge erred by treating the weapon as an aggravating factor for the heroin charge while also imposing a consecutive sentence for the weapon.

The sentence appeal was allowed, and the one-year sentence for the weapon was made concurrent to the 12-year sentence for importing heroin.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of a young person.

The trial judge had excluded evidence based on the conduct of security guards.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that under R. v. Buhay, the security guards were not police agents and therefore not subject to the Charter.

The acquittal was set aside and a new trial ordered.

The appellant brought an appeal against the sentence imposed by the lower court.

The Court of Appeal reviewed the matter to determine if the sentencing judge erred.

The court concluded that there was no error in principle in the sentencing of the appellant.

Consequently, leave to appeal the sentence was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime, as well as his sentence.

He argued that the trial judge failed to instruct the jury to consider charges separately, that a strip search violated his Charter rights, and that a police expert gave inadmissible evidence on the ultimate issue.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no miscarriage of justice in the jury instructions, an inadequate record for the Charter claim, and that the expert evidence was admissible under the Mohan criteria.

The appellant appealed his conviction for importing cocaine, arguing the trial judge improperly lumped his case with his co-accused and erred in rejecting his evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge explicitly considered the evidence against each accused separately and properly applied the standard of proof in rejecting the appellant's testimony.

The appellant appealed her conviction for importing cocaine, arguing the trial judge's verdict was unreasonable due to misapprehension of evidence, reliance on improper factors in assessing credibility, and failure to consider defence submissions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge carefully reviewed a wide range of factors, her credibility findings were supported by the evidence, and she had properly considered counsel's submissions.

The appellant was convicted of trafficking and possession for the purpose of trafficking in cocaine.

During the trial, hearsay evidence regarding the seizure of buy money from the appellant was admitted in anticipation of a Crown witness who was ultimately not called.

The trial judge refused a mistrial application and instructed the jury that there was no evidence of buy money being found on the appellant.

On appeal, the appellant argued a mistrial should have been declared and that the jury charge was inappropriate.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no tactical prejudice and concluding that the jury charge adequately addressed the issue and was arguably generous to the appellant.

The appellant appealed her custodial sentence for cocaine trafficking.

The trial judge had rejected a conditional sentence on the basis that general deterrence and denunciation required a custodial sentence.

Relying on the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in R. v. Proulx, the Court of Appeal held that general deterrence and denunciation can be met by a conditional sentence even in cocaine trafficking cases.

Given the appellant's full rehabilitation over four years on bail, the appeal was allowed and the sentence varied to a 13-month conditional sentence.