Harval Singh Bassi

The defendant, Ahmed Noor, was sentenced after being found guilty of unlawful possession of a loaded handgun, unlawful possession of a firearm while prohibited, breaching a prohibition order, and failing to comply with bail.

He had been acquitted of intentionally discharging a firearm on grounds of self-defence.

The court considered aggravating factors, including his criminal record for violence and firearm use, the loaded semi-automatic handgun, and the deliberate and prolonged public possession while under house arrest.

Mitigating factors included his admission of the offences, remorse, physical injury sustained during the incident, systemic factors related to anti-Black racism, and harsh pre-sentence custody conditions.

The Crown sought a 9-year global sentence, while the defence sought 5 years.

The court imposed a global sentence of 7.5 years, comprising 6.5 years for the firearm offence and 12 months for the breaches, to be served consecutively.

The defendant, Michael Naser Philib Zakhari, was charged with sexual assault and sexual interference.

The Crown conceded reasonable doubt on the sexual assault charge.

The core issue for sexual interference was the defence of mistaken belief in age, specifically whether the defendant honestly believed the complainant was 16 or older and took all reasonable steps to ascertain her age.

The court found the complainant's evidence unreliable regarding impairment and inconsistencies.

Based on the evidence, including that the complainant and her friends actively misrepresented her age as 18, the court found that the defendant honestly believed the complainant was 18 and took all reasonable steps to ascertain her age.

Consequently, the defendant was acquitted of both charges.

The accused was charged with sexual interference, invitation to sexual touching, and sexual assault involving a 14-year-old complainant.

The alleged incidents occurred in the complainant's grandfather's basement where the accused resided.

The court heard evidence from the complainant, his mother, his grandfather, and the accused.

The judge applied principles of reasonable doubt and credibility assessment, including the W.(D.) framework and cautions against sexual offence myths.

While the accused's testimony was found to be incredible, and inconsistencies were noted in the complainant's and his family's evidence, the court ultimately found that the Crown had not proven the essential elements of the charges beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was acquitted of all charges.

The applicant, Jermaine Watson, charged with possession for the purpose of trafficking, brought an application to exclude evidence seized by police following his arrest and searches of his person and vehicle, alleging breaches of his Charter rights (ss. 7, 8, 9).

The court found that the police lacked reasonable and probable grounds for the warrantless arrest, making the subsequent searches unlawful.

Applying the Grant analysis, the court determined that the seriousness of the Charter-infringing state conduct (arrest without reasonable grounds, public search) and the significant impact on the accused's Charter-protected interests outweighed society's interest in the adjudication of the case on its merits, despite the reliability of the evidence.

The application to exclude the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter was granted.

This endorsement addresses the collapse of a scheduled two-day criminal trial due to the defendant's last-minute guilty plea, without prior notice to the court or Crown.

The court highlights this as an example of ongoing case management challenges in high-volume provincial courts, despite new procedures like Trial Confirmation Court.

The decision emphasizes that such occurrences lead to inefficient use of precious trial time, causing delays for other matters, and stresses the shared responsibility of all parties, including counsel, in ensuring the efficient administration of justice.

The accused was charged with sexual assault and being a party to sexual assault.

The central issues were the complainant's consent and capacity to consent.

The court applied the W.D. framework for credibility and considered circumstantial evidence, including the complainant's memory loss and expert testimony on drug/alcohol effects.

The court found that the Crown did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the complainant did not consent or lacked capacity.

The accused was acquitted of both charges.

This decision concerns the sentencing of Brandon Drakes-Simon and Jason Williams for attempt murder, following their conviction for first-degree murder of the same victim.

The attempt murder involved a planned shooting on a highway.

The court identified several aggravating factors, including the use of a firearm, possession of multiple illegal guns, Drakes-Simon's prior gun convictions, extreme recklessness endangering others, and a judicial finding that the crime was a contract killing.

Mitigating factors for Williams included his lack of a prior criminal record and strong family support.

The court imposed concurrent sentences of 16 years for Drakes-Simon and 11 years for Williams, both running concurrently with their life sentences for first-degree murder.

The applicant, Mohamed Mohamed, sought a stay of proceedings under ss. 11(b) and 24(1) of the Charter due to unreasonable delay.

The total delay from charge to anticipated trial end was 26 months and 12 days.

The defence conceded 3.5 months of delay.

The court found the Crown's failure to disclose the Information to Obtain (ITO) for 17.5 months was the primary cause of delay, as it was integral disclosure necessary for the defence to prepare.

The Crown's request for a blanket 4-month deduction for COVID-19 backlog was denied due to lack of evidentiary support demonstrating a causal link and mitigation efforts.

The net delay of approximately 23 months exceeded the 18-month Jordan ceiling for provincial court matters.

The application for a stay of proceedings was granted.

The defendants in a drug and proceeds offence case sought standing to challenge search warrants under the Charter.

The court dismissed the application for standing for all defendants except one (Taylor Brennan, whose charges were later stayed), finding that they failed to prove a sufficient connection to the searched properties to establish a reasonable expectation of privacy on a balance of probabilities.

The decision reiterates that the onus is on the defendant to prove standing and discusses the application of the Edwards factors and the normative vs. categorical approach to Charter standing.

The defendant, H.K., was charged with sexual assault and sexual interference of a person under 16.

The defence argued that a second alleged meeting between the defendant and the complainant, during which the assault purportedly occurred, did not happen.

The court found the complainant's evidence regarding the second meeting inconsistent and unreliable, particularly concerning the absence of corroborating text messages she claimed existed.

Due to these significant discrepancies, the court was left with a reasonable doubt and acquitted the defendant of all charges.

The accused were charged with robbery, pointing and discharging a firearm, and in one case, breaching bail conditions, arising from an incident at a bar in Mississauga on October 9, 2019.

The Crown's case relied heavily on the identification evidence of the victim, who gave inconsistent statements to police and at trial.

The court admitted the victim's prior police statement under the principled exception to the hearsay rule based on procedural reliability.

However, the court found that the victim's evidence contained significant inconsistencies regarding the timing and circumstances of the alleged shooting, and that video evidence did not support her account.

The court concluded that the victim's evidence could not safely carry the whole weight of the Crown's case and acquitted both accused on all charges.

The defendants, F.I. and E.M., applied for a mistrial after being found guilty of sexual assault by a jury.

The application was based on the jury selection process, which did not allow peremptory challenges, following new procedures implemented on September 19, 2019.

This was argued to be contrary to the Court of Appeal's decision in R. v. Chouhan, which held that the abolition of peremptory challenges should not apply retrospectively to cases where the accused had a vested right to a trial by judge and jury under prior legislation.

The court dismissed the application, noting that counsel had not objected to the new jury selection process at the time of selection.

The judge adopted reasoning from R. v. Azzi, emphasizing the public interest in finality, the impact on the complainant, and the fact that the Supreme Court of Canada had granted leave to appeal the Chouhan decision, militating against a post-verdict mistrial.

The defendant was charged with operation of a motor vehicle with excess blood alcohol under section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code, arising from a traffic stop on May 11, 2018.

The sole issue was whether the Crown could rely on the presumption of identity under section 258(1)(c) of the Criminal Code to establish the defendant's blood alcohol concentration at the time of driving.

The defendant challenged the applicability of this presumption following Parliament's December 18, 2018 amendments to the Criminal Code, which substantially revised the driving offence provisions.

The court held that the presumption of identity continues to apply to prosecutions under the former section 253(1)(b) and that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

The defendant applied for leave to cross-examine Detective Constable Mike Taylor, the affiant of search warrants that led to the discovery of two firearms in the defendant's home and car.

The defendant sought to question the officer regarding the timing of confidential informant information and the meaning of "operational needs" that resulted in the non-execution of an initial warrant.

The court granted leave to cross-examine on both areas, finding them relevant to whether reasonable and probable grounds existed for the warrants.

However, an addendum clarified that one line of questioning regarding the timing of confidential informant information was ultimately irrelevant to the defendant's actual inquiry.

The defendant was charged with refusing to comply with an approved screening device (ASD) demand after being found asleep at the wheel at a green light.

The defendant claimed he was unable to provide a breath sample due to asthma and anxiety symptoms.

The Crown argued the defendant was feigning his inability to comply.

The court found the defendant's evidence not credible and convicted him of the offence, finding he intentionally refused to provide the sample.

The defendant was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle and operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration in excess of the legal limit.

The defendant brought Charter applications alleging breaches of section 8 (warrantless search of breath samples) and section 10(b) (right to counsel).

The court found that the 45-minute delay at the roadside before transporting the defendant to the testing facility violated the statutory requirement that breath samples be taken "as soon as practicable," constituting a section 8 breach.

The court also found a section 10(b) breach because police failed to facilitate the defendant's expressed desire to contact counsel during the roadside delay.

However, under section 24(2) of the Charter, the court admitted the breath testing evidence, finding that while the breaches were serious, the impact on the defendant's Charter-protected interests was minimal, the evidence was highly reliable and discoverable, and society's interest in adjudicating impaired driving cases on their merits favoured admission.

The defendant was convicted on both counts.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with more than 80 mg of alcohol in 100 ml of blood contrary to the Criminal Code.

The accused applied to exclude breath sample evidence, arguing the police breached his section 8 Charter rights by failing to make a statutory demand for breath samples and by failing to obtain samples as soon as practicable.

The court found that the arresting officer did not make the required statutory demand and that a 21-minute delay in obtaining samples was unreasonable, as the accused had clearly and unequivocally waived his right to counsel.

The Crown could not rely on the statutory presumption in section 258 of the Criminal Code without proving these preconditions.

The charge was dismissed.