Brigette A. Morrison

The applicant insurer sought judicial review of an interlocutory decision by a Small Claims Court deputy judge regarding document production and costs.

The underlying action involved a rental car company suing the insurer after coverage was denied for a rental car accident due to the insured's failure to cooperate.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding no exceptional circumstances, excess of jurisdiction, or denial of natural justice that would warrant intervention in a Small Claims Court interlocutory order.

The matter was directed to proceed to trial where the trial judge would determine the admissibility of the subpoenaed documents.

Following a decision granting summary judgment, the court issued a supplementary endorsement to address correspondence from the parties regarding costs.

The court had previously corrected two inadvertent errors in its costs awards at the request of the defendants.

The plaintiff's counsel subsequently emailed the court requesting that the costs orders be held in abeyance to allow for further written submissions, alleging sharp practice by opposing counsel.

The court declined the request, noting that all parties had previously agreed to the court determining costs based on the uploaded outlines without further submissions.

The court held that it was inappropriate to request a change to the costs decision or to make allegations of professional misconduct via email to the court.

The moving parties, a car rental company and its lessee, sought partial summary judgment dismissing the plaintiff's motor vehicle accident claims against them.

The plaintiff's vehicle was struck by the rental car, which was driven by the lessee's partner without express consent.

The court found that partial summary judgment was appropriate to determine the issue of consent.

Applying the objective test for implied consent, the court concluded that the driver would not have been justified in deeming she had implied consent to possess the vehicle, given she had never taken it before, only had a G1 license, and the lessee had no reason to suspect she would take it.

The motions were granted and the claims against the moving parties were dismissed.

This appeal concerned a priority and coverage dispute between two automobile insurers regarding third-party liability for the driver/lessee of a leased vehicle involved in an accident.

The appellant, Continental Casualty Company, insurer for the car rental company, challenged the application judge's finding that it was the priority insurer over BelairDirect Insurance Company, which had initially, but erroneously, believed it covered the driver.

The Court of Appeal dismissed Continental's appeal, affirming that BelairDirect was not bound by a settlement or waiver, as its initial actions were based on a mistaken belief of coverage and no binding agreement to abandon priority disputes was formed.

The applicant insurer sought a declaration that the respondent insurer had a duty to defend the driver of a rental vehicle in a motor vehicle accident tort action.

The applicant had initially defended the driver based on a mistaken belief that he was covered under his mother's policy.

Upon discovering the error, the applicant asked the respondent, who insured the rental vehicle, to assume the defence.

The respondent refused, arguing the applicant was estopped.

The court found the driver was not insured by the applicant, there was no binding agreement to abandon the priority dispute, and promissory estoppel did not apply because the respondent suffered no detrimental reliance.

The respondent was declared the priority insurer with a duty to defend.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment seeking a declaration that a third-party insurer ranked first in priority for coverage and was obligated to defend the action.

The third-party insurer denied coverage.

The court addressed a preliminary issue regarding the proper use of discovery transcripts in motions.

Ultimately, the court found it could not determine the substantive insurance coverage dispute without further submissions on its jurisdiction to interpret a Quebec-issued policy and the applicable Quebec law.

The motion was adjourned sine die.

This decision addresses a costs dispute arising from a motor vehicle accident involving a rental car.

Aviscar Inc. sought substantial indemnity costs against Sinisa Filipovic and Certas Direct Insurance Company for their refusal to accept primary insurance responsibility under the Insurance Act and for unnecessarily prolonging litigation.

The court found Aviscar's early offer to settle was reasonable and that the respondents' actions led to significant unnecessary legal expenses.

Applying proportionality and considering the respondents' conduct, the court awarded Aviscar Inc. a total of $49,500 in costs.

The moving party, a rental car company, sought summary judgment to dismiss a crossclaim brought by the co-defendants following a rear-end motor vehicle accident.

The co-defendants alleged the rental company was negligent because the plaintiff's seat allegedly dislodged during the collision.

The court granted summary judgment, finding no evidence that the rental company breached any duty of care regarding vehicle maintenance or inspection.

The court also rejected arguments regarding spoliation of evidence and the application of foreign law, concluding there was no genuine issue requiring a trial.

This costs endorsement followed unsuccessful motions by the defendants to dismiss the plaintiff's claims.

The plaintiff sought $17,673.81 in costs on a partial indemnity basis.

The defendants argued that the costs were excessive and that certain steps taken by the plaintiff were not directly related to the abuse of process argument raised in their motions.

The court declined to parse costs by specific issues within the motion, finding the plaintiff's response reasonable.

However, it found some time spent excessive and fixed the costs at $13,000, inclusive of HST and disbursements, to be paid by the defendants within thirty days.

The defendants brought summary judgment motions seeking dismissal of two actions as an abuse of process.

The actions arose from a motor vehicle accident involving an uninsured driver, after the plaintiff obtained a default judgment against the tortfeasor and pursued recovery through various insurers and entities associated with the rental vehicle.

The defendants argued the repeated proceedings constituted abusive relitigation.

The court held that the doctrine of abuse of process was not engaged because the earlier proceedings involved different entities and were not adjudicated on the merits, and no manifest unfairness or prejudice was established.

The motions were dismissed, without prejudice to the defendants bringing other procedural motions.

The plaintiff Najla Rahimi moved for summary judgment dismissing the counterclaim brought against her by the defendants.

The case involves a rear-end motor vehicle collision where the defendant Mojtaba Hatami, driving a leased car, rear-ended the plaintiffs' car.

The defendants claimed Najla Rahimi was contributorily negligent for stopping suddenly.

The court found no evidence of negligence by Najla Rahimi and held the defendant 100% liable for the collision.

The counterclaim was dismissed, and liability in the main action was resolved in favour of the plaintiffs, leaving only damages for trial.

On a summary judgment motion by the plaintiff driver, the court dismissed a counterclaim seeking contribution and indemnity arising from a rear-end collision.

Applying the Hryniak framework and the best foot forward principle, the court held the evidentiary record was sufficient to decide liability without a trial.

The defendant driver failed to rebut the presumption of negligence applicable in rear-end collisions, and there was no admissible evidence giving an air of reality to any allegation of contributory negligence by the plaintiff driver.

The ruling necessarily resolved liability in the main action, leaving only the assessment of damages for trial, while costs of the counterclaim were reserved.

A rental vehicle owner and its insurer brought a Rule 21 motion seeking a determination of priority of insurance under s. 277(1.1) of the Insurance Act following a motor vehicle accident involving a rented vehicle.

The plaintiffs sued the driver and the rental company but did not name the renter as a defendant, prompting the owner to commence a third‑party claim against the renter for contribution and indemnity.

The renter’s insurer argued that its policy was not “available” because the plaintiffs had not sued the renter directly.

The court held that a liability claim against the renter through a third‑party proceeding is sufficient to trigger the statutory priority rules.

The renter’s policy was therefore required to respond first, consistent with the legislative intent that the renter’s insurance be primary and the rental company’s insurer last in priority.

Following a jury verdict apportioning fault for a motor vehicle accident between two motorcyclists, the appellant challenged the trial judge’s jury instructions on causation, joint tortfeasor liability, and concurrent liability.

The court held that any alleged error concerning joint tortfeasor instructions was immaterial because the jury’s answers clearly established liability as a concurrent tortfeasor, and the evidence supported that route to liability.

The court also rejected the argument that the charge was unbalanced or unfair when read as a whole.

It further upheld the dismissal of a post-verdict Rule 21.01 motion concerning insurance coverage, holding that the issue could properly proceed in a separate action.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment decision on liability.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge did not have the benefit of the recent decision in Combined Air Mechanical Services Inc. v. Flesch.

The Court held that the 'full appreciation test' required a trial because the case turned substantially on credibility and disputed facts, including evidence of a joint venture involving street racing at excessive speeds and reckless driving.

The summary judgment was set aside and the motion dismissed.