Paul Omeziri

The plaintiffs, Manubhai Lallub Patel and Manjula Patel, brought a motion to set aside a Registrar's Order dismissing their action as abandoned, issued on February 28, 2014.

The action, commenced in 2013 following a 2011 collision, was never served on the defendants.

The plaintiffs' former counsel, Alpesh Patel, deliberately did not advance the litigation and later fabricated settlement documents, leading to a fraud charge against him.

The court applied the four Reid factors (explanation of delay, inadvertence, promptness of motion, and prejudice to defendants) in a contextual approach.

The court found that the plaintiffs failed to provide a reasonable explanation for the delay, as they did not even know the action had been commenced, and their former counsel's conduct was deliberate, not inadvertent.

While the motion was brought promptly after the dismissal order came to the plaintiffs' attention, the defendants demonstrated significant actual prejudice due to the loss of key medical evidence (OHIP summaries) and the inability to conduct timely independent medical assessments over a 12-year period.

The court also emphasized the principle of finality and the fact that the plaintiffs are pursuing remedies against their former solicitor.

Consequently, the motion to set aside the dismissal order was dismissed.

The parties requested a consent adjournment of the pretrial and trial dates because the plaintiff served a late expert report after their original expert became ill.

The court convened a case conference and criticized both parties' conduct regarding the expert reports.

The court adjourned the pretrial to September but directed the defendant to obtain their expert's responding report by August 31, 2022, in an effort to preserve the October trial date.

Intact Insurance Company appealed an arbitrator's decision that found a motorcycle passenger and driver were spouses under the Insurance Act, obliging Intact to pay accident benefits.

The passenger was in a committed five-year relationship with the driver but maintained a separate residence and was still married to another individual.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, finding the arbitrator committed an extricable error of law by applying family law principles to the definition of 'spouse' for insurance purposes and by failing to adhere to the bright-line test requiring parties to have lived together in the same residence for three years to be considered spouses under the Insurance Act.

The court applied a correctness standard of review.

The plaintiff pedestrian was struck by a vehicle and commenced an action against the driver.

After the limitation period expired, the plaintiff discovered through an unredacted police report that a second vehicle was involved and commenced a second action against its driver.

The defendant in the second action moved for summary judgment, arguing the claim was statute-barred and an abuse of process.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the plaintiff acted with reasonable diligence in discovering the second driver's identity and that the second action was not an abuse of process as the two actions could be heard together.

The defendants, Alex G. Krek and Francka Krek, brought a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs', William and Dianne Klein, action for delay, pursuant to Rule 24.01(1)(c) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The action, stemming from an oil spill 29 years prior, was commenced in 2011 and had seen significant delays and missed timetables.

The Kreks argued the delay was inordinate, inexcusable, and caused prejudice, citing the death of a witness and Mr. Krek's frail health.

The Kleins contended their delay was reasonable, particularly given a prior ruling by Wood J. in October 2017 that found their delay reasonable until recently, and subsequent consent timetables.

The court, while expressing "grave concerns" about the slow progress and finding the overall delay inordinate, ultimately denied the motion to dismiss.

This was based on the principle from Stokker v. Storoschuk that where delay has been addressed in a prior court order, only subsequent delay requires explanation.

The court found the delay since Wood J.'s order (17 months) was not inordinate or unexcused, but imposed a peremptory "last chance" timetable for the Kleins to advance the action.

The defendant moved to dismiss a motor vehicle accident action for delay under the Rules of Civil Procedure, relying on the plaintiffs’ failure to comply with a litigation timetable and to set the matter down for trial.

A plaintiff brought a cross‑motion to vary the timetable order previously imposed when the action was reinstated after an administrative dismissal.

The court held that the earlier reinstatement order effectively displaced reliance on the six‑month set‑down requirement and that dismissal for delay was not warranted.

While most of the delay was attributable to the plaintiffs, including missed deadlines and discovery delays partly arising from conflict-of-interest issues among plaintiffs, the court emphasized the preference for resolving civil actions on their merits.

The timetable order was varied and the action permitted to proceed, subject to the defendant’s ability to raise prejudice at trial arising from incomplete medical records.

The moving party sought summary judgment declaring that the co-defendant’s insurer was the first loss insurer under s. 277(1.1) of the Insurance Act arising from a single-vehicle accident involving a rented car in New York State.

The motion also sought a declaration that Ontario law governed vicarious liability issues and that the insurer fund the defence.

The court held that there were genuine issues requiring trial, including whether the driver was a renter or co-lessee under the rental agreement and whether New York law governed liability under the lex loci delicti rule.

The court further concluded that the narrow injustice exception to lex loci delicti did not clearly apply at this stage.

The insurer’s cross-motion to amend pleadings to plead New York law was granted because the amendment did not withdraw an admission and caused no non-compensable prejudice.

A rental vehicle owner and its insurer brought a Rule 21 motion seeking a determination of priority of insurance under s. 277(1.1) of the Insurance Act following a motor vehicle accident involving a rented vehicle.

The plaintiffs sued the driver and the rental company but did not name the renter as a defendant, prompting the owner to commence a third‑party claim against the renter for contribution and indemnity.

The renter’s insurer argued that its policy was not “available” because the plaintiffs had not sued the renter directly.

The court held that a liability claim against the renter through a third‑party proceeding is sufficient to trigger the statutory priority rules.

The renter’s policy was therefore required to respond first, consistent with the legislative intent that the renter’s insurance be primary and the rental company’s insurer last in priority.

The registered owner of a motor vehicle brought a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of the action against him arising from a pedestrian collision caused by his son while driving the vehicle.

The owner argued that his son operated the vehicle without his consent because the son only held a G1 licence and had been expressly prohibited from driving unaccompanied.

The court considered s. 192 of the Highway Traffic Act and the jurisprudence confirming that owner liability turns on consent to possession, not consent to operation.

Evidence showed the son had his own set of keys, unrestricted access to the vehicle on the family property, and that the vehicle had been purchased for his eventual ownership and use.

The court held that the owner failed to establish that the vehicle was in the son’s possession without consent and that there was at least a genuine issue requiring a trial.