Michael William Chadwick

The appellant appealed a summary judgment decision on liability.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge did not have the benefit of the recent decision in Combined Air Mechanical Services Inc. v. Flesch.

The Court held that the 'full appreciation test' required a trial because the case turned substantially on credibility and disputed facts, including evidence of a joint venture involving street racing at excessive speeds and reckless driving.

The summary judgment was set aside and the motion dismissed.

The insurer applied to vary or revoke a 2007 order to pay income replacement benefits, but sought to withdraw the application during the hearing, claiming its psychological expert changed his opinion.

The arbitrator allowed the withdrawal but imposed a term precluding the insurer from filing further applications regarding the 2007 order until it substantiated the expert's change of opinion.

The arbitrator also assessed the insured's expenses, awarding $18,204.83 for legal fees and disbursements, including reduced amounts for several expert reports that were deemed inefficient or of limited value.

The insurer applied to vary or revoke an order granting the insured ongoing income replacement benefits.

During the hearing, the insurer sought to withdraw its application after its psychological expert changed his opinion to support the insured's disability claim.

The insured opposed the withdrawal, seeking instead a dismissal with terms requiring the production of clinical notes and an addendum from the expert.

The arbitrator deferred ruling on the dismissal and expenses, but ordered the insurer to produce a written statement from its expert explaining the change in opinion, while allowing the parties to make further written submissions.

The applicant was injured when she slipped and fell on black ice in a parking lot after disembarking from a motorcoach.

She applied for statutory accident benefits, which the insurer denied on the basis that the incident was not an 'accident' under section 2(1) of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.

The arbitrator found that the applicant had safely disembarked and walked a short distance before falling.

Applying the direct causation test from Chisholm, the arbitrator concluded that the slip and fall was an intervening act not directly caused by the use or operation of the motor vehicle.

The application for arbitration was dismissed.

The insurer appealed an arbitrator's decision refusing its request for an adjournment to conduct insurer examinations under section 42 of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.

The Director's Delegate held that while arbitrators have the jurisdiction under the Statutory Powers Procedure Act to adjourn a hearing and stay proceedings where an insured unreasonably refuses to attend an insurer examination, the arbitrator in this case properly exercised his discretion in refusing the adjournment.

The arbitrator found the request was made too late and the insurer already knew the case it had to meet.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's finding that the appellant driver was engaged in the course of her employment at the time of a motor vehicle accident.

The driver was attending a mandatory training session in Mississauga, staying at an employer-paid hotel in Toronto, and driving an employer-owned vehicle.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's application of the Bazely v. Curry test and dismissed the appeal, awarding $5,000 in costs to the respondents.

The plaintiffs appealed an interlocutory order removing their solicitor of record for allegedly improper conduct.

The solicitor had contacted corporate counsel for a non-party (Cineplex) to clarify ownership issues regarding the premises where the plaintiff's slip and fall occurred.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal and reinstated the solicitor, finding that the motions judge mischaracterized the legal test and misconstrued the facts.

The court held that the Rules of Professional Conduct prohibiting contact with represented parties did not apply, as the non-party was not represented by the defendant's counsel and no confidential information was discussed.

The plaintiff appealed an interlocutory order removing their lawyer as solicitor of record in a slip-and-fall action.

The motion judge had found the lawyer's conduct in contacting corporate counsel of a non-party to be imprudent and in breach of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the non-party was not represented by the defendant's counsel and there was no conflict of interest.

The court held that the motion judge mischaracterized the test for removing a solicitor and that the lawyer's conduct did not bring public confidence in the justice system into question.

The applicant sought her expenses for an arbitration proceeding after successfully claiming ongoing income replacement benefits.

The insurer disputed the number of hours billed by the applicant's lawyer, particularly the bulk billing of 23.6 hours for 118 pieces of correspondence.

The arbitrator allowed half of the bulk-billed hours due to a lack of supporting evidence, but found the remaining hours reasonable.

Certain disbursements for medical records not produced in the arbitration were also deducted.

The arbitrator ordered the insurer to pay $11,514.50 for the applicant's legal fees, disbursements, and GST.

The applicant sought statutory accident benefits following a motor vehicle accident.

The insurer denied various benefits, leading to arbitration.

On a preliminary motion, the arbitrator ruled that the applicant's claims for certain examination costs were barred because she failed to seek prior approval under s. 24(1.1) of the Schedule.

However, the arbitrator allowed the applicant to proceed with claims for treatment expenses incurred before the insurer first raised the lack of treatment plans, as the insurer had breached its duty to assist the applicant.

The arbitrator also ordered the insurer to produce portions of its accident benefits file up to the date of the second mediation application, but denied the applicant's request for the insurer's internal policies on lumping out claims.

The applicant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and sought ongoing income replacement benefits after the 104-week mark.

The insurer had reinstated benefits prior to the pre-hearing but did not concede entitlement.

The arbitrator found that the applicant suffered a complete inability to engage in any suitable employment due to chronic pain, reduced endurance, and inability to sit, stand, or keyboard for significant periods.

The applicant was awarded ongoing income replacement benefits and her arbitration expenses.

The insurer brought a motion to stay the arbitration proceeding until the applicant attended an insurer medical examination (IME).

The insurer argued that procedural fairness required the stay because the applicant had recently served several medical reports.

The arbitrator dismissed the motion, finding that the insurer had not made early arrangements for the IME and had changed its defence strategy shortly before the hearing.

Furthermore, the arbitrator held that there is no inherent or statutory jurisdiction to order an insured to attend an IME or to stay a proceeding for failure to attend, as the insurer's only right to an examination is under section 42 of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule, which provides its own remedies for non-compliance.

The applicant sought statutory accident benefits after passing out on a sidewalk and falling into the side of a passing vehicle.

The insurer raised the preliminary issue of whether the incident constituted an 'accident' under section 2(1) of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.

The applicant argued the insurer was estopped from raising this issue due to delay.

The Arbitrator found no promissory estoppel as the applicant did not rely on the insurer's silence to his detriment.

However, the Arbitrator ruled that the incident was an 'accident' because the use or operation of the automobile directly caused the applicant's injuries, distinguishing the case from situations where an independent intervening act breaks the chain of causation.

The Applicant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and sought statutory accident benefits.

The Insurer terminated income replacement and housekeeping benefits based on insurer's examinations.

The arbitrator found the Applicant's evidence and her medical assessors' opinions credible, establishing that her physical and psychological impairments substantially prevented her from performing her pre-accident employment and housekeeping tasks.

The arbitrator rejected the Insurer's assessors' evidence as flawed and unpersuasive.

The Applicant was awarded income replacement and housekeeping benefits for the 104-week period, with interest.

Claims for post-104 week benefits were dismissed on a technical basis without prejudice.

The claim for a special award was dismissed as the Insurer's reliance on its assessors, though ultimately unsuccessful, was not unreasonable.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment awarding damages for lost profits arising from a breach of contract.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in accepting the plaintiff's expert's historical approach to calculating lost profits and failed to consider whether lost advertisements were transferred to other accounts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge was entitled to accept the plaintiff's expert evidence and that the argument regarding transferred advertisements was not sufficiently developed in the evidence.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her personal injury claim following a slip and fall near a bus stop.

At trial, the judge accepted the evidence of a bus driver over the appellant's testimony regarding the cause of the fall.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in his credibility findings and in limiting cross-examination of the bus driver on a 'will say' statement.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the factual findings and no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice regarding the cross-examination.

The defendants appealed an order striking their statement of defence for failing to comply with production orders.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the motions judge erred in principle by striking the pleading without reviewing all the affidavit evidence.

The Court concluded the 'ultimate litigation remedy' was not warranted given the defendants' efforts to comply, mutual delay, and limited evidence of prejudice to the plaintiff.

The defendants were ordered to produce all outstanding documents within seven days.

The defendants sought leave to appeal a decision refusing to bifurcate a personal injury trial where a jury notice was outstanding.

The motion judge found that there were conflicting decisions on whether bifurcation could be ordered in the face of an outstanding jury notice, specifically noting a conflict between the lower court's decision and Morniga v. State Farm.

Finding the issue to be of general importance to the personal injury bar and the administration of justice, the court granted leave to appeal.

The moving party, a defendant in a motor vehicle action, sought leave to appeal an interlocutory order that compelled the disclosure of any expert's report obtained from a joint vehicle inspection and required the parties to split outstanding storage costs.

The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal the disclosure order, finding good reason to doubt its correctness as it abrogated litigation privilege, which is a matter of public importance.

However, the court denied leave to appeal the storage costs order, characterizing it as a discretionary decision with no broader public importance.

The respondent was insured under an accidental death and dismemberment policy and submitted a claim for the loss of use of her leg.

The appellant insurer rejected the claim.

The respondent commenced an action slightly more than a year after submitting her proof of claim, but less than a year after the rejection.

The appellant moved for summary judgment, arguing the action was barred by the one-year limitation period in s. 206(1) of the Insurance Act.

The motion judge dismissed the motion, holding the period began upon unequivocal rejection.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the limitation period begins to run when the insurer receives sufficient evidence to assess the claim, not upon rejection, and that the discoverability principle does not apply to this statutory provision.