Heather Pringle

The appellant appealed from a conviction entered after pleading guilty to carrying a concealed weapon contrary to s. 90(2) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown had elected to proceed by indictment.

The critical issue was whether the trial court had jurisdiction to receive the guilty plea.

The appellant was entitled to elect his mode of trial under s. 536(2) of the Criminal Code, but was never put to his election.

The court found that the failure to comply with the election requirements went to the jurisdiction of the trial court and could not be cured by the procedural proviso.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial was ordered.

The Crown appealed from an acquittal on second degree murder and conviction for manslaughter.

The respondent stabbed and killed his girlfriend, admitting to the killing but claiming lack of intent for murder or alternatively acting under provocation.

The jury found him not guilty of murder but guilty of manslaughter.

The Crown advanced two grounds of appeal: whether the trial judge erred in leaving the provocation defence with the jury, and whether expert psychiatric evidence was admissible.

The appellate court dismissed the first ground, finding the Crown could not advance a contradictory position on appeal after accepting provocation was available at trial.

However, the court allowed the appeal on the second ground, finding significant portions of the psychiatrist's evidence regarding the accused's disposition and mental state were inadmissible as they invaded the jury's province and went beyond the proper scope of expert psychiatric opinion.

The court ordered a new trial on the charge of second degree murder.

The defendant was charged with refusing to provide a breath sample following a three-vehicle motor vehicle accident.

The Crown alleged the defendant refused to comply with a lawful demand under section 254(2) of the Criminal Code.

The defence challenged the lawfulness of the demand on four grounds: lack of subjective reasonable grounds to suspect alcohol consumption, lack of objective reasonableness, absence of evidence of driving within three hours, and failure to convey the mandatory nature of the demand.

The court found the officer had reasonable grounds to suspect based on the defendant's statement regarding his G-2 driver's licence jeopardy and that the defendant was driving within the relevant timeframe.

However, the court found the officer's presentation of the demand created ambiguity regarding its mandatory nature, leaving reasonable doubt as to whether the defendant actually refused or misunderstood his obligations.

The appellant was convicted of possession of child pornography under s. 163.1(4) of the Criminal Code based on 55 images found in the temporary Internet files on a shared computer.

The trial judge misapprehended expert evidence regarding how images are automatically cached in temporary Internet files, incorrectly concluding the appellant had deliberately downloaded the images.

The summary conviction appeal judge similarly misapprehended the evidence and dismissed the appeal.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal and set aside the conviction, finding that accessing child pornography is not a lesser included offence of possession, and that amending the information to charge accessing would prejudice the appellant.

The appellant appealed convictions under s. 259(4)(b) of the Criminal Code for driving while disqualified.

The appellant also challenged a forfeiture order that included his pick-up truck, alleged that police seized items outside the scope of the forfeiture order, and sought variation of a probation condition prohibiting possession of housebreaking tools that prevented him from working in construction.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions and forfeiture order but approved a variation of the probation condition to permit possession of tools required for his livelihood, subject to prior written approval of his probation officer.

On appeal from convictions for possession of controlled substances for the purpose of trafficking and simple possession, the appellants challenged the trial judge's findings.

The appellants, common law spouses, were convicted of two counts of possession of oxycodone and Percocet for trafficking purposes, and one count of simple possession of methadone.

The trial judge found both appellants in joint possession and guilty of trafficking.

The appellants appealed on grounds including misuse of prejudicial evidence regarding child endangerment and lack of mens rea.

The Court of Appeal allowed both appeals, finding the trial judge improperly admitted and relied upon evidence of child endangerment to infer trafficking intent, and that there was insufficient evidence of the mens rea required for the respondent's conviction.

The Lewis cousins were found guilty of aggravated assault following a jury trial, resulting from an attack that left Ryan Turcotte with a severe brain injury.

This decision outlines their sentences.

The court considered aggravating factors such as the unprovoked group attack, Turcotte's defenselessness, the high likelihood of serious injury, the extent of the injury, and the offenders fleeing the scene.

Mitigating factors included their youth, lack of prior criminal record, solid academic and work histories, strong family and community support, and the out-of-character nature of the offence.

The court emphasized denunciation and general deterrence as paramount sentencing objectives, imposing a sentence of two years less a day incarceration followed by three years probation for each offender, along with ancillary orders including a 20-year firearm prohibition, DNA sample provision, and no-contact orders.

The appellant appealed his summary conviction for assault causing bodily harm arising from a group altercation outside a restaurant.

At trial, the judge rejected the appellant's testimony that he was engaged in a consensual two-punch fight or acting in self-defence, instead accepting the Crown witnesses' evidence that the appellant and his friends engaged in a one-sided attack on the complainant.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge provided inadequate reasons, failed to properly apply the W.(D.) framework for assessing credibility, and erred in assessing reliability.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's reasons were adequate, the burden of proof was correctly applied, and the credibility findings were reasonable.

Thirty‑three accused sought exclusion of wiretap evidence arising from “Project Marvel,” a large police investigation into shootings, robbery, and organized gang activity in Toronto.

The applicants argued the authorizations violated s. 8 of the Charter because the police failed to establish “investigative necessity” under s. 186(1)(b) of the Criminal Code and improperly named certain individuals as “known persons” under s. 185(1)(e).

The court applied the deferential Garofoli review standard and held the authorizing judge had a reasonable basis to conclude investigative necessity existed despite alternative investigative techniques such as cell‑phone analysis.

The court further held that the challenged individuals were properly named as targets because interception of their communications could assist the investigation and the statutory threshold is low.

A separate sub‑facial challenge relating to the search of a backyard shed and the curtilage doctrine was also rejected.

The accused pleaded guilty to multiple drug trafficking charges, including the sale of a half kilogram of heroin to an undercover police officer.

He subsequently brought an application to stay the proceedings on the basis of entrapment, arguing that a police agent induced him to sell the drugs in exchange for documents related to a civil lawsuit.

The court rejected the accused's evidence, finding that he had a personal financial stake in the transactions and was not induced by the offer of documents.

The entrapment application was dismissed.

The offender, a repeat firearms offender with an extensive criminal record, was convicted of possessing a loaded prohibited firearm and breaching a lifetime weapons prohibition order for the fifth time.

The Crown sought a 20-year sentence, while the defence argued for 7 to 8 years.

The court found that the offender's repeated failure to abide by firearms laws and prior lenient sentences meant rehabilitation was not a significant factor, prioritizing specific deterrence and public protection.

The court imposed a total sentence of 11.5 years, consisting of 9 years for the firearms possession and a consecutive 2.5 years for breaching the prohibition order, reduced to 7.5 years net after granting enhanced credit for pre-sentence custody.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for having care or control of a motor vehicle with a blood‑alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit.

She argued the trial judge’s extensive interventions during the examination and cross‑examination of a key police witness compromised the appearance of trial fairness and that the trial judge’s reasons were inadequate.

The Superior Court held that the trial judge improperly usurped the role of Crown counsel by conducting most of the examination‑in‑chief, directing witnesses how to answer, and interfering with defence cross‑examination.

Considering the cumulative effect of these interventions, a reasonable observer would conclude that the accused did not receive a fair trial.

The conviction was therefore set aside and a new trial ordered.

The accused applied for production of investigative records from the Special Investigations Unit arising from his arrest during the execution of a search warrant, during which he sustained serious injuries.

The application was brought to support a potential Charter application seeking a stay of proceedings under ss. 7, 12, and 24(1).

Applying the framework from R. v. O’Connor, the court balanced the accused’s right to make full answer and defence against the confidentiality interests asserted by the SIU.

The court found the SIU witness interviews and follow-up reports highly probative of the circumstances of the arrest and necessary for the accused’s Charter claims.

The privacy interests asserted by the SIU were limited because the statements related to officers performing public duties and confidentiality promises were not absolute.

Production of the reports and interviews to the defence was ordered subject to standard disclosure conditions.

The Crown appealed a sentence imposed following a guilty plea to sexual interference involving a child under 16.

The trial judge had imposed the statutory minimum sentence of 14 days' imprisonment and probation.

The appeal court found multiple errors in principle, including misapprehension of a psychiatric report, failure to properly consider aggravating factors, and improper characterization of the offence as being at the low end of seriousness.

Although the appellate court concluded that the sentence was manifestly unfit and that a range of six to twelve months would ordinarily be appropriate, it declined to intervene due to significant delays and the respondent’s completion of the custodial portion of the sentence and substantial compliance with probation.

The Crown appeal was therefore dismissed.

The Criminal Lawyers' Association applied on behalf of Salma Jaffer for court-assessed fees above the legal aid rate of $88.00 per hour for work performed as amicus curiae in a serious sexual offence case.

The defendant was charged with multiple serious sexual offences, had difficulty maintaining solicitor-client relationships, and had questionable fitness.

The court appointed Jaffer as amicus to assist in ensuring the preliminary inquiry proceeded while protecting the defendant's fair trial interests.

The court granted the application and set Jaffer's remuneration at $150 per hour, finding that while the legal aid tariff is a significant factor, it is not conclusive and must be balanced against counsel's experience, the importance and complexity of the assignment, and the broader interests of the administration of justice.