J. Bryan Shaughnessy

The accused, a transport truck driver, was charged with four counts of dangerous driving causing death and nine counts of dangerous driving causing bodily harm after colliding with multiple vehicles in a construction zone on Highway 401.

The Crown proved the actus reus, showing the accused failed to slow down despite clear signage and stopped traffic.

The defence argued the accused experienced a 'micro-sleep' due to undiagnosed sleep apnea and chronic renal disease, negating the mens rea.

The court rejected the expert evidence of a micro-sleep, finding the accused's prolonged inattention and failure to brake constituted a marked departure from the standard of care of a reasonable person.

The accused was found guilty on all counts.

The self-represented applicant, a paramedic, brought an application seeking a declaration that the Ambulance Services Collective Bargaining Act, 2001 unjustifiably violates section 2(d) of the Charter by requiring ambulance workers to provide essential services during a strike.

The applicant argued that the legislation's purpose was unconstitutional on its face and therefore no evidentiary record of its effects was required.

The court dismissed the application, holding that a factual foundation demonstrating the legislation's deleterious effects on collective bargaining is essential, and its absence was fatal to the Charter challenge.

The plaintiffs loaned $25,000 to the individual defendant's corporation based on a long-standing friendship.

When the loan was not repaid, the plaintiffs sued the corporation and the individual defendant.

The defendants failed to attend the trial.

The court found that the individual defendant had personally guaranteed the loan to protect his own interest in the corporation, taking the guarantee out of the Statute of Frauds.

Judgment was granted against both defendants for the principal amount plus interest and costs.

The Township of Uxbridge brought an application seeking a declaration that the respondents were in civil contempt of two restraining orders issued under the Building Code Act and the Planning Act.

The orders prohibited the respondents from using their rural property as a contractor's yard and required them to clean up debris and commercial vehicles.

The court reviewed photographic evidence and testimony from a municipal enforcement officer, finding that the property remained littered with waste, commercial trucks, and machinery.

The court concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that the respondents intentionally failed to comply with the clear and unequivocal orders, finding them in contempt and scheduling a penalty hearing.

Following the plaintiff's acceptance of the defendant's offer to settle a motor vehicle accident claim for $30,000 plus partial indemnity costs and disbursements, the court was tasked with assessing the costs.

The plaintiff sought $72,278 in fees and $121,045 in disbursements, while the defendant argued for a total of $55,000 based on proportionality.

The court reduced the fees to $30,000 to reflect proportionality but allowed the full $121,045 for disbursements, noting they were reasonably incurred before the defendant produced a contradictory engineering report and made the settlement offer.

The plaintiff, who suffered a severe traumatic brain injury in a motor vehicle accident, sought court approval for two settlements: a $1 million tort settlement reached in 2007 and a $3 million statutory accident benefits settlement.

The court approved both settlements, noting the tort settlement should have had a capacity assessment at the time.

However, the court found the 30% contingency fee agreement signed on the eve of the accident benefits settlement was not fair and reasonable under the Solicitors Act.

The agreement was declared void, and the court reduced the legal fees to 17% of the recovery.

The plaintiff claimed sole ownership of a property and sought damages for unauthorized renovations by the defendants.

The defendant real estate agent claimed a 50% equitable interest based on an oral joint venture agreement and financial contributions to the deposit and closing costs.

The court found the defendant had an equitable interest despite the lack of a formal written agreement, applying the doctrine of part performance.

However, because the defendant repudiated the agreement after the plaintiff's son gutted the property, she was entitled to restitution of her financial contributions totaling $154,615.55, while the plaintiff's claims for damages and loss of rent were dismissed.

The plaintiff, Natalie Moretto, a 15-year-old at the time, was bitten on the face by the defendant's dog.

The court found the defendant strictly liable under the Dog Owner’s Liability Act.

The defendant failed to prove contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff.

The court awarded general damages for physical injury and some psychological sequelae, and future care costs for laser treatments and sunscreen.

However, the claim for loss of competitive advantage was dismissed due to insufficient evidence and the inadmissibility of expert opinion.

This motion concerned the priority of insurance policies following a motor vehicle accident.

The primary issue was whether a State Farm Personal Liability Umbrella Policy (PLUP) was a primary owner's policy or an excess policy, and its response sequence relative to a State Farm Automobile Policy and an Economical Insurance Automobile Policy.

The court determined that the State Farm PLUP was a true excess policy, not a motor vehicle liability policy under the Insurance Act, and would respond only after the primary coverages of both the State Farm Automobile Policy and the Economical Insurance Automobile Policy were exhausted.

The Economical Insurance Automobile Policy was found to be a primary, first-loss policy, responding alongside the State Farm Automobile Policy.

The plaintiffs sought court approval for a $12.5 million settlement arising from a catastrophic brain injury sustained by a 16-year-old during a high school rugby match.

The court reviewed the proposed structured settlement, private investment plan, and legal fees.

Finding the 30% contingency fee unreasonable given the size of the settlement and the exclusion of the OHIP subrogated claim, the court reduced the legal fee to 20% and directed the savings to the plaintiff's future care fund.

The settlement was approved with these modifications.

The court addressed two applications: a motion for court approval of an accident benefits settlement for a minor, Stephan Markus, and a guardianship application by his mother, Natalie Nicholas.

The court approved the accident benefits settlement amount of $650,000 but reduced the legal contingency fee from 25% to 15% and disallowed a disbursement for clerk's time.

The court rejected the proposed management plan for the settlement funds and Natalie Nicholas's application to be appointed guardian of property, citing concerns about the plan's realism and internal inconsistencies in affidavits.

All settlement funds were ordered to be placed into a structured settlement and paid into court until an authorized guardian of property is appointed, with a new management plan required.

The appellant, a former Member of Parliament, appealed his convictions and sentence for exceeding election expense limits, exceeding personal contribution limits, and filing a false electoral campaign return under the Canada Elections Act.

The Crown cross-appealed the sentence, seeking a longer term of imprisonment.

The appeal court dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge correctly interpreted the definition of election expenses, properly assessed credibility, and correctly applied party liability provisions.

The court also dismissed both sentence appeals, upholding the global sentence of one month in jail, a four-month conditional sentence, and 18 months' probation as proportionate and fit, though it set aside a $10,000 restitution order on consent.

The moving party sought court approval of a proposed $650,000 accident benefits settlement arising from a motor vehicle accident that caused catastrophic brain injury to the plaintiff as a child.

The court reviewed the medical evidence, future care needs, and the proposed allocation of settlement funds, including structured settlement arrangements and funds to be managed by the plaintiff’s mother.

The judge identified significant concerns regarding the adequacy of the settlement relative to future care needs, missing medical and economic reports, unclear accounting for certain funds, and the proposed guardianship and care arrangements.

The court concluded that the evidentiary record was insufficient to determine whether the settlement was in the plaintiff’s best interests.

The proposed settlement was therefore not approved and the matter was ordered to return with further evidence.

The moving party law firm brought a motion for directions, seeking payment of its solicitor's accounts from the Estate and the removal of the estate trustee.

The law firm argued it was retained by the Estate or, alternatively, was entitled to compensation on a quantum meruit basis for acting as a 'lawyer of necessity'.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the Estate had terminated its retainer with the law firm in 2009 and never re-retained it.

The court also held that the law firm lacked standing under Rules 74 and 75 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and s. 50 of the Estates Act because it was not a creditor and had no financial interest in the Estate.

The quantum meruit claim failed as the services were not requested or acquiesced to by the Estate, and there was no basis to remove the estate trustee.

In this costs endorsement following a personal injury jury trial, the plaintiff sought enhanced costs based on a Rule 49 offer of $300,000 inclusive of interest plus costs.

The defendants argued that the future income loss award should be excluded from the judgment for offer-comparison purposes because of the trust and assignment regime under s. 267.8 of the Insurance Act.

The court rejected that submission, held the judgment remained more favourable than the offer, and awarded partial indemnity costs to the offer date and substantial indemnity costs thereafter.

Applying Rule 57.01 and proportionality principles, the court fixed fees at $240,000 plus applicable GST/HST and allowed disbursements of $124,013.46.

This was a costs endorsement following dismissal of a motion seeking electronic ballot images in aid of a municipal election recount application.

The applicant argued for no costs on the basis of alleged public interest litigation, novelty of the issue, and policy concerns about discouraging election challenges.

The court held the proceeding advanced the applicant's private and pecuniary interest in reclaiming elected office, was not genuine public interest litigation, and did not raise a novel legal issue given existing authority on under-votes and ballot inspection.

Applying Rule 57.01(1), the court awarded the successful respondent partial indemnity costs of $5,000 all-inclusive.

During a jury trial arising from a motor vehicle accident, the defendants brought a threshold motion under s. 267.5(15) of the Insurance Act seeking a determination that the plaintiff had not sustained a permanent serious impairment of an important physical, mental or psychological function.

The court reviewed the statutory test and the regulatory criteria under the Ontario Regulations, including the requirements of substantial interference, importance of function, and permanence.

Based on extensive medical evidence diagnosing chronic pain syndrome, orthopedic injuries, and psychiatric conditions including major depressive disorder and somatic symptom disorder, the court found the impairments substantially interfered with employment and daily living.

The court accepted the evidence of multiple treating and expert physicians and rejected the defence medical expert’s opinion as unreliable.

The court concluded the plaintiff met the statutory threshold and was not barred from recovering damages for non‑pecuniary losses.

The Crown brought an application to estreat bail after the accused failed to appear for his preliminary hearing.

The accused had been released on a $100,000 recognizance, with two sureties pledging $50,000 each.

The court found that the sureties had exercised exceptional due diligence, imposing strict house rules and immediately reporting the accused to the police when he failed to report.

Applying the factors from Horvath, the court dismissed the forfeiture application against the sureties but ordered the $100,000 estreated against the absconded accused.

The moving defendant sought summary judgment dismissing a motor vehicle negligence action against her arising from a collision caused by her estranged spouse driving her vehicle while impaired.

The issue was whether the vehicle was in the driver’s possession with the owner’s implied consent under s. 192(2) of the Highway Traffic Act, or alternatively whether the owner was negligent in safeguarding her car keys.

The court held the owner rebutted the statutory presumption of consent, finding she had taken reasonable steps to prevent access to the vehicle and did not grant express or implied permission.

The alleged inconsistencies in her testimony were immaterial and did not undermine credibility on the central issues.

The court also rejected the insurer’s negligence argument, finding the owner acted as a reasonable and prudent person in controlling the keys.

The Crown defendants brought a motion for summary judgment dismissing a personal injury action on the basis that the plaintiff failed to provide notice within ten days as required by s. 7(3) of the Proceedings Against the Crown Act.

The plaintiff was injured when a swing set on Crown-owned property collapsed.

Although written notice was sent outside the statutory ten‑day period, correspondence indicated that the Crown’s property manager attempted to inspect the swing the day after the incident.

The court drew an adverse inference from the Crown’s failure to provide affidavit evidence explaining what information it received or what investigation it undertook.

The court held that the Crown effectively received notice and had an opportunity to investigate shortly after the incident, satisfying the legislative purpose of the notice provision.