Jassi Vamadevan

Two appellants challenged convictions for possession of fentanyl and crystal methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime after searches of two suspected stash houses.

The court held the trial judge erred in denying standing to advance a s. 8 Charter challenge because the prosecution theory itself alleged use and control of the properties, which had to be weighed in the totality of circumstances.

The court nevertheless rejected the argument that the verdicts were unreasonable, finding the circumstantial evidence was capable of supporting possession findings for each appellant in relation to White Oak.

The convictions were set aside and a new trial was ordered.

The applicant sought relief in an appeal before the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The court reviewed the record and applied the governing legal and procedural standards, including deference to factual and discretionary determinations where required.

The matter concluded with the following disposition: Appeal dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault against a resident of a group home who had Down syndrome.

At trial, the Crown successfully applied to admit the complainant's hearsay statements to personal support workers without calling the complainant to testify, and without expert evidence that testifying would cause trauma.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding the trial judge erred in concluding the hearsay evidence was necessary without first hearing directly from the complainant or receiving expert evidence regarding potential trauma.

Following a joint trial, both appellants challenged convictions for possession of cocaine for trafficking and related proceeds offences, largely on factual grounds.

The court found no basis to interfere with the trial findings.

Leave to appeal sentence for one appellant was granted but dismissed on the merits.

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault with a weapon and sexual assault against his wife.

The appellant alleged that the trial judge erred by reversing the onus of proof, failing to adequately explain credibility findings, engaging in propensity reasoning, and improperly applying the rule in Browne v. Dunn.

The Court of Appeal found no basis for intervention and dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's credibility assessments and acceptance of the complainant's testimony as confirmed by a recorded conversation.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario allowed Adam Chiarelli’s appeal from his conviction for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

The court found that the trial judge erred by failing to provide a limiting instruction regarding inadmissible opinion evidence given by police officers about items found in the vehicle being “consistent with drug trafficking.” The court dismissed other grounds of appeal, including the lack of a Vetrovec caution and the reasonableness of the verdict, but concluded the error was not minor and the curative proviso did not apply.

A new trial was ordered.

The appellant, Karanjot Parhar, appealed his eight-month custodial sentence for offences related to a car theft ring, arguing that the sentencing judge failed to consider credit for time spent on restrictive pretrial bail (Downes credit).

The court found that the sentencing judge erred in principle by not addressing Downes credit, and that this error impacted the sentence.

After reviewing the facts and the length and restrictiveness of the appellant’s pretrial bail, the court reduced the sentence to five months in custody, dismissing the Crown’s cross-appeal for a longer sentence.

The defendant, Dajour Campbell, was convicted after trial of possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking, dangerous operation of a motor vehicle, and flight from police.

The conviction for simple possession of fentanyl was conditionally stayed.

The Crown sought a sentence of 6-8 years for the drug offence and a consecutive 4-month sentence for the driving offences.

The defence argued for a conditional sentence of less than two years for the drug offence, contending that Campbell's lack of knowledge that the substance was fentanyl (believing it to be Percocet) should mitigate his moral blameworthiness, and a concurrent 90-day intermittent sentence for the driving offences.

The court imposed a sentence of 3 years for possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking, and 3 months concurrent for dangerous driving and flight from police, to be served consecutively to the drug offence, for a total of 39 months imprisonment.

The court rejected the argument that Campbell's lack of knowledge about the specific controlled substance (fentanyl vs. Percocet) mitigated his moral blameworthiness, citing jurisprudence that knowledge of a controlled substance is sufficient.

The court also declined to apply systemic racism as a mitigating factor without a demonstrated linkage to the offences.

The accused applied to exclude evidence seized under a search warrant, alleging violations of his s. 8 Charter rights due to misleading statements and insufficient grounds in the Information to Obtain (ITO).

The court dismissed the application, finding that while the affiant's conduct was negligent, it did not subvert the prior authorization process.

Even after excising false statements from the ITO, sufficient grounds remained to issue the warrant, thus no Charter violation was established.

This document serves as a formal header for an appeal decision, primarily noting the imposition and continuation of a publication ban under section 539 of the Criminal Code.

It explicitly states that the full judgment is subject to a statutory non-publication order, pending the outcome of the underlying trial, and is therefore not publicly accessible.

The document outlines the specific provisions of section 539 regarding the restriction of evidence publication from preliminary inquiries.

The defendant was charged with multiple drug and driving offences following a police pursuit.

The court determined the defendant was the driver of the vehicle.

The defendant was convicted of possession of fentanyl, possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking, dangerous driving, and flight from police.

Acquittals were entered for public mischief, possession of cocaine, heroin, and oxycodone, and possession of cocaine and heroin for the purpose of trafficking, primarily due to insufficient evidence of the defendant's knowledge and control over substances found in other locations or misidentification of the substance.

The accused brought an application under sections 8, 9, and 24(2) of the Charter to exclude firearms and drugs seized from his residence.

The police had arrested the accused and another suspect, entered the accused's residence without a warrant claiming exigent circumstances, and later obtained a search warrant based on information from a confidential informant.

The court found the search warrant invalid, as the information provided by the informant lacked sufficient compelling and corroborated details to establish reasonable and probable grounds that the evidence sought would be found in the residence.

The court also found the initial warrantless entry, the arrest, and the vehicle search to be unlawful.

Applying the Grant framework, the court concluded that the multiple, serious Charter breaches warranted the exclusion of the evidence under s. 24(2), despite the seriousness of the firearms offences.

The defendants in a drug and proceeds offence case sought standing to challenge search warrants under the Charter.

The court dismissed the application for standing for all defendants except one (Taylor Brennan, whose charges were later stayed), finding that they failed to prove a sufficient connection to the searched properties to establish a reasonable expectation of privacy on a balance of probabilities.

The decision reiterates that the onus is on the defendant to prove standing and discusses the application of the Edwards factors and the normative vs. categorical approach to Charter standing.

The applicant brought a section 8 Charter application to exclude evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant, arguing the Information to Obtain (ITO) was misleading and failed to disclose reasonable grounds.

The court applied the standard of review for search warrants, finding that despite some minor errors and omissions, the amplified record contained reliable evidence that might reasonably be believed on which the warrant could have issued.

The court found reasonable grounds to believe the applicant was involved in a bank fraud scheme and that evidence would be found in his home and vehicle.

The application was dismissed.