Samuel Greene

The appellant appealed a sexual assault conviction, arguing that the refusal of a trial adjournment to retain new counsel forced self-representation and that the appointment of former counsel as amicus and s. 486.3 counsel created a conflict and an appearance of unfairness.

Applying the high threshold for miscarriage of justice based on trial unfairness, the court held that the right to counsel of choice is not absolute and that the case management judge properly balanced fair trial interests against the timely administration of justice.

The court found no prejudice, no disclosure of confidential information, and no appearance of unfairness arising from the former counsel’s appointment.

The conviction was also supported by strong corroborative evidence, including security footage, DNA evidence, a distinctive tattoo, and a matching backpack.

The appellant was convicted of dangerous driving causing bodily harm and failing to remain at the scene after engaging in a high-speed street race that resulted in a severe collision.

He appealed his convictions, arguing errors in the dismissal of his s. 11(b) Charter application, the admission of his police statement, and the jury instructions.

He also appealed his 15-month custodial sentence, arguing for a conditional sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's rulings or jury instructions.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the custodial sentence was deemed fit given the serious aggravating factors, including the appellant's efforts to conceal his involvement.

The Crown appealed a decision of the Court of Appeal for Ontario to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The respondent brought a motion to adduce new evidence, which was allowed.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal from the bench, with written reasons to follow.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittals on charges of sexual assault, incest, and human trafficking against his biological daughter.

The trial judge had acquitted the respondent based on reasonable doubt arising from material inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence and reliability concerns related to her hallucinations, delusions, and heavy street drug use.

On appeal, the Crown argued the trial judge relied on myths and stereotypes about mental illness and assessed the evidence piecemeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's reliability concerns were grounded in case-specific evidence, not stereotypes, and that he properly assessed the evidence as a whole.

The appellant appealed his convictions for human trafficking-related offences, arguing that the application judge erred in dismissing his section 11(b) Charter application for unreasonable delay.

The Court of Appeal found that while the application judge double-counted a five-month period of defence delay, the error was immaterial because the deduction of 24 months for the suspension of jury trials due to the COVID-19 pandemic was appropriate.

As the total delay fell well under the 30-month presumptive ceiling and the Crown made efforts to move the matter forward, the exceptional remedy of a stay was not warranted.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of two counts of first degree murder in the deaths of his common law partner and her daughter, whose bodies were never found.

The Crown alleged he killed them and burned their bodies in steel barrels.

On appeal, the appellant challenged several evidentiary rulings, including the admission of statements made during an undercover operation, the admission of the victims' hearsay statements, and the trial judge's refusal to stay proceedings after a bone fragment was destroyed during DNA testing.

The appellant also challenged the trial judge's refusal to direct a verdict of acquittal on first degree murder, the jury instructions on after-the-fact conduct, and the trial judge's refusal to recuse himself for alleged bias.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings, jury instructions, or application of the directed verdict test.

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault, sexual assault, and sexual exploitation of his daughter.

The trial judge was Justice Fletcher Dawson, sitting with a jury.

The appellant raised three grounds of appeal: (1) that the trial judge erred in permitting cross-examination of the complainant's mother and sisters regarding uncharged abusive conduct; (2) that the trial judge made a section 276 error regarding evidence of the complainant's sexual activity; and (3) that the trial judge made a Browne v. Dunn error by failing to ensure that contradictory evidence was put to the complainant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all three grounds of appeal and upheld the convictions.

Appeal from a conviction for second-degree murder.

The appellant admitted to being the shooter and guilty of manslaughter but contended that his intoxicated state and the suddenness of events should have created reasonable doubt as to whether he possessed the requisite mens rea for murder.

The trial judge provided a rolled-up instruction to the jury on the cumulative effect of evidence regarding intoxication on the mental element for murder.

The appellant argued the trial judge failed to adequately describe evidence of his intoxication from a bartender and evidence of a brewing altercation inside the bar.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's approach and upheld the conviction, applying the curative proviso based on the overwhelming Crown case.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario granted William Craig Robson’s motion for release pending appeal and a partial stay of his driving prohibition after his conviction for dangerous driving causing death.

The court found that the grounds of appeal were not frivolous and raised significant legal issues, including the definition of “public” under s. 320.13(3) of the Criminal Code and causation in the context of dangerous off-road activities.

The court concluded that Robson did not pose a risk to public safety and that his continued detention was not necessary to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario allowed the Crown's appeal from a stay of proceedings in a sexual assault case, finding that the premature disclosure of defence materials to the complainant’s counsel was an innocent error and did not result in prejudice to trial fairness.

The court held that a stay of proceedings is a drastic remedy reserved for the clearest of cases and that alternative remedies were available.

The matter was remitted for trial before a different judge.

The appellant was convicted of possessing a loaded prohibited firearm found in the trunk of a vehicle he was driving.

At trial, the appellant brought applications alleging breaches of his s. 8 and s. 11(b) Charter rights, which the trial judge dismissed by largely adopting the Crown's submissions without providing independent analysis or factual findings.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found the trial judge's reasons on both Charter applications were insufficient to permit meaningful appellate review.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant, a physician, appealed his conviction on three counts of sexual assault and sought leave to appeal his sentence.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario considered grounds including the admission and use of cross-count similar act evidence, the sufficiency of the trial judge's reasons, errors in credibility and reliability assessment, and the trial judge's treatment of prior consistent statements and motive to fabricate.

The Court found no errors in the trial judge's handling of similar act evidence, the sufficiency of reasons, or the credibility assessments.

It also found no error in the application of the totality principle in sentencing.

The conviction appeal was dismissed, and leave to appeal sentence was granted but the sentence appeal was also dismissed.

The appellant challenged his convictions for firearm and drug trafficking offences, and his 10-year sentence, arguing that the trial judge erred in determining the scope of a s. 10(b) Charter breach (right to counsel).

The appellant contended that the delay in facilitating his lawyer call began earlier, at the point of arrest by Toronto Police Service (TPS), rather than only upon arrival at the Durham Regional Police Service (DRPS) station.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the initial delay by TPS was justified due to ongoing public and officer safety concerns and evidence preservation tasks.

The court concluded that the s. 10(b) breach only commenced at the DRPS station, as found by the trial judge, and dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals.

Two appellants were convicted of manslaughter following a group assault in which the victim was fatally stabbed by another member of the attacking group.

Both appellants appealed their convictions, arguing the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on causation in the context of co-principal liability.

The majority held that, reading the jury instructions as a whole, the jury was properly — though not perfectly — instructed on legal causation and the intervening act doctrine.

The majority further clarified that an act by a co-participant in a group assault can, in principle, trigger the intervening act doctrine, rejecting the Crown's contrary submission.

The dissent would have allowed the appeals and ordered a new trial, finding the repeated instruction that foreseeability of continuing assaults 'may be enough' to establish causation was erroneous and not cured by the remainder of the charge.

The appellant, Nicholas Doering, brought a second appeal against his conviction for failing to provide the necessaries of life, after the Court of Appeal had previously affirmed his guilt on that charge and remitted the matter for sentencing.

The appellant argued that the trial judge erred in not re-opening the case to allow new legal arguments on his conviction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the trial judge had no jurisdiction to re-open the case as the matter was remitted for sentencing purposes only.

The court held that the issue of guilt was res judicata and the current appeal constituted an impermissible collateral attack on its previous order, emphasizing the principle of finality in the appellate process.

The appellants, Roslyn Blake and Claire Graham, appealed their convictions, seeking a stay of proceedings due to unreasonable delay under section 11(b) of the Charter, relying on the framework established in *R. v. Jordan*.

The Court of Appeal assumed, without deciding, that Ms. Graham's net delay could exceed 30 months.

However, the court upheld the trial judge's finding in Ms. Blake's case that the complexity of the matter justified the delay beyond the presumptive ceiling, noting that this assessment was equally applicable to both co-accused appellants.

The court emphasized the deference owed to the trial judge's expertise in assessing case complexity.

The appeals were dismissed.

The appellant, Pedro Hechavarria-Tapia, appealed his dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence for serious intimate partner violence.

The appeal challenged the sentencing judge's findings of fact regarding the appellant's treatability and willingness to engage in rehabilitation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding ample support in the record for the sentencing judge's conclusions that the appellant was intractable and unwilling to be treated for the relevant conditions, despite some superficial engagement with probation officers and past program enrollment.

The offender, a police officer, was found guilty of failing to provide necessaries of life after a conviction for criminal negligence causing death was quashed on appeal.

The court addressed the defence's application to re-open the case and decline conviction on the remaining charge, which was dismissed due to lack of jurisdiction.

The court then proceeded to sentence the offender for failing to provide necessaries of life, imposing an 18-month conditional sentence, considering the reduced moral blameworthiness after the criminal negligence conviction was overturned, and the offender's mental health and the harsher impact of custody on a former police officer.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder after shooting his drug dealing partner.

At trial, he claimed self-defence, abandoning his initial statements to police that the victim was killed during a robbery by unknown intruders.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in dismissing his s. 11(b) Charter delay application, excluding expert evidence on 'fight or flight' syndrome, and admitting statements made to police.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the delay or expert evidence rulings, but held that the appellant was psychologically detained at the police station earlier than the trial judge found.

The failure to advise him of his right to counsel violated ss. 9 and 10 of the Charter, requiring exclusion of the statements under s. 24(2).

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellants appealed their convictions for second-degree murder and manslaughter arising from a fatal group assault.

The primary appellant, convicted of murder as the stabber, sought to introduce fresh expert evidence and challenged the trial judge's instructions on identification and a key witness.

The co-appellants, convicted of manslaughter, argued the trial judge misdirected the jury on causation, specifically regarding whether the stabbing was an intervening act that broke the chain of causation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all appeals, finding the jury instructions, when read as a whole, properly conveyed the law of causation and the requirements for assessing witness credibility.