Brendan L. Gluckman

The Court of Appeal for Ontario considered whether a search warrant was validly issued in a drug trafficking case.

The appellant argued that the Information to Obtain (ITO) was misleading and incomplete, and that the reviewing judge improperly relied on evidence not before the issuing judge.

The Court found a breach of section 8 of the Charter but held that the evidence should not be excluded under section 24(2), as the breach was not serious, the police acted in good faith, and the evidence was critical to the Crown's case.

The appeal was dismissed.

This is an appeal from conviction where the appellant argued the Crown breached confidential informant privilege by disclosing information to a co-accused.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred by applying an overly narrow standard for determining a privilege breach, emphasizing that any information that *might tend* to identify an informant is protected.

The Crown's failure to protect this near-absolute privilege, despite repeated warnings, constituted an abuse of process.

The convictions were set aside, and a stay of proceedings was entered.

The appellant, an immigration consultant, was convicted of forgery and use of a forged document after filing a non-authentic employment letter with an immigration application.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge's jury charge was inadequate for failing to highlight evidence suggesting the appellant knew the application was stale-dated, which would negate the intent elements of forgery.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's charge was adequate and noting that the appellant's counsel did not present this alternative theory at trial.

The appellant, Ricardo Francis, appealed his convictions for possessing a loaded firearm and possession of drugs for trafficking, and his seven-year sentence.

The convictions arose from vehicle and strip searches conducted after his arrest on an outstanding warrant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the searches lawful under s. 8 of the Charter.

However, the Court granted leave to appeal the sentence, finding that the trial judge erred in principle by failing to adequately consider the principle of restraint for a youthful, first-time offender.

The sentence was varied from seven years to five years imprisonment.

The appellant appealed his conviction, primarily challenging the lawfulness of a strip search conducted in the presence of a female officer, arguing it violated his Charter rights.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that exigent circumstances justified the female officer's continued involvement during the appellant's violent resistance, and that the evidence obtained from the search was admissible.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Dwayne Brown, appealed his conviction for drug trafficking offences, challenging the validity of a general warrant that authorized covert entries into a storage locker.

Police discovered cocaine, marijuana, oxycodone, alprazolam, and Canadian currency in the locker.

Brown argued that the warrant violated his s. 8 Charter rights, contending that the reviewing judge applied an incorrect standard for reasonable grounds and that the requirements of s. 487.01 of the Criminal Code were not met.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the reviewing judge correctly applied the "reasonable probability" standard for issuing the warrant and that all statutory preconditions for a general warrant, including the "best interests of the administration of justice" and "no other provision" elements, were satisfied.

The appellants, Desiree McNeill and John Waechter, appealed their convictions for jointly possessing heroin and crystal methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking.

A central issue was whether police required a second warrant to examine a seized cellphone belonging to an individual not initially targeted by the investigation, given the broad authorization in the initial search warrant for electronic devices found in a suspected drug trafficking hub.

The Court of Appeal held that the initial warrant, supported by a comprehensive Information to Obtain (ITO), provided sufficient reasonable grounds to authorize the examination of any electronic device found in the premises, including those of unknown individuals, without requiring a second warrant.

The court also found no basis to challenge the reasonableness of the convictions, concluding that the trial judge's finding of joint constructive possession was reasonable based on the totality of the evidence.

Both appeals were dismissed.

The defendant, Ethan Eckstein, brought a pre-trial Charter application challenging the validity of a tracking warrant and search warrants, and seeking to exclude evidence obtained from these searches under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The court found that the tracking warrant was valid, as the Information to Obtain (ITO) provided reasonable grounds based on compelling, credible, and corroborated confidential informant information, despite minor drafting errors.

The court also found that the defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the searched unit, thus no s. 8 Charter violation occurred regarding those searches.

Even if Charter breaches had occurred, the court determined that the evidence would not be excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter, balancing the seriousness of state conduct, impact on Charter interests, and society's interest in adjudication on the merits.

The application was dismissed.

The defendant, Abdul Shahin, brought a pre-trial Charter application seeking to exclude evidence obtained from searches of his apartment unit (595 Proudfoot Lane, unit 808) and police observations in the building's common areas.

The court found that Shahin had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his unit, but not in the common areas (eighth-floor hallway).

The general warrant and subsequent search warrant were deemed valid, and no Charter breaches occurred.

Even if s. 8 Charter breaches had occurred, the court determined that the evidence would not be excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter, considering the seriousness of state conduct, the impact on Charter interests, and society's interest in adjudication on the merits.

The application was dismissed.

The defendant, Tang Hien Quanh, brought a pre-trial Charter application seeking to exclude evidence obtained from his arrest and subsequent searches of his person and a Toyota RAV4.

The defendant argued violations of his s. 9 (arbitrary detention) and s. 8 (unreasonable search and seizure) Charter rights.

The court found no s. 9 or s. 8 Charter breaches, concluding that the arresting officer had reasonable and probable grounds for arrest and that the searches were lawful, including the RAV4 search conducted under a valid warrant.

Even if breaches occurred, the court determined that the evidence should not be excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter, balancing the seriousness of state conduct, the impact on the defendant's rights, and society's interest in adjudication on the merits.

The defendant, Marco Maric, was found guilty of conspiracy to traffic in cocaine based on an Agreed Statement of Facts.

The sentencing hearing addressed the appropriate sentence, considering aggravating factors such as the significant quantity of cocaine (10.5 kg destined for him, 4 kg found in his unit), his leadership role in a sophisticated operation, and motivation by greed.

Mitigating factors included his difficult childhood as a war refugee, strong family support, long work history, remorse, and significant time spent on restrictive house arrest bail (927 days).

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence as paramount objectives for cocaine trafficking, while also acknowledging the defendant's rehabilitative potential.

The Crown sought 10-12 years, and the defence sought 7-8 years.

The court imposed a sentence of nine years, reduced to seven years and eight months after accounting for pre-sentence custody and house arrest credit.

Ancillary orders included a DNA order, a lifetime weapons prohibition for certain items, a 10-year prohibition for others, and forfeiture of offence-related property and proceeds of crime.

Appeal from conviction and sentence for possession for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime.

The Crown conceded that the two convictions for possession of proceeds of crime could not stand and those convictions were set aside with acquittals entered.

The convictions for possession for the purpose of trafficking were upheld as the trial judge had a reasonable basis to uphold the warrant issuance and police had reasonable grounds to arrest and conduct searches incident to arrest.

The sentence was reduced from 14 months on each count to 6 months less one day on each count running consecutively, resulting in a global sentence of 12 months less two days, to account for the appellant's risk of deportation and demonstrated rehabilitation.

The appellant, a successful federal election candidate in 2008, was convicted of exceeding his election expense limit, wilfully exceeding his personal contribution limit, and filing a false election campaign return.

He paid $21,000 personally for voter identification and get-out-the-vote services from a contractor, circumventing campaign spending limits, and then conspired to file a false return reporting only $1,575 in expenses.

The trial judge and Summary Conviction Appeal Judge upheld the convictions.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the interpretation of "election expense" under the Canada Elections Act, arguing that the Crown must prove the actual use and commercial value of services purchased.

The Court of Appeal rejected this interpretation, holding that the statutory definition of election expense is clear and unambiguous, and that expenses are measured by the cost incurred, not the value of goods or services consumed.

The court also upheld the application of Criminal Code party liability provisions to Canada Elections Act offences.

The appellant appealed his conviction for drug trafficking and possession for the purpose of trafficking.

The trial judge found that police had reasonable grounds to arrest the appellant following observation of a suspected drug transaction.

Although the trial judge found a breach of s. 8 of the Charter regarding a warrantless entry into the appellant's apartment, she held that a subsequent search warrant was validly issued and declined to exclude the evidence under s. 24(2).

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding no errors in the trial judge's analysis of reasonable grounds for arrest, reasonable expectation of privacy, the validity of the search warrant, or the s. 24(2) analysis.

The appellant was convicted of conspiracy to import and importing heroin following a jury trial.

He received concurrent sentences of 16 years in penitentiary, less 4 months pre-disposition credit.

On appeal, the appellant challenged his convictions on six grounds, including issues relating to the admissibility of hearsay evidence under the co-conspirators' exception, post-arrest statements, travel history evidence, and jury instructions regarding a Vetrovec witness.

The appellant also sought leave to appeal his sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal from conviction and, while granting leave to appeal sentence, dismissed the sentence appeal as well.

The appellant was charged with possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking arising from a reverse sting operation conducted by the RCMP in August 1997.

The appellant was initially acquitted in 2000, but the Court of Appeal set aside the acquittal and ordered a new trial.

At the retrial in 2014, the appellant sought a stay of proceedings based on abuse of process, alleging that the lead investigator deliberately misled his superiors and withheld disclosure.

The trial judge rejected these allegations and convicted the appellant.

The appellant appealed both conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no material misapprehension of evidence, and dismissed the sentence appeal, finding the 10 years 10 months imprisonment and delayed parole eligibility were fit.

The Crown brought an application under section 490(9)(d) of the Criminal Code for forfeiture of USD $32,279.78 and CAD $3,060.50 seized from the respondent's account.

The respondent had been acquitted of all charges, including money laundering.

Both parties agreed the funds were proceeds of crime from an illegal ephedrine exportation scheme.

The court granted the forfeiture order despite acknowledging that TD Bank had violated a Superior Court Restraint Order by withdrawing $35,000 from the account and sending it to Citi Bank, and despite the Crown's minimal efforts to enforce the breach.

The court found that the funds remained proceeds of crime and that Parliament's intention to deprive offenders of criminal proceeds outweighed the equitable considerations arising from TD Bank's breach.

The accused, a lawyer, was charged with multiple counts of money laundering, possession of proceeds of crime, fraud, and conspiracy related to an international ephedrine exportation scheme operated by Afshin Dastani.

The Crown's case relied heavily on the testimony of Dastani, who admitted to operating an illegal drug exportation business and claimed he disclosed the illicit nature of his activities to the accused.

The court found Dastani to be an unreliable and discredited witness due to numerous inconsistencies in his evidence and a pattern of deception toward family, friends, legal advisors, and government authorities.

Without credible evidence of the accused's knowledge that funds were proceeds of crime, the court acquitted the accused on all charges.

The accused brought applications to stay charges under section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging unreasonable delay.

The charges involved possession of property obtained by crime, money laundering, fraud, and drug trafficking offences spanning from January 2009 to June 2012.

The overall delay was 33 months from arrest to trial.

The court conducted a detailed analysis of the delay, attributing it to Crown delay (216 days), defence delay (235 days), inherent delay (457 days), and institutional delay (78 days).

The court found that the Crown and institutional delay combined amounted to just under 10 months, which was not unreasonable given the exceptional complexity of the case, particularly the Lavallee proceedings required to protect solicitor-client privilege following searches of the accused lawyer's office.

The court balanced the delay against society's strong interest in a trial on the merits given the serious allegations of money laundering by a lawyer involving millions of dollars.

The applications were dismissed.

The Crown prosecuted Dean Del Mastro, a Conservative candidate in the 2008 federal election, and Richard McCarthy, his Official Agent, for violations of the Canada Elections Act.

The charges included incurring election expenses exceeding campaign limits, making personal contributions exceeding limits, and filing false or incomplete election expense returns.

The central issue involved a $21,000 contract with Holinshed Research Group for voter identification and get-out-the-vote calling services during the election period.

The Crown alleged the contract was completed and paid for but not properly declared.

The Defence contended the contract was limited to $1,575 for partial GOTV calling only.

After a 15-day trial, the court found the Crown proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt and convicted both accused on multiple counts.