Dr. Lawrie Reznek

Following a high-speed rear-end collision that propelled the plaintiff's vehicle into a rollover in a ditch, the court found the plaintiff sustained an mTBI, post-concussion syndrome, dizziness and balance-related impairments, adjustment disorder, and aggravated knee injuries.

The defence theory that the plaintiff fabricated or exaggerated symptoms was rejected, and the court strongly preferred the plaintiff's treating and vocational experts over the defence neuropsychiatric and neuropsychological evidence.

Applying the but for causation test, the court held the collision caused the plaintiff's permanent impairments and rendered him unemployable in the film industry or any competitive employment.

The plaintiff recovered general damages, past and future income loss, future care costs, special damages for treatment at the Mayo Clinic, and the spouse recovered damages under s. 61(2)(d) of the Family Law Act.

The parties separated following incidents of family violence, including the respondent hitting their child and physically and sexually assaulting the applicant.

The applicant sought sole decision-making and supervised parenting time, while the respondent sought equal parenting time and joint decision-making.

The court found the applicant's evidence of family violence credible and ordered that the respondent's parenting time be supervised while inside the home, but permitted unsupervised time outside the home.

The applicant was granted sole decision-making responsibility and a permanent restraining order against the respondent.

The court also imputed rental income to the respondent for child support purposes and ordered him to pay an equalization payment and retroactive child support.

The applicant insurer sought judicial review of a decision by the Director's Delegate, which allowed the insured's appeal from an arbitrator's denial of statutory accident benefits.

The Director's Delegate found that the arbitrator erred in law by failing to provide adequate reasons for denying income replacement and medical benefits.

Applying the Vavilov framework, the Divisional Court held that the standard of review was reasonableness.

The Court concluded that the Director's Delegate reasonably found the arbitrator's reasons inadequate, as they failed to address the principal evidence or explain the reasoning process.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The plaintiff sought damages for personal injuries sustained in a 2013 motor vehicle accident.

Following a jury trial where the jury awarded zero damages, the defendant brought a threshold motion under s. 267.5(5) of the Insurance Act.

The court found that the plaintiff failed to prove on a balance of probabilities that he sustained a permanent serious impairment of an important physical, mental or psychological function caused by the 2013 accident.

The plaintiff's medical evidence was flawed because his experts were either unaware of or could not parse out the effects of three subsequent motor vehicle accidents.

The defendant's motion was granted and the plaintiff's claim for non-pecuniary loss was dismissed.

The plaintiff, a cyclist with significant pre-existing psychological and cognitive vulnerabilities, was struck by a police cruiser while riding through a pedestrian crosswalk at night.

The court apportioned liability 60% to the defendant police officer and 40% to the plaintiff.

Applying the thin skull rule, the court found the collision exacerbated the plaintiff's pre-existing conditions and caused a mild traumatic brain injury, rendering him completely disabled and requiring 24/7 attendant care.

Total damages were assessed at over $5.2 million, reduced to $3,131,370 after accounting for contributory negligence.

The defendant appealed a jury verdict in a personal injury action arising from a motor vehicle accident.

At trial, the judge excluded defence video surveillance evidence intended for impeachment, failed to provide a correcting instruction after the plaintiffs' counsel made an inflammatory closing address, and failed to fairly review the defence's medical evidence of malingering in the jury charge.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge applied the wrong legal test for admitting impeachment evidence under Rule 30.09 and erred in his handling of the closing address and jury charge.

The cumulative effect of these errors resulted in a miscarriage of justice, necessitating a new trial.