Nadia Laeeque

The appellant sought to withhold 23 mandate letters delivered by the Premier of Ontario to each minister upon forming government in 2018, claiming exemption under s. 12(1) of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act as Cabinet records that would reveal the substance of Cabinet deliberations.

The Information and Privacy Commissioner ordered disclosure, finding the letters were non-exempt outcomes of the Premier's deliberative process rather than records revealing the substance of Cabinet deliberations.

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that the IPC failed to give meaningful weight to the constitutional conventions of Cabinet confidentiality, the fluid and dynamic nature of the Cabinet decision-making process, and the central role of the Premier within that process.

The Court found the mandate letters were revealing of the substance of Cabinet deliberations, both on their face and when compared against subsequent government action, and that the IPC's narrow interpretation of s. 12(1) was unreasonable.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their action for delay under Rule 48.14(7) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The action, alleging historic sexual and physical abuse from 1966-1974, was filed in 2015 but had seen little progress by 2020.

The motion judge found no acceptable explanation for the delay, including an 18-month period where former counsel explored a class action.

The appellants argued the judge failed to contextualize the delay given the absence of limitation periods for their claims and erred in characterizing counsel's decision to suspend the action.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the contextual approach to delay but finding no error in the motion judge's conclusion that the delay was egregious and unexplained, despite the nature of the claims.

Costs were awarded to the respondents.

The Ontario Trial Lawyers Association (OTLA) brought a motion for leave to intervene as a friend of the court in an appeal.

The underlying appeal concerned the dismissal of an action for delay, specifically involving claims of historical sexual and physical abuse.

OTLA proposed to argue that the Rules of Civil Procedure create an "absurdity" by allowing certain plaintiffs whose actions are dismissed for delay to re-commence their actions, but not those dismissed at a status hearing, particularly for claims not subject to limitation periods.

The motion was dismissed for several reasons, including that the proposed intervention introduced new issues and arguments not raised by the appellants, lacked factual evidence, would significantly expand the scope of the appeal, and was a tardy motion that would likely require an adjournment.

Costs were awarded against OTLA.

The plaintiff sought court approval of a $12 million settlement in a class action alleging systemic negligence and breach of fiduciary duty by the provincial government resulting in physical and sexual abuse at the Child and Parent Resource Institute (CPRI).

Despite objections from some class members regarding the lack of a direct apology and the adequacy of compensation, the court approved the settlement, finding it fell within the zone of reasonableness established in similar institutional abuse class actions.

The court also approved class counsel's legal fees of $2.75 million and honoraria for the representative plaintiffs.

The plaintiff moved to extend the timetable for procedural steps in an action alleging historic sexual assault while in foster care.

The defendant Children's Aid Society cross-moved to dismiss the action for delay.

The court found that while the plaintiff's counsel initially caused delay by unilaterally cancelling discoveries, the defendant subsequently engaged in 'scorched earth' tactics that actively obstructed the litigation's progress.

Applying the Reid criteria, the court granted the extension, dismissed the cross-motion, and ordered the action into case management.

The self-represented plaintiff brought an action against a supermarket for a slip and fall, and also sued his former lawyers, the Law Society of Ontario, LawPRO, and the Crown in Right of Ontario.

The non-supermarket defendants brought motions to strike the statement of claim and dismiss the actions against them.

The court granted the motions, finding the claims disclosed no reasonable cause of action, lacked material facts, and were frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The claims against the moving defendants were struck without leave to amend, and costs of $800 were awarded to each moving defendant.

The defendants moved for summary judgment dismissing a medical negligence action on the basis that it was res judicata and statute-barred under s. 38(3) of the Trustee Act.

The plaintiffs had previously commenced an essentially identical action arising from the same death, which had been dismissed as out of time and unsuccessfully appealed through the Divisional Court, the Court of Appeal, and the Supreme Court of Canada.

In the present action, the plaintiffs again alleged negligence, lack of informed consent, and fraudulent concealment.

The court held that the allegations had already been fully considered in the prior proceedings and raised no triable issue.

Allowing the claim to proceed would constitute an abuse of process and the limitation period under the Trustee Act applied.

The plaintiff was evicted from a seniors' housing complex located on provincial land adjacent to a First Nation reserve.

She sued the federal and provincial Crowns, alleging negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and vicarious liability for the actions of First Nations constables and the OPP's failure to intervene.

The federal Crown moved to strike the claim under Rule 21, and the provincial Crown moved for summary judgment under Rule 20.

The court granted both motions, finding that the federal Crown owed no private law duty of care or fiduciary duty to the plaintiff and was not vicariously liable for First Nations constables.

The court also found no genuine issue for trial against the provincial Crown, as the OPP owed no private law duty of care to the plaintiff in these circumstances.

Following a motion decision dismissing a request to amend a statement of defence to add a cross‑claim against Ontario and Canada as statute‑barred, the court addressed Ontario’s claim for costs.

The unsuccessful party argued that Ontario acted opportunistically by waiting until after the limitation period expired to raise the limitation defence and submitted that each party should bear its own costs or that Ontario’s rates should be reduced.

The court rejected the allegation of opportunism and confirmed that costs for the Crown are assessed based on fairness and reasonableness rather than actual internal billing rates.

After considering the hours claimed, the applicable partial indemnity rate guidance, and comparative information regarding Canada’s costs settlement on the same motion, the court exercised its discretion to reduce the requested amount.

Costs were awarded to Ontario in the amount of $6,000 inclusive.

The Attorney General of Ontario brought a motion under Rule 21.01(1)(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure to strike a statement of claim alleging malicious prosecution and conspiracy to commit malicious prosecution following a fraud charge that was later stayed.

The court held that the pleadings failed to disclose a reasonable cause of action.

The conspiracy allegations lacked the necessary particulars regarding the alleged agreement and overt acts of the conspirators.

The malicious prosecution claim also failed because the pleadings did not adequately allege absence of reasonable and probable cause or malice, as required by the Supreme Court of Canada in Miazga v. Kvello Estate.

The statement of claim against the Attorney General was therefore struck.

The defendants moved under Rule 21 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to dismiss a civil action alleging misfeasance in public office and related claims arising from a temporary cease trade order issued by the Ontario Securities Commission.

The plaintiff alleged the order had expired and that subsequent prosecutions and regulatory proceedings were therefore unlawful.

The court held that the validity of the cease trade order had already been determined in multiple prior regulatory and criminal proceedings, including a guilty plea and unsuccessful appeals.

Applying issue estoppel and the doctrine of abuse of process, the court concluded that the plaintiff was attempting to relitigate issues already conclusively determined.

The action was dismissed with prejudice.

Following dismissal of a motion by the Crown to strike a negligence and negligent misrepresentation claim arising from a government procurement process for school bus services, the court determined the appropriate costs award.

The plaintiffs sought substantial indemnity costs while the Crown argued for a lower partial indemnity award.

Applying Rule 57 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and the fairness principles from Boucher, the court held that the motion, although unsuccessful, was not wholly devoid of merit and therefore did not justify substantial indemnity costs.

The court also rejected the Crown’s submission that HST should not be included in a costs award against it.

Partial indemnity costs of $39,897 inclusive of disbursements and HST were awarded to the plaintiffs.

On a Rule 21 and Rule 25 motion, the moving defendants sought to strike a statement of claim alleging malicious prosecution, negligence, conspiracy, and related causes of action.

The court held it was plain and obvious the malicious prosecution and false arrest allegations could not succeed because the claimant's conviction had been upheld on appeal.

The court further held the negligence allegations tied to correctional policy decisions and claims against the public guardian failed to disclose a private law duty of care, and many allegations constituted impermissible collateral attack and abuse of process.

The statement of claim was struck as against the moving defendants and the action against them was dismissed, with costs awarded to those defendants.