Brendan L. Gluckman

The defendant brought a pre-trial Charter application seeking to exclude evidence obtained pursuant to various wiretap authorizations, general warrants, and search warrants, alleging violations of his s. 8 Charter rights.

The Crown conceded a s. 8 breach regarding a May 3, 2016 general warrant due to an error in identifying the specific condominium unit.

The court found that the other authorizations and warrants were validly issued and that the police did not act negligently or in bad faith.

Applying the Grant framework, the court concluded that the evidence obtained from the May 3, 2016 general warrant should not be excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter, as the police acted in good faith and the evidence was highly reliable and important to the prosecution.

The application was dismissed.

The defendant, Ethan Eckstein, brought a pre-trial Charter application challenging the validity of a tracking warrant and search warrants, and seeking to exclude evidence obtained from these searches under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The court found that the tracking warrant was valid, as the Information to Obtain (ITO) provided reasonable grounds based on compelling, credible, and corroborated confidential informant information, despite minor drafting errors.

The court also found that the defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the searched unit, thus no s. 8 Charter violation occurred regarding those searches.

Even if Charter breaches had occurred, the court determined that the evidence would not be excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter, balancing the seriousness of state conduct, impact on Charter interests, and society's interest in adjudication on the merits.

The application was dismissed.

The defendant, Abdul Shahin, brought a pre-trial Charter application seeking to exclude evidence obtained from searches of his apartment unit (595 Proudfoot Lane, unit 808) and police observations in the building's common areas.

The court found that Shahin had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his unit, but not in the common areas (eighth-floor hallway).

The general warrant and subsequent search warrant were deemed valid, and no Charter breaches occurred.

Even if s. 8 Charter breaches had occurred, the court determined that the evidence would not be excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter, considering the seriousness of state conduct, the impact on Charter interests, and society's interest in adjudication on the merits.

The application was dismissed.

The defendant, Tang Hien Quanh, brought a pre-trial Charter application seeking to exclude evidence obtained from his arrest and subsequent searches of his person and a Toyota RAV4.

The defendant argued violations of his s. 9 (arbitrary detention) and s. 8 (unreasonable search and seizure) Charter rights.

The court found no s. 9 or s. 8 Charter breaches, concluding that the arresting officer had reasonable and probable grounds for arrest and that the searches were lawful, including the RAV4 search conducted under a valid warrant.

Even if breaches occurred, the court determined that the evidence should not be excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter, balancing the seriousness of state conduct, the impact on the defendant's rights, and society's interest in adjudication on the merits.

The defendant, Marco Maric, was found guilty of conspiracy to traffic in cocaine based on an Agreed Statement of Facts.

The sentencing hearing addressed the appropriate sentence, considering aggravating factors such as the significant quantity of cocaine (10.5 kg destined for him, 4 kg found in his unit), his leadership role in a sophisticated operation, and motivation by greed.

Mitigating factors included his difficult childhood as a war refugee, strong family support, long work history, remorse, and significant time spent on restrictive house arrest bail (927 days).

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence as paramount objectives for cocaine trafficking, while also acknowledging the defendant's rehabilitative potential.

The Crown sought 10-12 years, and the defence sought 7-8 years.

The court imposed a sentence of nine years, reduced to seven years and eight months after accounting for pre-sentence custody and house arrest credit.

Ancillary orders included a DNA order, a lifetime weapons prohibition for certain items, a 10-year prohibition for others, and forfeiture of offence-related property and proceeds of crime.

The accused was charged with possession of MDA and methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking and unlawful production after police found a drug laboratory in the basement of his leased residence.

The accused brought a Charter application challenging the search warrants, which was dismissed as the court found sufficient grounds based on intercepted communications linking him to a drug distribution network.

At trial, the accused denied knowledge of the drugs, claiming he rented the basement to a third party.

The court rejected his testimony as implausible and found that the Crown proved constructive possession and production beyond a reasonable doubt.

Appeal from conviction and sentence for possession for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime.

The Crown conceded that the two convictions for possession of proceeds of crime could not stand and those convictions were set aside with acquittals entered.

The convictions for possession for the purpose of trafficking were upheld as the trial judge had a reasonable basis to uphold the warrant issuance and police had reasonable grounds to arrest and conduct searches incident to arrest.

The sentence was reduced from 14 months on each count to 6 months less one day on each count running consecutively, resulting in a global sentence of 12 months less two days, to account for the appellant's risk of deportation and demonstrated rehabilitation.

The appellant, a successful federal election candidate in 2008, was convicted of exceeding his election expense limit, wilfully exceeding his personal contribution limit, and filing a false election campaign return.

He paid $21,000 personally for voter identification and get-out-the-vote services from a contractor, circumventing campaign spending limits, and then conspired to file a false return reporting only $1,575 in expenses.

The trial judge and Summary Conviction Appeal Judge upheld the convictions.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the interpretation of "election expense" under the Canada Elections Act, arguing that the Crown must prove the actual use and commercial value of services purchased.

The Court of Appeal rejected this interpretation, holding that the statutory definition of election expense is clear and unambiguous, and that expenses are measured by the cost incurred, not the value of goods or services consumed.

The court also upheld the application of Criminal Code party liability provisions to Canada Elections Act offences.

The appellant appealed his conviction for drug trafficking and possession for the purpose of trafficking.

The trial judge found that police had reasonable grounds to arrest the appellant following observation of a suspected drug transaction.

Although the trial judge found a breach of s. 8 of the Charter regarding a warrantless entry into the appellant's apartment, she held that a subsequent search warrant was validly issued and declined to exclude the evidence under s. 24(2).

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding no errors in the trial judge's analysis of reasonable grounds for arrest, reasonable expectation of privacy, the validity of the search warrant, or the s. 24(2) analysis.

The appellant was convicted of conspiracy to import and importing heroin following a jury trial.

He received concurrent sentences of 16 years in penitentiary, less 4 months pre-disposition credit.

On appeal, the appellant challenged his convictions on six grounds, including issues relating to the admissibility of hearsay evidence under the co-conspirators' exception, post-arrest statements, travel history evidence, and jury instructions regarding a Vetrovec witness.

The appellant also sought leave to appeal his sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal from conviction and, while granting leave to appeal sentence, dismissed the sentence appeal as well.

The appellant was charged with possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking arising from a reverse sting operation conducted by the RCMP in August 1997.

The appellant was initially acquitted in 2000, but the Court of Appeal set aside the acquittal and ordered a new trial.

At the retrial in 2014, the appellant sought a stay of proceedings based on abuse of process, alleging that the lead investigator deliberately misled his superiors and withheld disclosure.

The trial judge rejected these allegations and convicted the appellant.

The appellant appealed both conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no material misapprehension of evidence, and dismissed the sentence appeal, finding the 10 years 10 months imprisonment and delayed parole eligibility were fit.

The appellant was convicted of possession of methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking, possession of marijuana, and failing to comply with probation.

The drugs were found hidden behind a recessed light fixture in a basement closet of a residence where the appellant was sleeping.

The trial judge found the appellant in constructive possession based on circumstantial evidence, including his wallet and a letter in the bedroom.

The Court of Appeal held that the circumstantial evidence could not reasonably support an inference that the appellant had knowledge of the hidden drugs.

The appeal was allowed and acquittals were entered on all charges.

The Crown brought an application under section 490(9)(d) of the Criminal Code for forfeiture of USD $32,279.78 and CAD $3,060.50 seized from the respondent's account.

The respondent had been acquitted of all charges, including money laundering.

Both parties agreed the funds were proceeds of crime from an illegal ephedrine exportation scheme.

The court granted the forfeiture order despite acknowledging that TD Bank had violated a Superior Court Restraint Order by withdrawing $35,000 from the account and sending it to Citi Bank, and despite the Crown's minimal efforts to enforce the breach.

The court found that the funds remained proceeds of crime and that Parliament's intention to deprive offenders of criminal proceeds outweighed the equitable considerations arising from TD Bank's breach.

The appellant, a former Member of Parliament, appealed his convictions and sentence for exceeding election expense limits, exceeding personal contribution limits, and filing a false electoral campaign return under the Canada Elections Act.

The Crown cross-appealed the sentence, seeking a longer term of imprisonment.

The appeal court dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge correctly interpreted the definition of election expenses, properly assessed credibility, and correctly applied party liability provisions.

The court also dismissed both sentence appeals, upholding the global sentence of one month in jail, a four-month conditional sentence, and 18 months' probation as proportionate and fit, though it set aside a $10,000 restitution order on consent.

The accused, a lawyer, was charged with multiple counts of money laundering, possession of proceeds of crime, fraud, and conspiracy related to an international ephedrine exportation scheme operated by Afshin Dastani.

The Crown's case relied heavily on the testimony of Dastani, who admitted to operating an illegal drug exportation business and claimed he disclosed the illicit nature of his activities to the accused.

The court found Dastani to be an unreliable and discredited witness due to numerous inconsistencies in his evidence and a pattern of deception toward family, friends, legal advisors, and government authorities.

Without credible evidence of the accused's knowledge that funds were proceeds of crime, the court acquitted the accused on all charges.

The appellant was convicted of importing narcotics after a 26-month delay between his arrest and trial.

He appealed his conviction, arguing that his right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter was infringed.

The appellant contended that the 15.5-month delay caused by his efforts to retain counsel of choice, exacerbated by Legal Aid Ontario's refusal to transfer his certificate, should be characterized as institutional or Crown delay.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the delay was part of the inherent time requirements of the case and that a s. 11(b) application is not the proper forum to review the reasonableness of Legal Aid Ontario's decisions.

The appellants were convicted of trafficking cocaine and possessing the proceeds of crime based on circumstantial evidence, including text messages, cell phones, and cash found in their vehicle.

On appeal, they argued the verdicts were unreasonable and that the trial judge misapprehended evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the circumstantial case strong and the trial judge's minor factual errors immaterial to the reasoning process.

The accused brought applications to stay charges under section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging unreasonable delay.

The charges involved possession of property obtained by crime, money laundering, fraud, and drug trafficking offences spanning from January 2009 to June 2012.

The overall delay was 33 months from arrest to trial.

The court conducted a detailed analysis of the delay, attributing it to Crown delay (216 days), defence delay (235 days), inherent delay (457 days), and institutional delay (78 days).

The court found that the Crown and institutional delay combined amounted to just under 10 months, which was not unreasonable given the exceptional complexity of the case, particularly the Lavallee proceedings required to protect solicitor-client privilege following searches of the accused lawyer's office.

The court balanced the delay against society's strong interest in a trial on the merits given the serious allegations of money laundering by a lawyer involving millions of dollars.

The applications were dismissed.

The Crown prosecuted Dean Del Mastro, a Conservative candidate in the 2008 federal election, and Richard McCarthy, his Official Agent, for violations of the Canada Elections Act.

The charges included incurring election expenses exceeding campaign limits, making personal contributions exceeding limits, and filing false or incomplete election expense returns.

The central issue involved a $21,000 contract with Holinshed Research Group for voter identification and get-out-the-vote calling services during the election period.

The Crown alleged the contract was completed and paid for but not properly declared.

The Defence contended the contract was limited to $1,575 for partial GOTV calling only.

After a 15-day trial, the court found the Crown proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt and convicted both accused on multiple counts.

The appellant appealed his global sentence of nine years in custody for possession of cocaine, methamphetamine, and MDMA for the purpose of trafficking, and conspiracy to traffic cocaine.

He argued the sentence exceeded the range for a first offender, violated the parity principle compared to his co-accused, and overemphasized denunciation and deterrence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentence was justified by the totality principle, the appellant's role as a supplier with a higher quantum of drugs, and the trial judge's proper consideration of mitigating factors.