Adrianna Mills

The appellant appealed convictions for assault, assault with a weapon, and sexual assault involving his former spouse.

He argued the trial judge engaged in uneven scrutiny of the evidence, improperly holding his testimony to a harsher standard than the complainant's.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that the trial judge failed to reconcile material inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence while superficially rejecting the appellant's testimony, demonstrating a flawed methodology that affected the core credibility findings.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The Crown appealed a decision of the Court of Appeal for Ontario to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The respondent brought a motion to adduce new evidence, which was allowed.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal from the bench, with written reasons to follow.

The appellant, who was previously found not criminally responsible for attempted murder, appealed a detention order made by the Ontario Review Board.

She argued the Board failed to adequately consider her proposal for a conditional discharge that included a 'Young clause' and treatment compliance conditions.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the Board must meaningfully consider whether the proposed conditions could practically and effectively address the risk to the public, and remitted the matter for a new hearing.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault, assault with a weapon, and possession of a weapon after the complainant was stabbed in the torso.

The sole trial issue was identity of the assailant.

On appeal, the appellant argued that the trial judge's reasons were inadequate and that the trial judge erred in treating a post-offence apology as consciousness of guilt.

The Court of Appeal held that the reasons, though brief, were adequate when read in light of the whole record and counsel's submissions.

The court further held that the trial judge did not err in using the apology as confirmatory evidence, as no alternative explanation for it appeared on the record.

Appeal dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of intimidation of a justice system participant, criminal harassment, uttering a threat to cause bodily harm, and two counts of breach of undertaking arising from a sustained campaign of social media posts, threats, and communications targeting an OPP officer.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge failed to address the mens rea for the specific intent offences of intimidation and criminal harassment and erred in convicting on one breach of undertaking count.

The Court of Appeal held that the requisite mens rea findings were implicit in the trial judge's meticulous description of the appellant's conduct, which gave rise to irresistible inferences of intent.

However, the court set aside the conviction on the breach of undertaking count alleging the appellant went where the complainant was known to be, finding the trial judge misdescribed the count and failed to make findings supporting the conviction.

The appellant challenged his jury conviction for sexual assault offences and a five-year penitentiary sentence, arguing the jury charge on motive was unbalanced and the sentencing judge improperly treated lack of insight or remorse as aggravating.

The court held the charge, read functionally and as a whole, accurately and sufficiently instructed the jury, including on motive to fabricate and motive to offend, and any imperfections did not create legal error.

On sentence, the court found no error in principle affecting fitness and no improper reliance on lack of remorse.

The conviction appeal was dismissed, leave to appeal sentence was granted, and the sentence appeal was dismissed.

The applicant sought relief in an appeal before the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The court reviewed the record and applied the governing legal and procedural standards, including deference to factual and discretionary determinations where required.

The matter concluded with the following disposition: Appeal dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions on the ground that the application judge erred in dismissing his application for a stay of proceedings based on unreasonable delay.

The Court of Appeal agreed that the time from when the second trial date was set until the first offered trial date available to defence counsel should have been apportioned rather than treated entirely as defence delay, but held that the time from the July 2022 proposed trial date to the second trial date was properly defence delay.

With the corrected apportionment, the net delay fell just under 30 months, below the presumptive ceiling, and no stay was warranted.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault and the sentence imposed.

The conviction appeal raised two grounds: first, that the trial judge failed to address frailties in the complainant's evidence and material inconsistencies, and second, that the trial judge erred in her section 11(b) Charter analysis regarding defence delay.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's credibility assessment or her apportionment of delay.

The appellant received a two-year custodial sentence for a serious sexual assault of a 13-year-old child.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction appeal and the sentence appeal, finding the sentence fit and appropriate.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault and assault against his former wife.

He appealed on the narrow ground that the trial judge erred in refusing to allow the defence to pursue additional electronic messages during cross-examination of the complainant.

The trial judge required that any application for third-party disclosure of such messages be brought under s. 278.1 of the Criminal Code prior to trial, not mid-trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that although the trial judge made some factual errors in his ruling, his ultimate decision to foreclose the mid-trial application was justified as a proper exercise of trial-management powers.

The appellant, Amy Smith Cox, appealed a detention order of the Ontario Review Board that found she continued to pose a significant threat of serious harm to the public and imposed a no-contact provision with her father.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal regarding the significant threat finding but allowed the appeal in part regarding the no-contact provision, varying it to permit contact with her father at the discretion of the treatment team.

The appellant, Victoria Frazer, appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board which concluded she remained a significant threat to public safety and ordered her continued conditional discharge.

The appellant sought an absolute discharge, arguing she did not pose a significant threat.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the Board's conclusion was unreasonable and relied too heavily on speculation regarding potential medication non-compliance and substance use.

Consequently, the Court set aside the Board's order and granted the appellant an absolute discharge.

The appellant appealed a sentence imposed for uttering threats and assault with a weapon after the sentencing judge rejected a joint sentencing submission.

The respondent Crown conceded that the appeal should be allowed because the joint submission was within or close to the appropriate range.

The Court of Appeal held that the sentencing judge erred in departing from the joint submission, which did not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The appeal was allowed, and the sentence was substituted with the recommended 12-month sentence followed by 18 months of probation.

The appellant, Shawn Frederick Prindle, appealed his sentence for multiple convictions including assault, assault with a weapon, theft, mischief to property, and breach of recognizance.

He argued that the sentencing judge erred by not granting credit for time spent under strict bail conditions (Downes credit) and by rejecting a conditional sentence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, reducing the global sentence to 365 days’ imprisonment (with 21 days presentence custody deducted), but declined to substitute a conditional sentence, finding a custodial sentence was still required given the gravity and context of the offences.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed Dwayne Thomas’s appeal from a six-and-a-half year sentence for sexual assault and breach of trust.

The court found the trial judge was entitled to exceed the usual sentencing range due to the aggravated breach of trust and the victim’s vulnerability as an incarcerated person.

The court rejected arguments that the trial judge failed to give sufficient weight to rehabilitation, the harshness of incarceration for a former correctional officer, and post-sentencing rehabilitative efforts.

The decision affirms the priority of deterrence and denunciation in sentencing for sexual assault by persons in positions of authority.

The appellant, K.M., appealed convictions for sexual assault and for choking the complainant to render her incapable of resisting.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal, finding that while the trial judge’s reasons were not ideal, they were sufficient when read contextually.

The trial judge’s credibility findings and rejection of the defence theory of fabrication were adequately explained, and the application of the W.(D.) framework was proper.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, S.M., appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing that the trial judge erred by misapprehending the complainant's evidence regarding her alleged financial motive to fabricate and by failing to properly consider the implausibility of the assaults given the proximity of sleeping children.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no material misapprehension of evidence by the trial judge and concluding that the trial judge adequately addressed the implausibility argument.

The court affirmed the trial judge's entitlement to believe the complainant's testimony.