Spencer Bass

The plaintiffs brought a motion for a status hearing to prevent the dismissal of their action for delay under Rule 48.14.

The action arose from a failed real estate transaction where the defendant failed to close.

The court found that the plaintiffs had provided an acceptable explanation for the delay, citing the primary plaintiff's intense duties as a frontline medical worker during the COVID-19 pandemic and family issues.

The court also found that any prejudice to the defendant due to fading memories or lost documents was self-created by his own failure to take steps to move the action forward.

The motion was granted, the action was allowed to proceed, and the plaintiffs were awarded partial indemnity costs.

The moving parties brought a motion to reopen their appeal after the Ontario government passed legislation repealing the statutory provisions at issue.

The moving parties argued that the repeal was an attempt to evade constitutional scrutiny and render the remitted rehearing moot.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, holding that it was premature to conclude the remitted issues were moot, as the application judge retains discretion to hear the matter.

The Court emphasized that the application judge has the institutional advantage to make the necessary factual findings on the expanded Charter claims.

In a constitutional compliance review arising from Robinson-Superior Treaty augmentation litigation, the moving parties challenged both the Crown's engagement process and the compensation amount set after negotiations failed.

The court held that although aspects of engagement, including late disclosure of reliance on per-capita benchmarking against a related treaty settlement, caused serious relational harm, the reviewing role required deference to a range of honourable discretionary outcomes.

Applying a sui generis review framework grounded in honour of the Crown and reconciliatory justice, the court concluded the Crown's ultimate compensation determination of $3.6 billion plus agreed costs was justified in the legal and factual context.

The court therefore declined to intervene in the compensation decision while also addressing allocation issues between federal and provincial Crown responsibility in the reasons.

The Crown sought to cross-examine the appellant's former trial and appellate counsel, now a Superior Court judge, on his affidavit evidence submitted in support of a fresh evidence application on appeal.

The appellant and the intervening judge opposed cross-examination, arguing that it would undermine public confidence in the administration of justice and proposing written interrogatories as an alternative.

The Court of Appeal granted the Crown's motion for cross-examination, holding that judicial immunity does not apply to conduct undertaken prior to judicial appointment and that cross-examination is the norm for affidavit evidence in appellate proceedings.

The applicant brought two motions: (1) seeking interim injunctive relief including orders to restrain respondents from acting as directors, restricting access to corporate bank accounts, preserving corporate records, freezing personal assets, granting administrator-level access to corporate systems, and obtaining a Norwich order for bank records; and (2) seeking leave to commence a derivative action under the Ontario Business Corporations Act.

The motions arose from an oppression remedy application concerning a cannabis retail business.

The court dismissed both motions, finding the applicant failed to establish a prima facie case of fraud or misappropriation, did not demonstrate irreparable harm, and failed to satisfy the balance of convenience test.

The court converted the application to an action and imposed a litigation timetable.

This decision grants an interlocutory injunction exempting all existing supervised consumption sites (SCSs) in Ontario from the operation of section 2 of the Community Care and Recovery Act, 2024, pending a final decision on the merits.

The court finds that the three-part test for injunctive relief is met: there is a serious issue to be tried regarding Charter rights, irreparable harm would result from SCS closures, and the balance of convenience favours the applicants.

The ruling details the public health crisis of opioid use, the role of SCSs in harm reduction, and the disproportionate impact of closures on marginalized populations.

This is a costs endorsement following an appeal.

The parties settled the costs of the appeal, agreeing that the respondent would pay the appellants an all-inclusive amount of $75,000.

The Ontario Court of Appeal allowed an appeal by seven youth challenging the constitutionality of Ontario's greenhouse gas emission reduction target and plan.

The application judge had dismissed their claim, characterizing it as seeking positive rights.

The Court of Appeal found this was an error, clarifying that the case concerned whether Ontario's voluntarily assumed statutory obligation to combat climate change was Charter compliant under ss. 7 (life, liberty, security of the person) and 15 (equality).

The matter was remitted for a new hearing to determine if the Target and Plan violated the Charter.

Jacob Hoggard appealed his conviction for sexual assault causing bodily harm to J.B., arguing the trial judge erred by admitting expert evidence on the neurobiology of trauma, failing to correct the Crown's closing submissions, delivering an unbalanced jury charge, and improperly admitting discreditable conduct evidence.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in admitting the expert testimony as it was not necessary and risked misuse, but applied the curative proviso under s. 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code, concluding that no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurred due to the trial judge's effective corrective instructions.

The other grounds of appeal were dismissed, and the appeal was dismissed.

The applicant brought an urgent motion for an interim stay pending an application for judicial review.

The parties sought a consent adjournment of the motion.

The court granted the adjournment on consent, ordering that the interim interim stay remain in place until the motion is heard, the application is decided, or the parties consent to lift it.

The appellant sought to withhold 23 mandate letters delivered by the Premier of Ontario to each minister upon forming government in 2018, claiming exemption under s. 12(1) of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act as Cabinet records that would reveal the substance of Cabinet deliberations.

The Information and Privacy Commissioner ordered disclosure, finding the letters were non-exempt outcomes of the Premier's deliberative process rather than records revealing the substance of Cabinet deliberations.

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that the IPC failed to give meaningful weight to the constitutional conventions of Cabinet confidentiality, the fluid and dynamic nature of the Cabinet decision-making process, and the central role of the Premier within that process.

The Court found the mandate letters were revealing of the substance of Cabinet deliberations, both on their face and when compared against subsequent government action, and that the IPC's narrow interpretation of s. 12(1) was unreasonable.

The applicants, who were unsuccessful in their constitutional challenge regarding Ontario's response to climate change, and the respondent, who successfully defended the application, both sought costs.

The respondent sought $45,000 on a partial indemnity basis, while the applicants sought $96,999.79 or, alternatively, no costs.

The court applied the factors for public interest litigation and declined to award costs to the successful respondent, noting the applicants had no pecuniary interest, the issues were of existential public importance, and the respondent had superior capacity to bear costs.

The court also declined to award costs to the unsuccessful applicants, finding this was not one of the rare cases justifying such an award.

The court ordered that each party bear their own costs.

The appellant, Interhealth Canada Limited, appealed a trial decision dismissing its claims against its former CEO, Michael O’Keefe, and Canadian Hospitals Network International Inc. (CHNI) for breach of fiduciary duty and diversion of corporate opportunities.

The appellant alleged O’Keefe diverted two maturing opportunities (HIH Opportunity and Cromwell Opportunity) to CHNI after his resignation.

The appeal also raised process-related issues, including a "trial by stopwatch" and the dismissal of a recall motion.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings that the opportunities did not fairly belong to the appellant and were fundamentally different from those the appellant pursued.

The court also found no prejudice from the trial management and upheld the recall motion dismissal.

The applicants, seven young Ontarians, brought an application challenging Ontario's greenhouse gas reduction target (the "Target") set under the Cap and Trade Cancellation Act, 2018.

They argued that the Target, which aims to reduce emissions by 30% below 2005 levels by 2030, is unconstitutional and violates their rights under sections 7 and 15 of the Charter.

The court found that the issues were justiciable, as they involved a challenge to specific state action and legislation.

However, the court dismissed the application, concluding that while climate change poses a severe threat and disproportionately impacts youth, the Target itself does not violate the Charter.

The court held that section 7 does not impose positive obligations on the state to enact more stringent environmental policies, and the Target is not arbitrary or grossly disproportionate.

Furthermore, the court found no section 15 violation, as the disproportionate impacts are caused by climate change itself, not the impugned legislation, and the Charter does not impose a positive obligation to remedy social inequalities.

The appellants appealed their convictions for second-degree murder and manslaughter arising from a fatal group assault.

The primary appellant, convicted of murder as the stabber, sought to introduce fresh expert evidence and challenged the trial judge's instructions on identification and a key witness.

The co-appellants, convicted of manslaughter, argued the trial judge misdirected the jury on causation, specifically regarding whether the stabbing was an intervening act that broke the chain of causation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all appeals, finding the jury instructions, when read as a whole, properly conveyed the law of causation and the requirements for assessing witness credibility.

The appellant, Michael Davani, appealed his conviction for murder, raising three grounds: improper cross-examination on prior discreditable conduct by co-accused's counsel, unfairness due to the trial judge's criticism and interjections, and an unbalanced jury charge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's application of the Pollock principles regarding bad character evidence, no inappropriate or excessive judicial interventions, and that the jury charge was fair and balanced when read as a whole.

The defendant, a Member of Parliament, faced two counts of breach of trust under section 122 of the Criminal Code, alleging he solicited funds by deceit or for personal benefit in connection with his official duties.

After the Crown closed its case, the defence brought a motion for a directed verdict.

The court examined the evidence regarding loans obtained from individuals who had received immigration assistance or invitations to a Prime Minister's event.

The court found that the Crown failed to adduce sufficient evidence to establish the second element of the offence, specifically that the alleged conduct was "in connection with the duties of his office." The court determined that the inferences required to support the Crown's theory, such as the loans being connected to prior immigration assistance or the event invitations demonstrating partiality, amounted to impermissible speculation or conjecture.

Consequently, the motion for a directed verdict was granted, and the defendant was acquitted on both charges.

The plaintiffs, Resolute Forest Products Inc. and its affiliates, brought a motion seeking an order to waive the deemed undertaking rule under Rule 30.1.01(8) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

They sought to use discovery evidence, including documents, from the Ontario action in a related defamation and intentional interference with economic relations action commenced in the United States District Court of the Northern District of California.

The defendants, Greenpeace Canada and its employees, opposed the motion.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that Resolute failed to demonstrate a superior public interest that would outweigh the privacy protections of the deemed undertaking rule.

The court noted that the parties and issues in the Canadian and US actions were not sufficiently similar to warrant a waiver, and that Rule 30.1.01(6) already permits the use of discovery evidence for impeachment in another proceeding, including foreign ones.

The court also found that Resolute was not sufficiently particular about what specific evidence was required.

The City of Mississauga sought judicial review of an IPC order requiring the disclosure of an electronic spreadsheet containing personal information of over 11,000 voters from the 2018 municipal election.

The IPC found that disclosure was expressly authorized by section 88(5) of the Municipal Elections Act, which overrides the privacy exemption in the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the IPC's reliance on binding precedent and its distinction between access and use restrictions to be reasonable.

The appellant, a truck driver, appealed his convictions for importing cocaine and possession for the purpose of trafficking, following a retrial.

The Crown's case was entirely circumstantial, with the central issue being the appellant's knowledge of the drugs found in his trailer.

The trial judge, sitting alone, rejected the appellant's testimony and concluded that knowledge was the only reasonable inference.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the verdict reasonable, the trial judge's application of circumstantial evidence principles correct (including considering inferences from lack of evidence), and no material misapprehension of evidence that led to a miscarriage of justice.