Michael John Nicholas Haraschuk

The Crown applied to introduce evidence of other sexual activity and discreditable conduct by the accused in a sexual assault trial.

The court ruled on the admissibility of this evidence, applying the balancing test of probative value versus prejudicial effect.

The court permitted general contextual questions about the relationship and evidence of the accused's controlling behavior regarding the complainant's clothing.

However, it excluded evidence of other "unusual" sexual activity, pressured sexual activity, general use of sex toys, general alcohol consumption, and the accused's mental illness, finding their prejudicial effect outweighed their probative value or that they engaged in prohibited "twin myths" or propensity reasoning.

The applicant sought a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter due to unreasonable delay.

The total delay from charge to anticipated trial date exceeded the 30-month Jordan ceiling for Superior Court matters.

The Crown argued that the delay was due to exceptional circumstances, including the COVID-19 pandemic and the co-accused's need for new counsel, which necessitated an adjournment.

The applicant had opposed the adjournment and offered to proceed if severed from the co-accused.

The court found that the net delay exceeded the ceiling and that the Crown failed to rebut the presumption of unreasonableness.

While acknowledging the impact of COVID-19 and the importance of joint prosecutions, the court determined that the Crown had a duty to sever the applicant's trial when the joint prosecution compromised his s. 11(b) rights and unreasonably extended the prejudice he was suffering.

The Crown's failure to sever was deemed a failure to take reasonable steps to avoid the delay.

Consequently, the court found a breach of the applicant's s. 11(b) right and ordered a stay of proceedings.

The accused, an Indigenous person, pleaded guilty to multiple criminal offences, including assault causing bodily harm to a police officer, breaches of court orders, and drug/weapon possession.

The court considered Gladue factors, the accused's history of trauma and addiction, and the collateral consequences of incarceration during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The Crown sought a five-year sentence, while the defence sought time served.

The court imposed a global sentence of 44 months, applying a 1.5:1 pre-sentence custody credit (35 months) and an additional 3-month mitigation credit for pandemic conditions, resulting in 6 months of new custody.

The court declined to impose a probation order, citing the accused's history of breaches and the Gladue principles.

The applicant sought a stay of sexual assault charges based on unreasonable pre-charge delay (4 years, 4 months), arguing police conduct constituted an abuse of process by allowing the complainant to dictate the timing of charges.

The Crown contended that police discretion, which considered the complainant's emotional readiness and willingness to participate, was reasonable and aligned with contemporary societal attitudes and victims' rights.

The court dismissed the application, finding no actual prejudice to the applicant's fair trial rights and concluding that the police conduct, while influenced by the complainant's circumstances, did not amount to egregious state conduct that seriously compromised the integrity of the judicial system.

The applicants sought to quash subpoenas issued by the respondent, Laura Pinkerton, for her criminal trial on a charge of forcible entry.

Pinkerton intended to call witnesses to support her claim of entitlement to the property, arguing a long-standing conspiracy to divest her of it.

The court found that a person's entitlement to property is immaterial to a forcible entry charge under Section 72(1.1) of the Criminal Code, which focuses on preserving public peace and actual peaceable possession.

Furthermore, the evidence sought would constitute an impermissible collateral attack on prior court orders establishing possession.

As the proposed witnesses could not provide material evidence, the Justice of the Peace exceeded jurisdiction in issuing the subpoenas.

The subpoenas were quashed.

The accused was charged with sexual exploitation of a young person under Criminal Code section 153(1)(a).

The Crown alleged that the accused, who was in a position of trust or authority, touched the complainant's private parts for a sexual purpose.

The complainant was 16 years old at the time and living in the accused's home as a condition of bail.

The trial judge found that while the complainant's evidence contained material inconsistencies and credibility issues, the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the touching occurred.

Additionally, the court found that the Crown did not establish that the accused was in a position of trust or authority over the complainant.

The accused was acquitted.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and driving with a blood alcohol level exceeding 80 mg of alcohol in 100 mL of blood.

Police observed unusual driving behavior and conducted roadside screening and breath testing.

The Crown presented toxicology and intoxilyzer evidence establishing impairment.

However, the court found multiple Charter breaches: violations of language rights (sections 7, 10(a), and 10(b)) as the accused, a Francophone, was not provided adequate communication in French during arrest, testing, and release procedures; and a violation of section 9 Charter rights due to unlawful overholding in custody.

The court determined that the convergence of these breaches warranted a stay of proceedings rather than exclusion of evidence.

The applicant sought a stay of proceedings for criminal negligence causing death, alleging breaches of Charter sections 7, 11(d), and 11(b) due to pre-charge and post-charge delay.

The court found significant pre-charge delay (26 months and 23 days) and prejudice to the applicant, including the death of a material witness and the unfairness of sequential charges (provincial offence then criminal) arising from the same incident.

The court granted a stay of proceedings based on sections 7 and 11(d) of the Charter, finding an abuse of process.

The court also considered the s. 11(b) argument but would have dismissed it due to a re-calculation of defence delay, which would have brought the net delay below the presumptive ceiling.

The applicant, Brittany Taylor, sought a stay of proceedings for a charge of possessing fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking, alleging a denial of her right to a trial within a reasonable time under section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The total delay from arrest to expected trial completion was 24 months, which is below the 30-month presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan for Superior Court matters.

The court found no attributable defence delay.

However, it determined that the applicant's efforts to expedite the trial were not sustained and that the case did not markedly exceed its reasonable time requirements, considering its complexity and the institutional delays.

The application for a stay was dismissed.

The accused was charged with assaulting a peace officer and obstructing a peace officer in the execution of their duty.

The charges arose from an incident on July 18, 2015, involving a neighbour dispute.

While police were arresting the accused's son for breach of the peace, the accused approached from behind and grabbed or pulled at the officer's vest.

The court found the accused not guilty of assault but guilty of obstruction, finding that the accused intentionally interfered with the arrest rather than accidentally losing his balance as claimed.

The accused brought a Charter application seeking exclusion of evidence seized under a search warrant for computers and storage devices allegedly containing child pornography.

He argued the information to obtain the warrant lacked full, frank, and fair disclosure, that the warrant lacked reasonable and probable grounds, and that the search was overly broad.

The court found that certain information in the information to obtain should be excised or amplified, including surveillance obtained through an unlawful entry onto private property and references to prior charges that had not resulted in conviction.

However, even after excision and amplification, sufficient grounds remained to support the issuance of the warrant.

Applying the section 24(2) framework, the court held the Charter breaches were not sufficiently serious to justify excluding the evidence.

The accused applied for certiorari to quash committals for trial on charges of manslaughter and criminal negligence causing death following a preliminary inquiry.

The case arose from the accused leaving a bottle of methadone with a third party as collateral for a loan; the drug was later consumed by another person who died of acute methadone intoxication.

The applicant argued that there was no evidence of objective foreseeability or causation and that voluntary consumption by the deceased severed the chain of causation.

The court held that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence upon which a properly instructed trier of fact could find that trafficking in methadone under the circumstances was dangerous and that bodily harm was objectively foreseeable.

The court further held that the consumption of the methadone did not necessarily break the chain of causation and that the evidence supported committal for trial on the challenged counts.

The Ontario Court of Justice considered whether it had jurisdiction to entertain an application for interim release under section 523(2)(b) of the Criminal Code after the accused had been committed to stand trial and an indictment had been filed with the Superior Court of Justice.

The court held that jurisdiction over interim release transfers to the Superior Court of Justice upon the filing of the indictment, and that the Ontario Court of Justice has no jurisdiction to hear the application once the matter is before the Superior Court.

The accused brought an application under s. 278.3 of the Criminal Code seeking production of third‑party records from a psychologist and a children’s aid society relating to the complainant in a sexual assault prosecution.

The defence argued the records were likely relevant to credibility and reliability because the complainant had stated he sometimes “made things up” or misinterpreted events.

The court applied the framework from R. v. Mills and R. v. O’Connor governing production of confidential records and held that the threshold of likely relevance was met for the psychologist’s records.

Those records were ordered produced to the judge for review for the period April 1, 2009 to July 24, 2013.

Although the evidentiary basis for production of children’s aid society records was not otherwise established, the court ordered production of the records already obtained by police because they had been improperly requested and reviewed during the investigation.

The applicant brought a certiorari application seeking to quash committal to trial on charges of assault causing bodily harm, unlawfully causing bodily harm, and extortion following a preliminary inquiry.

The applicant argued that the evidence did not establish a causal connection between the alleged assault and the complainant’s serious injuries and that the extortion charge lacked evidence of intent to obtain property.

Applying the committal test articulated in R. v. Arcuri, the court held that a properly instructed jury could reasonably infer that the injuries were caused by the alleged assault based on common sense inferences from the evidence.

The court also found sufficient evidence that violence was used to obtain control of the disputed property during the altercation.

The application to quash the indictment was dismissed.

A young person charged with six counts of sexual abuse against two male cousins applied for severance of the counts.

The accused sought to have three counts tried separately from the remaining three counts.

The court considered the criteria established in R v. Last, including general prejudice, legal and factual nexus, complexity, and other factors.

The court found that a legal and factual nexus existed between the counts based on the age of the victims, their relationship to the accused, location, timeframe, and similarity of alleged acts.

The court rejected the severance application, finding that trying all counts together would be in the interests of justice and would not expose the accused to undue prejudice.