Geoffrey Roy

Two appellants challenged convictions for possession of fentanyl and crystal methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime after searches of two suspected stash houses.

The court held the trial judge erred in denying standing to advance a s. 8 Charter challenge because the prosecution theory itself alleged use and control of the properties, which had to be weighed in the totality of circumstances.

The court nevertheless rejected the argument that the verdicts were unreasonable, finding the circumstantial evidence was capable of supporting possession findings for each appellant in relation to White Oak.

The convictions were set aside and a new trial was ordered.

Following a joint trial, both appellants challenged convictions for possession of cocaine for trafficking and related proceeds offences, largely on factual grounds.

The court found no basis to interfere with the trial findings.

Leave to appeal sentence for one appellant was granted but dismissed on the merits.

The appellant was convicted of importing a controlled substance (cocaine) and sentenced to six years' imprisonment.

He appealed both his conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's decision to exclude a prior exculpatory statement under the Edgar exception, the application of the W.(D.) analysis, or the treatment of circumstantial evidence.

The court also dismissed the sentence appeal, affirming the trial judge's imposition of a sentence at the low end of the established range for cocaine importation, and clarified the reconciliation of the Cunningham sentencing range with the proportionality principles emphasized in Parranto.

The appellant, Gianluca Salvati, appealed his convictions for multiple drug offences, possession of proceeds of crime, and breach of a bail recognizance.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal.

The court upheld the trial judge's findings regarding constructive possession of drugs and proceeds, finding no misapprehension of evidence or reversal of the burden of proof.

On the breach of recognizance charge, the court found that an uncertified photocopy of the bail recognizance was properly admissible under the common law public or judicial documents exception to the hearsay rule, despite the trial judge having admitted it under the principled exception.

Mohammad Golizadeh pleaded guilty to possessing 28 kilograms of opium for the purpose of trafficking.

The Crown sought a 7.5-year custodial sentence, while the defence proposed a conditional sentence of 2 years less a day.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the large quantity of opium and the sophisticated, ongoing nature of the scheme, and mitigating factors such as his first offender status, guilty plea, remorse, addiction as a contributing factor, and strong family support.

The judge imposed a 4-year custodial sentence, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence while acknowledging rehabilitation and restraint principles.

The appellant, a pharmacist, was convicted of trafficking in fentanyl and sentenced to 13 years in prison.

She appealed her convictions, arguing that her s. 8 Charter rights were violated when police obtained information about her pharmacy from the regulatory college without a warrant, and that the search warrant for her home lacked sufficient grounds.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no reasonable expectation of privacy in the regulatory information and sufficient grounds for the warrant.

However, the Court allowed the sentence appeal, reducing the sentence to 8 years due to the extraordinary collateral consequences of a rare genetic disease affecting both the appellant and her young daughter.

The applicant brought an application for a stay of proceedings, arguing his s. 11(b) Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time was infringed.

The total delay from the charge date to the anticipated end of trial was 56.5 months.

After deducting 7 months for defence-caused delay and 14 months for exceptional circumstances related to the COVID-19 pandemic, the remaining delay was 35.5 months.

As this exceeded the 30-month presumptive ceiling for superior courts and the Crown advanced no argument on complexity, the court found the delay presumptively unreasonable.

The application was granted and the charges were stayed.

The appellant, Todd Kehoe, appealed his conviction for trafficking in fentanyl patches, knowingly causing a person to use forged fentanyl patches, and obtaining merchandise by false pretenses.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's s. 24(2) ruling, which dismissed an application to exclude evidence arising from an alleged s. 8 Charter breach.

The Court of Appeal did not need to definitively rule on the s. 8 issue, finding no error in the trial judge's s. 24(2) analysis, which properly engaged with a Grant analysis and was owed deference.

The appeal was dismissed.

The offender was found guilty by a jury of attempting to import one kilogram of cocaine and attempting to possess it for the purpose of trafficking.

The Crown sought a three-year custodial sentence, while the defence sought a conditional sentence.

The court considered extensive social context evidence detailing the offender's experiences with anti-Black racism, poverty, and systemic disadvantages.

Finding that her moral culpability was reduced by her minor role as a courier and her significant rehabilitative efforts, the court imposed a conditional sentence of two years less a day, followed by three years of probation.

The appellant, Farhad Feizi, appealed his conviction for opium importation, arguing that evidence from a controlled delivery and search should have been excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The challenge stemmed from inaccurate address information in the Information to Obtain (ITO) for the general warrant.

The trial judge allowed the Crown to amplify the ITO, finding the errors were made in good faith and were minor/technical.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, affirming that amplification is permissible for minor, good-faith errors, even if they relate to essential components of a search warrant application, and that appellate deference is owed to such findings.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant pleaded guilty to possession of a narcotic for the purposes of trafficking.

The Crown conceded the appeal, acknowledging that trial counsel unintentionally misled the appellant regarding the immigration consequences of his guilty plea, which were central to his decision.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the guilty plea, quashed the conviction, and ordered a new trial.

The accused brought a Charter application seeking to exclude evidence obtained during a traffic stop and subsequent warrantless vehicle search, arguing breaches of ss. 8, 9, and 10 of the Charter.

The accused was under police surveillance for suspected drug trafficking and was pulled over after failing to signal a lane change.

The court found the detention was lawful as the police had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest for drug possession, and the traffic stop was not a mere ruse.

Although the Crown conceded a breach of the accused's s. 10 rights because the officer asked about the contents of a bag before advising of the right to counsel, the court applied the Grant framework and concluded the evidence should not be excluded under s. 24(2).

The application was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for trafficking in cannabis, arguing the verdict was unreasonable as the evidence only supported personal use.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the wiretap evidence supported the trial judge's conclusion.

However, the Court noted that the appellant's criminal record incorrectly reflected a Schedule I offence instead of a Schedule II offence.

The Court ordered that the record be corrected as soon as possible.

The court considered an application under s. 24(2) of the Charter of Rights to exclude evidence (drugs and proceeds of crime) seized from an apartment.

In a prior decision, the police were found to have breached the accused's s. 8 Charter rights by entering and searching the apartment without reasonable and probable grounds.

Applying the R. v. Grant test, the court found the state conduct to be careless and serious, the impact on the accused's privacy interests in their home to be significant, and that admitting the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

Consequently, the seized evidence was excluded from trial.

The offender, a medical doctor, was convicted by a jury of trafficking in fentanyl.

He participated in a scheme with a pharmacist and others, prescribing over 4,000 fentanyl patches for financial gain.

The court found his actions constituted a severe breach of trust motivated by greed.

Emphasizing general deterrence and denunciation, the court sentenced the offender to 12 years in prison, along with ancillary orders.

The appellant was convicted of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking contrary to section 5(2) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act and sentenced to one year imprisonment.

He appealed his conviction, challenging the validity of production orders and tracking warrants obtained through informations to obtain that relied on information from two confidential informants.

The trial judge applied the Debot factors and found reasonable grounds to support the authorizations.

The appellant argued the trial judge misapplied the legal test and erred in assessing the reliability of the confidential informants' information.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding no error in the trial judge's application of the correct statutory test or her analysis of the Debot factors.

The accused, charged with possession of drugs for the purpose of trafficking, challenged the validity of search warrants executed at their residences under section 8 of the Charter.

The warrants were based heavily on information from two confidential informants, which was substantially redacted in the Information to Obtain (ITO) to protect informer privilege.

Applying the Garofoli Step 6 procedure and the Debot inquiries, the court found that the redacted ITO, even with Crown summaries, lacked sufficient reliable and compelling evidence to establish reasonable and probable grounds.

The police surveillance failed to meaningfully corroborate the informants' tips regarding the presence of drugs at the target address.

Consequently, the court ruled the warrants invalid and the subsequent searches and arrests unlawful.

The offender, a pharmacist, was convicted of trafficking and possession for the purpose of trafficking fentanyl.

She participated in a scheme with a doctor and another individual to divert thousands of fentanyl patches using false prescriptions.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence, noting the severe breach of trust and the devastating impact of fentanyl.

Despite the offender's rare medical condition and lack of a criminal record, the court imposed a global sentence of 13 years imprisonment.

Dr. Otto, charged with fentanyl trafficking, faced a parallel professional discipline investigation by the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario (CPSO).

During the CPSO investigation, Dr. Otto provided a statutorily compelled statement and patient files.

The Crown sought a ruling on the voluntariness and admissibility of this compelled statement and the use of the patient files in the criminal trial, arguing for its use for impeachment purposes if Dr. Otto testified.

The defence sought exclusion of the statement for all purposes and challenged the production order used to obtain the CPSO file.

The court found the statement voluntary and not made to a person in authority, but nevertheless excluded it for all purposes under s. 24(1) of the Charter, applying the principles from R. v. White and R. v. Soules.

The court upheld the production order for the CPSO file, finding sufficient grounds even after excising information derived from the compelled statement.

The patient files were deemed admissible as they were created as part of a regulated profession, not compelled by the state in an adversarial context.

The defendant, Dr. George Otto, brought an application under s. 24(2) of the Charter to exclude evidence following findings of s. 8 Charter violations related to search warrants and production orders for electronic devices in a fentanyl trafficking case.

The court applied the R. v. Grant framework, balancing the seriousness of the state's conduct, the impact on the accused's Charter interests, and society's interest in adjudication on the merits.

While acknowledging significant privacy impacts, the court found the police conduct was not deliberate or flagrant, and the evidence was reliable and crucial to the Crown's serious case.

Ultimately, the court determined that admitting the evidence would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute, and its exclusion would.