Douglas M. Belch

Following a four‑week jury trial arising from a motor vehicle collision caused by an impaired driver, the plaintiffs obtained a damages verdict of $220,000 but a much smaller net judgment after statutory deductions and accident benefits offsets.

Both parties sought costs, relying on competing Rule 49 settlement offers and arguments concerning proportionality and the impact of statutory deductibles.

The court held that statutory deductibles are not considered when determining entitlement to costs and rejected the defendant’s argument that its offers were more favourable.

After reviewing the complexity of the trial, expert evidence, motions, and proportionality considerations, the court fixed the plaintiffs’ costs at $250,000 in fees plus $126,598.48 in disbursements and applicable HST.

The court further concluded that recent amendments to the Insurance Act affecting cost calculations should not apply retroactively to this litigation.

Following a jury award in a personal injury action, the parties sought clarification of the terms of judgment concerning deductions for statutory accident benefits relating to housekeeping expenses and disclosure of litigation insurance.

The defendant argued that housekeeping benefits previously received under the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule should be deducted from both past and future housekeeping awards.

The plaintiffs submitted that benefits for past housekeeping could only be deducted from the jury’s award for past housekeeping losses and not from future losses.

The court accepted the plaintiffs’ position, holding that past benefits cannot be deducted from future losses, and confirmed the higher judgment amount.

The defendant’s request for disclosure of litigation insurance was found to be premature and unnecessary at that stage.

Following a civil jury verdict arising from a motor vehicle accident, the court was asked to settle the terms of judgment including deductions for statutory accident benefits, the applicable statutory deductible under the Insurance Act, and the appropriate prejudgment interest rate.

The defendant sought to deduct the full amount allocated to income replacement benefits in a prior accident benefits settlement, while the plaintiffs argued only amounts clearly matching the jury award should be deducted.

The court held the settlement allocation for income replacement benefits was binding and deductible.

However, it accepted the plaintiffs’ position that the increased statutory deductible introduced shortly before trial should not apply retrospectively, maintaining the earlier deductible amount.

Exercising discretion under the Courts of Justice Act, the court also set prejudgment interest at 3%.

The defendant brought a threshold motion under s. 267.5(5) of the Insurance Act arguing the injured plaintiff had not sustained a permanent serious impairment of an important physical, mental, or psychological function following a motor vehicle collision.

Conflicting medical evidence was presented regarding chronic pain, psychiatric impairment, and the causal connection between the collision and the plaintiff’s symptoms.

The court accepted expert evidence linking facet joint injuries and chronic pain to the accident and found the plaintiff’s condition substantially interfered with his ability to perform the heavy physical duties of his construction business.

The court also rejected suggestions that the plaintiff was malingering.

The plaintiff met the statutory threshold for non‑pecuniary damages.

The appellant appealed convictions for two counts of sexual assault, arguing the trial judge misapprehended key evidence when concluding the appellant had denied all physical contact with the complainant.

The appellate court reviewed the trial record and noted that the appellant had admitted holding the complainant’s hands, a fact acknowledged earlier in the trial judge’s reasons.

The appellate court found that the trial judge’s later statement that the appellant denied “any and all physical contact” created a significant inconsistency that may have played a central role in the credibility assessment leading to conviction.

Because the misapprehension concerned material evidence and may have influenced the reasoning process, the conviction could not safely stand.

The court set aside the convictions and ordered a new trial.

The defendants sought summary judgment dismissing claims arising from a motor vehicle accident following a cottage birthday party where alcohol was consumed.

The plaintiffs alleged the property owners were liable as social hosts and as occupiers of premises, arguing they failed to prevent intoxicated driving and failed to address rocks allegedly obstructing a right-of-way.

The court held the property owners were not social hosts because they neither organized nor participated in the party and did not serve alcohol.

The accident also occurred off their property, and their limited right to use a shared right‑of‑way did not make them occupiers responsible for its condition.

Finding no genuine issue requiring a trial, the court dismissed the action and cross‑claims against them.

The moving party sought to vary a consent order arising from a mediated wrongful dismissal settlement, arguing the order incorrectly named a corporate entity that did not exist at the time of settlement.

The court considered whether the settlement and resulting consent order contained a mistake regarding the proper corporate defendant.

Applying the objective test for consensus ad idem and Rule 59.06, the court concluded a reasonable bystander would find the settlement was intended to be with a different corporate entity carrying on business under a similar name.

The court amended the style of cause to substitute the correct corporate defendant and vacated enforcement measures taken against the incorrectly named company.

The applicant, the former stepmother of the child, brought a motion for interim access.

The biological parents, who shared joint custody, opposed the motion.

The respondent father also brought a cross-motion for security for costs.

The court dismissed the applicant's motion for interim access, finding that it was not in the child's best interests given the parents' objections, the potential to undermine their parenting, and the child's expressed wishes.

The court also dismissed the respondent's motion for security for costs, as the applicant was an Ontario resident with substantial equity in her home.

The respondent was awarded set-off costs of $3,500.

The appellant appealed a conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg per 100 ml.

At trial, the accused argued that breath samples should be excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter due to breaches of ss. 8, 9, and 10(b) arising from a police officer’s mistaken belief that a 15‑minute waiting period was required before administering a roadside screening test after the accused had been smoking.

The trial judge found Charter breaches but admitted the breath samples after applying the three-part test from R. v. Grant, concluding the officer acted in good faith and society’s interest in adjudicating impaired driving offences supported admission.

On appeal, the appellant argued the officer’s conduct constituted negligence rather than good faith and that the trial judge misapplied the Grant analysis.

The court held the trial judge considered the proper factors and was not clearly wrong in characterizing the conduct as a good faith mistake.

Deference was owed to the trial judge’s balancing under s. 24(2), and the conviction was upheld.

The plaintiff contractor brought a motion to amend its statement of claim to add the spouse of the defendant corporate officer as a defendant for breach of the trust provisions of the Construction Lien Act.

The claim arose from unpaid invoices for drilling and blasting services performed on multiple solar energy projects, with the plaintiff alleging that trust funds received by the contractor were diverted.

The court considered whether the claim against the proposed defendant was statute‑barred and whether leave should be granted under the Rules of Civil Procedure to add a party.

The court held that the limitation period for the trust claim began when the trust monies were received, not when the plaintiff last performed work.

Because the motion to add the new defendant was brought within two years of discovering the payment of trust funds, and any prejudice could be remedied by costs, leave to amend was granted.

The applicant, an inmate serving a sentence in administrative segregation at a maximum-security penitentiary in Ontario, applied for habeas corpus to prevent his involuntary transfer to the general population of a maximum-security penitentiary in British Columbia.

He argued the transfer would deprive him of his residual liberty by separating him from his family, medical support, and legal counsel.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, finding that a transfer from segregation to the general population within the same security classification does not constitute a deprivation of liberty.

Furthermore, the court held that the transfer decision was reasonable and lawful, as the correctional authorities had properly considered their statutory duties.

Following a complex motion involving amendments to a statement of claim and issues relating to government funding of a transportation consortium’s defence, the court addressed costs among multiple parties.

The moving plaintiffs were successful in obtaining leave to amend their claim and to add the provincial government as a defendant, but were unsuccessful in obtaining litigation funding from the government.

The court applied the principles under Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, emphasizing that costs must be fair and reasonable rather than reflective of actual legal fees incurred.

Costs of $150,000 were awarded to the plaintiffs payable by the Crown for the successful amendment issues, while the Crown was awarded $61,950 payable by the plaintiffs for the unsuccessful funding request.

The issue of the defendant consortium’s costs relating to funding was deferred to the trial judge or a future judicial review.

Following a motion decision dismissing a request to amend a statement of defence to add a cross‑claim against Ontario and Canada as statute‑barred, the court addressed Ontario’s claim for costs.

The unsuccessful party argued that Ontario acted opportunistically by waiting until after the limitation period expired to raise the limitation defence and submitted that each party should bear its own costs or that Ontario’s rates should be reduced.

The court rejected the allegation of opportunism and confirmed that costs for the Crown are assessed based on fairness and reasonableness rather than actual internal billing rates.

After considering the hours claimed, the applicable partial indemnity rate guidance, and comparative information regarding Canada’s costs settlement on the same motion, the court exercised its discretion to reduce the requested amount.

Costs were awarded to Ontario in the amount of $6,000 inclusive.

Police seized $100,000 in cash from the trunk of a rental vehicle during a traffic stop and detained it as offence-related property under s. 490(1) of the Criminal Code.

The accused applied under s. 462.34(4) of the Criminal Code for release of a portion of the seized funds to retain counsel for upcoming criminal proceedings.

The Crown argued the court lacked jurisdiction to release offence-related property for legal expenses.

The court rejected that position, relying on jurisprudence recognizing access to seized funds for reasonable legal fees where necessary to preserve the right to counsel and a fair trial.

The court ordered $25,000 released to defence counsel in trust for legal fees, subject to accounting safeguards.

An inmate serving a life sentence applied for habeas corpus challenging his continued detention in a medium-security institution following a settlement that required his transfer from a maximum-security institution to a medium-security federal penitentiary in Ontario.

The applicant argued that transfer to a particular medium-security facility imposed more restrictive housing conditions and therefore constituted a deprivation of liberty.

The court held that the move from maximum to medium security increased, rather than reduced, the applicant’s liberty and therefore did not establish the deprivation required for habeas corpus.

The court further found that the transfer complied with the parties’ settlement terms and that the correctional authorities retained discretion to determine the specific institution.

The application was dismissed.

The plaintiffs, seven private school bus operators, brought a motion to amend their statement of claim and add the Ministry of Education as a party defendant in their action against a student transportation consortium regarding the use of Requests for Proposals (RFPs) for procurement.

The plaintiffs also sought an order declaring the Ministry's funding of the consortium's legal costs ultra vires and an interim costs funding order for their own legal fees.

The court granted leave to amend the pleadings and add the Ministry as a defendant, finding no non-compensable prejudice and that the Ministry was a necessary party given its role in directing the RFP process.

The court adjourned the issue of the consortium's funding to the trial judge, noting it required judicial review.

The court dismissed the plaintiffs' request for interim costs funding, finding they had not established impecuniosity.

On an interim family law motion, the parties sought temporary relief regarding parenting arrangements, child support, and the matrimonial home following separation after a long relationship with four children.

The court emphasized maintaining the status quo pending trial and addressed concerns regarding prior violence toward one child by requiring that the responding party’s parenting time remain supervised by a child protection agency.

The court appointed the Office of the Children’s Lawyer and set defined residence periods pending trial.

The responding party was given an option to purchase the applicant’s interest in the matrimonial home within 45 days failing which the property would be listed for sale.

Interim child support was ordered at guideline levels if the purchase occurred, or at a reduced hardship amount while the home remained unsold.

The parties separated after a short marriage.

The applicant sought child support for her daughter from a previous relationship, arguing the respondent stood in place of a parent.

The court applied the Chartier framework and found the respondent did stand in place of a parent, ordering him to pay $400 monthly in child support, which was a deviation from the Guidelines to account for support paid by the biological father.

The court also determined the equalization of net family property, resulting in a small payment to the respondent, and dismissed the applicant's claims for spousal support and a restraining order.

A member of a farmers’ market association brought an application seeking declarations that the association breached its bylaws by rejecting his full-season vendor application, removing his seniority, and reallocating his market stalls after he failed to deliver post-dated stall fee cheques by the required date.

The court examined the association’s bylaws governing dues, termination of membership, and notice requirements, finding the governing documents unclear regarding the consequences of late delivery of stall fee payments.

The court held that, under the bylaws, the member was entitled to notice and an opportunity to remedy the default within 30 days.

Because the member attempted to cure the default within that timeframe, the association’s rejection of his application and removal of seniority were premature.

The court ordered reinstatement of the member’s seniority and directed that he receive first choice of vacant stalls for the following season.

Motion to vary child support and related family law orders.

The father sought a reduction of guideline child support on the basis that he had seven additional children with other partners and argued all nine children should be treated equally in calculating his obligations.

The mother opposed the reduction and sought an order requiring contribution to section 7 expenses, including childcare, and requested a restraining order due to a past assault.

The court partially reduced the guideline support amount in recognition of the father's obligations to other children but declined to order payment of section 7 expenses.

A limited restraining order prohibiting harassment was granted for a five‑year term.