Peter Kott

The court considered whether police infringed the accused’s rights under sections 10(a) and 10(b) of the Charter by delaying the right to counsel and failing to promptly inform him of increased jeopardy after a search revealed drugs and a gun.

The court found breaches of both rights but concluded, after a Grant analysis, that the evidence should not be excluded.

The application to exclude the evidence was dismissed.

Katie Brittain was charged with possession of cocaine and fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking.

At a preliminary inquiry, the court assessed the admissibility of an utterance made by Brittain to police and the sufficiency of evidence for committal to trial.

The court found the utterance was not spontaneous, was made while Brittain was detained/arrested and uncauioned, and therefore not voluntary and inadmissible.

Without the utterance, there was insufficient evidence to establish knowledge, possession, and control of the seized drugs.

Consequently, the accused was discharged.

The defendant was charged with multiple drug and driving offences following a police pursuit.

The court determined the defendant was the driver of the vehicle.

The defendant was convicted of possession of fentanyl, possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking, dangerous driving, and flight from police.

Acquittals were entered for public mischief, possession of cocaine, heroin, and oxycodone, and possession of cocaine and heroin for the purpose of trafficking, primarily due to insufficient evidence of the defendant's knowledge and control over substances found in other locations or misidentification of the substance.

The defendant, Jonathan Williams, was found guilty by a jury of harbouring a person to facilitate the sale of sexual services (s. 286.3 Criminal Code) and receiving financial benefit from the commission of such an offence (s. 286.2 Criminal Code).

The Crown sought a three-year sentence, while the defendant requested an 18-month conditional sentence.

The court rejected the conditional sentence, emphasizing the need for denunciation and general deterrence in human trafficking cases, which are considered inherently violent and exploitative.

The judge imposed a concurrent sentence of 28 months for harbouring and 20 months for receiving financial benefit, along with a three-year no-contact order and a DNA order.

The court considered mitigating factors such as the defendant being a first-time offender with strong community support and low risk of re-offending, but found the aggravating factors, including exploitation of trust and control over the victim's sexual services, to be more compelling.

The defendants, Michael Buckley and Dwayne Young, were charged with first-degree murder in the death of Jonathan Wite.

They pleaded not guilty to murder but guilty to manslaughter, which the Crown did not accept.

The trial proceeded to determine guilt for first-degree murder, second-degree murder, or manslaughter.

The court found that the Crown failed to prove first-degree or second-degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt, concluding that the incident was a "robbery gone wrong" rather than a planned murder.

Both defendants were found guilty of manslaughter based on common unlawful purpose and objective foreseeability of harm.

Robin Maharaj was found guilty on ten counts of knowingly making false or misleading statements to the Workplace Safety and Insurance Board (WSIB), defrauding the WSIB of over $100,000 over four years.

The court applied principles of regulatory sentencing, drawing from criminal law, emphasizing general and specific deterrence, proportionality, and parity.

Aggravating factors included the premeditated nature of the fraud, its duration, the significant amount defrauded, and the offender's lengthy criminal record for fraud.

Mitigating factors, including the offender's severe health issues, were considered but outweighed by the aggravating factors.

The court imposed a total custodial sentence of 300 days (30 days consecutive on each of the ten counts).

The Crown brought a motion to admit excerpts of audio-video recordings from police cells, containing alleged party admissions by the accused, Jordan Nicholas and Reymon Duncan-Jones.

The defence opposed, arguing issues of context, audio quality, and potential prejudice.

Applying the principles from R v Schneider, the court found the evidence relevant and admissible as party admissions, noting that such evidence is rarely excluded.

The court determined that concerns regarding context and quality were matters of weight for the jury, to be addressed through appropriate jury instructions.

The Crown's application was granted.

This is an application by the accused for a stay of prosecution due to unreasonable delay, pursuant to section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The total delay from arrest to anticipated trial completion was 31.4 months, exceeding the 30-month presumptive ceiling established by R. v. Jordan.

The court considered two discrete events as potential exceptional circumstances: a mistrial declared in March 2022 and delays caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court found that the mistrial was an exceptional circumstance, as the trial judge in the mistrial had assigned no blame to any party.

The court also found that a six-month period of delay was attributable to the pandemic, acknowledging inherent court system delays even pre-pandemic.

After deducting these periods, the net delay fell within the Jordan timeframe.

The application for a stay of proceedings was dismissed.

Mr. Williams, convicted of sex trade-related offenses, brought an application challenging the constitutionality of s. 286.1(1) of the Criminal Code, arguing it violated his rights under sections 7 (security of the person) and 2(b) (freedom of expression) of the Charter.

He contended the provision was overbroad and grossly disproportionate, exacerbating safety risks for sex workers by inhibiting communication.

The Crown argued the provision was constitutional, citing the secondary nature of safety concerns in the PCEPA amendments and the pressing objectives of reducing demand for prostitution.

The court found that s. 286.1(1) did not offend s. 7 but did offend s. 2(b) of the Charter.

However, the court concluded that the infringement of s. 2(b) was saved by section 1 of the Charter, as the objectives were pressing and substantial, the means were rationally connected and minimally impairing, and the benefits outweighed the harms.

The application was dismissed.

The accused brought an application for a stay of proceedings, arguing that his right to a trial within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter was violated.

The total delay to the expected time of trial was approximately 61 months.

The court applied the Jordan framework and deducted periods of defence delay and exceptional circumstances, including the COVID-19 pandemic, the complainant's pregnancy, a judge's illness, and a mistrial caused primarily by the Crown's failure to provide notice regarding a s. 276 issue.

The net delay was calculated at 23 months, well below the 30-month presumptive ceiling.

The application was dismissed.

The applicant sought a stay of extradition proceedings and a declaration that s. 4 of the Extradition Act was unconstitutional, arguing abuse of process and Charter s. 7 infringement due to a second extradition request after a prior discharge.

The court dismissed the application, finding that s. 4 of the Act explicitly permits further proceedings unless they constitute an abuse of process, and that the current proceedings, based on additional evidence, did not meet the high threshold for abuse of process or violate the principles of fundamental justice under s. 7 of the Charter.

This decision concerns a second extradition request by the United States for Mohamed Abdi Siyad, also known as "Hassan," for alleged human smuggling.

The respondent had been discharged in a previous extradition hearing because the judge was not satisfied on a balance of probabilities that he was the person sought.

In this second hearing, the court found sufficient prima facie evidence of conduct that would justify committal for trial in Canada under section 117(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.

Crucially, new fingerprint evidence, not available in the first hearing, satisfied the court on a balance of probabilities that the respondent was indeed the person sought by the requesting state.

The court ordered the respondent's committal into custody to await surrender.