Michael William Chadwick

The moving party sought an extension of time to appeal a decision of the Licence Appeal Tribunal denying statutory accident benefits.

The motion was brought nearly five months after the deadline.

Applying the four-factor test for extending time, the court found that while the moving party intended to appeal and there was no prejudice to the respondent, the delay was poorly explained and the proposed appeal lacked merit.

The proposed appeal improperly sought to challenge findings of fact, whereas appeals from the Tribunal are restricted to questions of law.

The motion was dismissed.

The applicant insurer appealed and sought judicial review of a Licence Appeal Tribunal reconsideration decision finding that the respondent, a 19-year-old student athlete who was rendered tetraplegic in a motor vehicle accident, was principally dependent on his sister for care and therefore an insured person under her automobile insurance policy.

The Divisional Court found that the adjudicator identified the correct legal principles regarding dependency and reasonably applied them to the evidence, which showed the respondent relied on his sister for physical and emotional support despite living away for school.

The appeal and judicial review were dismissed.

The appellant moved for a stay of an ongoing Licence Appeal Tribunal (LAT) proceeding regarding his claim for statutory accident benefits, pending the determination of his application for judicial review.

The underlying judicial review challenged an interlocutory LAT decision denying the appellant's request to convert a written hearing into an oral hearing.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for a stay, finding that the application for judicial review was premature as the LAT proceedings had not yet concluded, and the appellant failed to establish exceptional circumstances to justify court intervention at this stage.

The plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle accident involving a rental vehicle leased by the defendant lessee but driven by an unauthorized third party.

The sole issue at trial was whether the lessee had given express or implied consent to his friend to possess the vehicle, which would make the lessee vicariously liable under s. 192(3) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The court rejected the lessee's evidence that he had flatly refused his friend's request to use the vehicle, finding his subsequent conduct inconsistent with a refusal.

The court concluded that the presumption of consent was not rebutted and held the lessee vicariously liable for the negligent operation of the vehicle.

The defendants moved for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's motor vehicle accident claim, arguing it was statute-barred by the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the defendants failed to meet their evidentiary burden to establish there was no serious issue requiring a trial regarding the discoverability of the claim, specifically whether the plaintiff's injuries met the "threshold" for non-pecuniary damages within the limitation period.

The court also found that the matter was not suitable for resolution using expanded summary judgment powers due to overlapping evidence with the merits of the claim.

The appellant was struck by a car and retained a lawyer who pursued accident benefits but failed to commence a tort action within the limitation period.

The appellant sued the lawyer for negligence, and new counsel subsequently issued a statement of claim against the driver.

The motion judge dismissed the tort action as statute-barred, finding the appellant failed to exercise reasonable diligence to discover whether her injuries met the Insurance Act threshold.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, concluding that the appellant's failure to inquire about the permanence of her injuries was unreasonable and that a defence medical report obtained during litigation did not toll the limitation period.

The plaintiff sought leave to appeal an interlocutory order requiring her to post security for costs.

She argued the motions judge failed to properly consider her After the Event (ATE) Legal Expense Insurance as an asset in Ontario.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the motions judge did consider the ATE insurance as one of several factors and there was no good reason to doubt the correctness of the decision.

The court also declined to admit fresh evidence regarding the ATE insurance on the leave application.

This was a costs decision following a summary judgment motion in an insurance consent dispute arising from a motor vehicle accident.

Although the moving defendant ultimately succeeded on the underlying motion and had served favourable offers to settle, the court held the motion process was unnecessary because he failed for years to answer undertakings and produce contemporaneous insurer communications that would likely have resolved the coverage dispute earlier.

Applying the costs discretion under s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and the Rule 57.01 factors, with particular emphasis on whether an unnecessary step was taken, the court awarded costs against the moving defendant to the insurer respondent.

The decision emphasizes the post-Hryniak culture shift requiring timely disclosure and cooperative, proportionate litigation conduct.

The defendant vehicle owner brought a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of the claim against him arising from a rear-end collision, arguing the driver had taken the vehicle without consent under s.192(2) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The record included a statutory declaration from the driver asserting she had taken the vehicle without consent, but conflicting statements and incomplete discovery evidence raised credibility concerns.

The court held that inconsistencies, evidentiary gaps, and unresolved credibility issues prevented a fair determination on the written record.

Applying the summary judgment framework from Hryniak v. Mauldin, the court declined to grant summary judgment and ordered a limited oral hearing.

A mini-trial was directed to determine whether the driver had the owner’s implied consent to possess the vehicle.

The moving defendant sought summary judgment dismissing a motor vehicle negligence action against her arising from a collision caused by her estranged spouse driving her vehicle while impaired.

The issue was whether the vehicle was in the driver’s possession with the owner’s implied consent under s. 192(2) of the Highway Traffic Act, or alternatively whether the owner was negligent in safeguarding her car keys.

The court held the owner rebutted the statutory presumption of consent, finding she had taken reasonable steps to prevent access to the vehicle and did not grant express or implied permission.

The alleged inconsistencies in her testimony were immaterial and did not undermine credibility on the central issues.

The court also rejected the insurer’s negligence argument, finding the owner acted as a reasonable and prudent person in controlling the keys.

Following a jury verdict awarding damages for personal injury arising from a motor vehicle accident, the court addressed entitlement to costs in light of competing Rule 49 settlement offers.

The jury awarded $60,000 in total damages, including $15,000 for general damages and $45,000 for future loss of income or competitive advantage.

The court considered whether prejudgment interest should be notionally applied to the general damages award when comparing the verdict to the defendant’s settlement offer for Rule 49 purposes, particularly given the statutory deduction under the Insurance Act.

The court held that statutory deductions are ignored when determining entitlement to costs and that prejudgment interest should be notionally added to the general damages.

With that calculation, the plaintiff obtained a judgment slightly more favourable than the defendant’s offer and was therefore presumptively entitled to costs.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment decision on liability.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge did not have the benefit of the recent decision in Combined Air Mechanical Services Inc. v. Flesch.

The Court held that the 'full appreciation test' required a trial because the case turned substantially on credibility and disputed facts, including evidence of a joint venture involving street racing at excessive speeds and reckless driving.

The summary judgment was set aside and the motion dismissed.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's finding that the appellant driver was engaged in the course of her employment at the time of a motor vehicle accident.

The driver was attending a mandatory training session in Mississauga, staying at an employer-paid hotel in Toronto, and driving an employer-owned vehicle.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's application of the Bazely v. Curry test and dismissed the appeal, awarding $5,000 in costs to the respondents.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her personal injury claim following a slip and fall near a bus stop.

At trial, the judge accepted the evidence of a bus driver over the appellant's testimony regarding the cause of the fall.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in his credibility findings and in limiting cross-examination of the bus driver on a 'will say' statement.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the factual findings and no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice regarding the cross-examination.

The defendants appealed an order striking their statement of defence for failing to comply with production orders.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the motions judge erred in principle by striking the pleading without reviewing all the affidavit evidence.

The Court concluded the 'ultimate litigation remedy' was not warranted given the defendants' efforts to comply, mutual delay, and limited evidence of prejudice to the plaintiff.

The defendants were ordered to produce all outstanding documents within seven days.

The defendants sought leave to appeal a decision refusing to bifurcate a personal injury trial where a jury notice was outstanding.

The motion judge found that there were conflicting decisions on whether bifurcation could be ordered in the face of an outstanding jury notice, specifically noting a conflict between the lower court's decision and Morniga v. State Farm.

Finding the issue to be of general importance to the personal injury bar and the administration of justice, the court granted leave to appeal.

The respondent was insured under an accidental death and dismemberment policy and submitted a claim for the loss of use of her leg.

The appellant insurer rejected the claim.

The respondent commenced an action slightly more than a year after submitting her proof of claim, but less than a year after the rejection.

The appellant moved for summary judgment, arguing the action was barred by the one-year limitation period in s. 206(1) of the Insurance Act.

The motion judge dismissed the motion, holding the period began upon unequivocal rejection.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the limitation period begins to run when the insurer receives sufficient evidence to assess the claim, not upon rejection, and that the discoverability principle does not apply to this statutory provision.