CITATION: R. v. Singh, 2026 ONSC 2634

COURT FILE NO.: CR-24-0133-00

DATE: 2026-05-04

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

B E T W E E N:

HIS MAJESTY THE KING

Sivadanesh Koveerasingham, for the Crown

• and -

AJITPAL SINGH

Harval Bassi & Hue Nguyen, for the Accused

Accused

HEARD: November 21, 2025 & February 6, 2026 at Thunder Bay, Ontario

Mr. Justice S.J. Wojciechowski

Decision on Sentencing

1Ajitpal Singh (“Mr. Singh”) appeared before me on November 21, 2025. At that time, following a s. 606 plea inquiry, Mr. Singh pleaded guilty to one count of dangerous operation of a motor vehicle contrary to s. 320.13(1) of the Criminal Code of Canada (“Criminal Code”).

2As will be reviewed further in this decision, as part of the plea inquiry, Mr. Singh acknowledged the potential of adverse immigration consequences which could result from a guilty plea. His counsel, Mr. Bassi, ensured that these consequences were apparent to his client and provided the Court with an opinion letter which had been prepared by an immigration lawyer for Mr. Singh.

3Once the facts supporting the indictment were agreed upon, Mr. Singh was found guilty and the parties provided me with their individual submissions on sentencing.

4The Crown seeks a conviction with a 2 year driving prohibition and a $3,000 fine.

5Mr. Bassi, on the other hand, is seeking a discharge with Mr. Singh making a voluntary payment of $10,000 as a victim fine surcharge or restitution, in addition to agreeing to a driving prohibition for a period of 5 to 10 years.

Background

6Mr. Singh was traveling westbound in a tractor trailer on Highway 102 on December 12, 2021. At the time, Mr. Singh was following another tractor trailer which was being driven by Mohamed Ahmed (“Mr. Ahmed”), who in turn was following a passenger vehicle. James Young (“Mr. Young”) was driving a red Ford SUV (“the SUV”) in front of Mr. Ahmed’s tractor trailer.

7As the three vehicles traveling together approached the Wildwood Variety store (“Wildwood Variety”) in the vicinity of Auto Road, the SUV began to slow down in order to turn left into the parking lot of Wildwood Variety. During the process of making his left hand turn, Mr. Young noted in his rear view mirror that Mr. Ahmed was not slowing down, and as such, he took evasive action and pulled right and forward off the highway in order to avoid a rear end collision with Mr. Ahmed. Mr. Ahmed, upon noticing the passenger vehicle’s manoeuvre, braked heavily in an attempt to avoid the SUV, causing his tractor trailer to enter the eastbound lane of Highway 102.

8Driving eastward towards Wildwood Variety – and the vehicles being driven by Mr. Ahmed and Mr. Singh – was another tractor trailer. This eastbound vehicle was driven by Michel Pharand (“Mr. Pharand”), with Marie-Paule Landry (“Ms. Landry”) as a passenger.

9As Mr. Ahmed applied his brakes suddenly, his tractor trailer jackknifed into the eastbound lane. At the same time, Mr. Singh was following so closely that he did not have much time to react. While Mr. Singh attempted to use his brakes as well, it was too late to prevent the front of his tractor trailer from colliding with the rear of Mr. Ahmed’s vehicle. The resulting collision pushed Mr. Ahmed’s vehicle further into the eastbound lane and a head on collision occurred with Mr. Pharand’s vehicle. Upon examination at the scene, no brake or skid marks were found on the highway caused by Mr. Singh’s vehicle.

10As a result of the collisions between Mr. Pharand’s and Mr. Ahmed’s tractor trailers, Mr. Pharand was killed, and Ms. Landry was severely injured, fracturing her pelvis and causing extensive injuries to her knee and shoulder.

11Mr. Singh did not suffer any personal injuries as a result of this accident.

12Having regard to all the circumstances, Mr. Singh was operating his vehicle by following too closely to Mr. Ahmed’s vehicle, limiting his ability to react to slowing vehicles on the highway. Mr. Singh’s conduct exhibits a marked departure from the standard of care a reasonable person should exercise in similar circumstances, and this was the basis for the charge.

13Both the Crown and Defence agreed that no causation is admitted with respect to the death of Mr. Pharand and the injuries to Ms. Landry. Simply, the admission of Mr. Singh is that he was travelling too closely to the tractor trailer operating in front of him. Mr. Singh’s conduct did not cause the deadly collision between Mr. Pharand’s and Mr. Ahmed’s vehicles.

Plea Inquiry

14Mr. Singh was provided with an interpreter from the English language to the Punjabi language at the outset of the hearing. During the course of this plea and sentencing hearing, Mr. Singh was provided with simultaneous translation.

15Before conducting the s. 606 plea inquiry, Mr. Bassi advised the Court that he had received written instructions from Mr. Singh which he was prepared to share.

16Mr. Singh wished to enter a guilty plea to the one count of dangerous driving, and understood that by pleading guilty, he would be giving up his right to a trial, including the opportunity to put forward a defence or advance any Charter applications.

17Mr. Bassi indicated that he was satisfied that after speaking to Mr. Singh, his guilty plea was given freely and voluntarily.

18The Court was advised that Mr. Singh understood that by pleading guilty, he was admitting the essential elements of the offence of dangerous operation of a motor vehicle. Mr. Singh was also aware that the position on sentencing was not joint, and that the Crown was not advocating for the same outcome as Mr. Bassi. Mr. Singh understood that ultimately the decision on sentencing was in the Court’s hands.

19Mr. Bassi indicated that he was not an immigration lawyer, and could not provide legal advice to Mr. Singh as to any possible consequences his guilty plea could have. However, Mr. Singh did obtain independent legal advice from an immigration lawyer, and relying on that advice, still wished to proceed with his guilty plea.

20Mr. Singh comes before the Court without any criminal record, but understood that he could end up with a criminal record as a result of his plea. In addition, Mr. Singh was aware that a guilty plea could impact his ability to travel to other countries, that there could be consequences pertaining to his employment opportunities, and that there would be an automatic driving prohibition imposed, the length of which would be determined by the Court.

21He finally understood the nature of the victim fine surcharge which was applicable, and would not be seeking a waiver of same.

22Following the submissions of Mr. Bassi, I undertook my own plea inquiry, and confirmed with Mr. Singh that he understood the implications of a guilty plea, including those described by Mr. Bassi.

Victim Impact Statements

23Three victim impact statements were entered into evidence, one from Karine Bedard, one from Michael Jewer, and the last from Marie-Paule Landry.

24All of these related to the loss of Michel Pharand who was killed in the accident of December 12, 2021.

25I reviewed these statements in the context of Mr. Singh being part of a motor vehicle accident which resulted in the death of Mr. Pharand. However, the position of the parties was clear in that the actions of Mr. Singh did not cause Mr. Pharand’s death, and as such, the impact of these statements upon the sentencing decision is limited.

26It is clear that Marie-Paule Landry has experienced anger and sadness with the loss of her partner, Mr. Pharand, including the loss of no longer being in each other’s company, sharing their thoughts, traveling together, and enjoying their lives with their children and grandchildren. Emotionally and financially, Mr. Pharand’s death has been difficult for Ms. Landry, noting that she will never be the same person she was before the accident which has had repercussions to her having a normal life.

27Karine Bedard is the daughter of Marie-Paule Landry, who provided the background to her receiving the news of the accident, and being with her mother as she was treated for her extensive injuries and the subsequent period of rehabilitation. The loss of Mr. Pharand has had a major impact upon Ms. Bedard and her family, including her three young children. As well, Ms. Bedard detailed the heartbreak of watching her mother have to cope with chronic pain and limited mobility caused by the accident. Her heart is full of sadness, unable to find peace with the events which have left her mother struggling every day and which caused the permanent loss of her guardian angel and her children’s grandfather, Michel.

28The victim impact statement of Michael Jewer reflects a similar experience described by his wife, Karine Bedard. Mr. Pharand and Mr. Jewer were close friends before Mr. Pharand and Ms. Landry married, playing the role of a father figure, so his loss is intensified with the fact that ultimately Mr. Pharand became family to Mr. Jewer, his wife and their three children. When hearing of his death, Mr. Jewer describes the feeling as like someone tearing his heart out of his chest and stepping on it. While trying to be strong for his family, he has felt the need to occasionally retire to his basement to cry and let out his emotions. Being part of his family, Mr. Jewer reflected that they will never forget Mr. Pharand and the impact he had on their lives.

29I thank Ms. Landry, Ms. Bedard and Mr. Jewer for taking the time to prepare and file their victim impact statements for my review, and I acknowledge the courage it took for them to express their feelings publicly and before the court.

Position of the Parties

Position of the Crown

30In his submissions on behalf of the Crown, Mr. Koveerasingham maintained that following Mr. Singh’s plea, he should not be granted a discharge, and instead a conviction should be entered for his offence. He should also be required to pay a fine of $3,000 in addition to being prohibited from driving for a period of 2 years.

31The Crown’s position was that the discharge requested by the Defence would be contrary to the public’s interest. Mr. Singh’s conduct and driving behaviour warrants accountability and a sentence which reflects general deterrence.

32Despite the fact that immigration consequences could flow from a conviction, these are simply collateral to the main issues of sentencing and are not to be considered as either aggravating or mitigating factors. The Crown submitted that any immigration consequences do not support a discharge, since at the end of the day, Mr. Singh would be able to appeal any decision of the Minister’s delegate pursuant to s. 63 of the Immigration Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27. If a decision is made following Mr. Singh’s conviction which impacts his immigration status, then that decision is reviewable.

33In the circumstances of this offence, Mr. Singh was operating a tractor trailer on a single lane highway in a convoy-like fashion, limiting any ability for him or other users of the highway to react, which calls for deterrence and denunciation.

34Only a conviction will deter other drivers who operate commercial vehicles on Canadian highways from doing what Mr. Singh did on December 12, 2021. The public demands accountability for these kinds of cases, which can only be achieved through a conviction. And while the Crown could be seeking a custodial sentence, based upon the mitigating factor that court resources are being saved as a consequence of the guilty plea, only a fine in lieu of custody is requested.

Position of the Defence

35Mr. Bassi began his submissions by referencing the letter from Sandeep Athwal, an immigration lawyer, which addresses consequences arising from a s. 320.12(1) Criminal Code conviction.

36Section 63 of the Immigration Refugee Protection Act would make anyone convicted of this offence inadmissible to Canada, and if already in Canada as a foreign national, removal by the Canada Border Services Agency could be effected without a hearing.

37Mr. Bassi further submitted that while persons with status of a permanent resident or a protected person would have the right to advance an appeal to the Minister in the event a removal process was instituted, Mr. Singh does not hold status under either of those categories, and as a foreign national would have no recourse to removal following a dangerous driving conviction.

38Accordingly, the Defence takes the position that very real immigration consequences follow a conviction of Mr. Singh.

39In taking this position, Mr. Singh does not mean to diminish the terrible tragedy which occurred, and appreciates the loss of life which resulted from the accident. Mr. Singh’s role, however, was not causative of Mr. Pharand’s death according to the agreed upon facts and positions of the parties.

40Mr. Singh admitted to following too closely, and was unable to brake in time to avoid hitting Mr. Ahmed’s vehicle. Mr. Ahmed, on the other hand, was separately charged for his role in this accident, and a trial has already commenced in this regard. In fact, Mr. Singh has agreed to be a witness in that trial.

41In terms of background, Mr. Singh is 33 years old, does not have a criminal record, and there are no Highway Traffic Act offences which have been brought forward by the Crown. His parents reside in India, and one of his sisters has immigrated to Canada with his remaining siblings still resident in India.

42Mr. Singh came to Canada in 2018 on a study permit, and completed his studies in 2019. After applying for a work permit, he obtained work as a mechanic and then obtained his truck driver’s licence, after which he moved to Manitoba and eventually began working as a truck driver.

43While following the accident Mr. Singh continued to drive trucks, he stopped in August 2022 due to the trauma of the accident which caught up to him through ongoing flashbacks. Since that time, Mr. Singh has turned to religion for guidance and support, and in addition has completed over 100 hours of community service.

44A number of reference letters were submitted, each attesting to Mr. Singh’s good character.

45In terms of an appropriate sentence, Mr. Bassi agreed that deterrence and denunciation were the primary considerations. However, he submitted that a discharge would be appropriate in the circumstances to address the disproportionate impact a conviction would have upon Mr. Singh when compared to the impact of sentences imposed upon Canadian citizens in similar situations.

46Accordingly, Mr. Bassi submitted that his client should receive a discharge, be required to make restitution in accordance with s. 738(1)(b) of the Criminal Code, and be restricted from driving for a period of time.

47Mr. Singh has submitted that he be required to make restitution, or pay a victim impact surcharge, in the amount of $10,000. With respect to a driving prohibition, Mr. Singh agrees that the maximum permissible of 10 years would appropriate.

Consideration of Parties’ Positions

48In addition to the standard considerations which are outlined in s. 718 of the Criminal Code, this case raises the impact of sentencing upon Mr. Singh’s immigration status, as well as whether the facts of this case warrant a discharge.

Factors to Consider – Sentencing Impact Upon Immigration Status

49As part of any plea inquiry process, and a prominent consideration by Mr. Singh in his decision to plead guilty in the present case, the collateral consequences to an individual’s immigration status need to be addressed.

50These personal circumstances of an offender are neither aggravating nor mitigating factors. While a judge considering an appropriate sentence has discretion to tailor that decision in consideration of immigration consequences, each case is fact dependent.

51In fashioning a sentence, what is important is that statutory schemes unrelated to promoting the goals of sentencing should not drive the sentencing decision. In the case of R. v. Pham, 2013 SCC 15, at para. 16, the Supreme Court of Canada reviewed the collateral consequences of a possible deportation arising from a sentencing decision:

These consequences must not be allowed to dominate the exercise or skew the process either in favour of or against deportation. Moreover, it must not lead to a separate sentencing scheme with a de facto if not a de jure special range of sentencing options where deportation is a risk.

52Later in the decision at para. 20, the Court observed that “collateral immigration consequences are but one relevant factor amongst many others related to the nature and the gravity of the offence, the degree of responsibility of the offender and the offender’s personal circumstances.”

53Ultimately, the facts of a particular case might make it appropriate to reduce the sentence to ensure that it does not have adverse consequences for the offender’s immigration status, however, there will be other cases in which it is not appropriate to do so: Pham, at para. 24.

54All this being said, the Court at para. 10 in Pham recognized these consequences are taken into account within the overall principles governing sentencing:

Ultimately, the sentence that is imposed must be consistent with the fundamental purpose of sentencing, which is to contribute to the respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society. The sentence must have one or more of the objectives of denunciation, general and specific deterrence, separation of offenders from society if need be, rehabilitation, reparations to victims for harm done to them, promotion of a sense of responsibility in offenders and acknowledgment of the harm done to victims and to the community (s. 718 of the Criminal Code).

55I have considered these factors which are set out in s. 718 of the Criminal Code in coming to my decision on sentencing.

56Justice Moldaver further reviewed the consideration of immigration consequences in R. v. Suter, 2018 SCC 34, stating at para. 48:

The question is not whether collateral consequences diminish the offender's moral blameworthiness or render the offence itself less serious, but whether the effect of those consequences means that a particular sentence would have a more significant impact on the offender because of his or her circumstances. Like offenders should be treated alike, and collateral consequences may mean that an offender is no longer "like" the others, rendering a given sentence unfit.

57At the same time, the fundamental principle of proportionality must prevail in every case. A sentencing judge cannot use collateral consequences to reduce a sentence to a point where the sentence becomes disproportionate to the gravity of the offence or the moral blameworthiness of the offender: Suter, at para. 56.

58The recent case of R. v. D.B., 2025 ONCA 577, provided an opportunity for the Court of Appeal for Ontario to address the principles governing collateral consequences. Chief Justice Tulloch framed the key principles in this manner at paras. 12-15:

1. First, collateral consequences humanize and individualize sentencing by accounting for its effects other than the criminal sanction itself.

2. Second, considering collateral consequences is mandatory, not optional.

3. Third, the law approaches collateral consequences generously, not restrictively.

4. Finally, the inevitability exception to this generous approach is narrow.

59Relying upon Pham, Chief Justice Tulloch also highlighted that the severity of the impacts which collateral consequences can have, namely the loss of employment, the disruption of entire families, and the loss of social assistance, all of which makes the path to rehabilitation more difficult to travel, hinders re-integration in the future, and can reduce the need for further denunciation or deterrence: D.B., at para. 12.

Discharges

60If it is not contrary to the public interest, and if it is in the best interests of the accused, a court may order an accused to be discharged – absolutely or on conditions – in prescribed circumstances involving offences in the same category to which Mr. Singh pleaded guilty, in accordance with s. 730(1) of the Criminal Code.

61In the case of R. v. Berseth, 2019 ONSC 888, Justice Durno explained at para. 43 that when considering s. 730(1), typically the accused is a person of good character without any prior convictions, such that it is not necessary to deter him or her from future offences nor require a process of rehabilitation. Specific deterrence is not a relevant consideration given the circumstances of the accused, nor is the accused’s rehabilitation through correctional or treatment centres required.

62When considering the public interest, if imposing a sentence is required to deter others from similar offences, then this becomes a factor against granting a discharge. The concern for general deterrence, therefore, must be given due consideration: Berseth, at paras. 44-45.

63Jurisprudence also provides that discharges are not only reserved for less serious or trivial matters: see Berseth, at para. 47; R. v. Hayes, [1999] O.J. No. 938 (Ont. S.C.); R. v. Barilko, 2014 ONSC 1145, at paras. 31-32; R. v. S.F., 2025 ONSC 1487, at para. 22.

Decision

64In fashioning the appropriate sentence in response to Mr. Singh’s guilty plea, I am firstly mindful of the fact that the crime which brings this matter forward is dangerous operation of a motor vehicle because Mr. Singh was following too close to Mr. Ahmed and could not avoid a collision.

65I recognize the totality of the actions of everyone involved in the accident caused Mr. Pharand to lose his life, and Ms. Landry and her family are now left to deal with the aftermath of that tragedy as well as her own injuries. From a review of the victim impact statements, that loss has obviously been devastating to Ms. Landry, her daughter, son-in-law, and grandchildren.

66However, within the criminal context of this sentencing hearing, and in accepting the guilty plea from Mr. Singh, the sentence which I am imposing is not based upon any connection between Mr. Singh’s dangerous driving and Mr. Pharand’s death. Both the Crown and the Defence have agreed that Mr. Singh’s collision with the rear of Mr. Ahmed’s vehicle did not cause Mr. Pharand’s death.

67While not expressly admitted, based upon the positions taken by the Crown and Defence, it appears that it was Mr. Ahmed and his driving behaviour which ultimately resulted in Mr. Pharand’s death. In considering the positions of the parties, the conduct of Mr. Singh did not make the situation any better as a result of the impact between his vehicle and the rear of Mr. Ahmed’s vehicle, but did not worsen the situation either such that his conduct caused the tragic outcome which resulted.

68Aggravating factors in this case include the fact that Mr. Singh was following so close that he did not have enough time to apply his brakes and prevent the collision with Mr. Ahmed’s tractor trailer.

69Mitigating factors include the guilty plea of Mr. Singh which has avoided the use of valuable court resources required for a trial, the many hours of community service which Mr. Singh has completed, his lack of any criminal record, and his remarks to the court accepting responsibility for his part of the motor vehicle accident.

70While the Crown seeks a conviction followed by a 2 year driving prohibition and a $3,000 fine, the Defence seeks a discharge.

71In advancing the proposition of a discharge, the Defence advised that Mr. Singh would still be prepared to be subjected to a 5 to 10 year driving prohibition, as well as making a $10,000 payment as either an increased victim fine surcharge or as restitution to Mr. Pharand’s family.

72I recognize that the basis for requesting a discharge is the inevitable immigration consequences which would result from a conviction. For committing the offence of dangerous driving, I accept the submissions from the Defence that Mr. Singh would be deported to India in accordance with provisions of the Immigration Refugee Protection Act. I must therefore consider whether these collateral consequences specific to Mr. Singh’s circumstances would be disproportionate the crime to which he admitted guilt, whether a conviction would not be in his best interests, and whether granting a discharge would be contrary to the public interest.

73I have considered the Crown’s position that any sentence should reflect the principle of general deterrence, and if I end up accepting that proposition, then I agree that a discharge would not be appropriate. The Crown also made the point that an accused should not be able to “buy” a discharge by offering to pay more money and being subjected to a lengthier driving prohibition than is being sought by the Crown, a position which I endorse.

74In deciding the appropriate sentence for Mr. Singh, the following considerations are front and center:

a) Mr. Singh comes before the Court without any record or any history of criminality;

b) Mr. Singh has been living in Canada since 2018, where he has studied and worked to make a life in this country;

c) If convicted, he will almost certainly face deportation, which would be a result unique to Mr. Singh in that no Canadian citizen would face a similar consequence if he or she pleaded guilty to the same crime;

d) Deportation would be a disproportionate result to the crime which this sentencing hearing is addressing;

e) Since the accident, Mr. Singh has completed over 100 hours of community service;

f) Mr. Singh is prepared to stay off the road for 5 to 10 years, which is relevant to the principle of denunciation and deterrence;

g) Given that this is the first time Mr. Singh has come before the Canadian courts, and his agreement to be subjected to a lengthy driving prohibition, when considered in light of the community service hours he has completed since the accident and his expression of remorse, these all weigh heavily towards negating the need and underlying basis for a rehabilitative sentence;

h) A payment of monies as an enhanced victim surcharge fine exceeding the minimum amount provided by the Criminal Code, and/or as restitution to Mr. Pharand’s family, would promote a sense of responsibility for Mr. Singh’s crime as well as providing reparations to the victims of the accident which occurred; and

i) In considering whether a conviction is required to deter others from committing similar offences, the lengthy driving suspension conceded by Mr. Singh as being appropriate will play a role in supporting the principles of general deterrence, in addition to specific deterrence, making the need for a conviction less relevant in these circumstances.

75Based upon the factors set out above, I am prepared to exercise my discretion and enter an absolute discharge for Mr. Singh.

76The maximum driving prohibition allowed in accordance with s. 320.24(5)(b) is 10 years. Mr. Singh submits that in the circumstances of his situation, a driving prohibition between 5 and 10 years would be appropriate. In light of Mr. Singh’s position, I agree that in the circumstances he shall be prohibited from driving for a period of 8 years.

77Finally, Mr. Singh shall pay $10,000 as restitution to Marie-Paule Landry in accordance with s. 738(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

78The victim fine surcharge is waived.

The Hon. Mr. Justice S.J. Wojciechowski