Michael John Nicholas Haraschuk

The accused was charged with impaired operation and having a blood alcohol concentration over 80.

At trial, the Crown conceded the impaired operation charge.

The accused brought a Charter application arguing his ss. 8, 9, and 10(b) rights were breached.

The court found that the arresting officer lacked objective grounds for the arrest and breath demand, breaching ss. 8 and 9.

The court also found a s. 10(b) breach because police failed to identify the accused when leaving voicemails for his counsel of choice.

However, applying the Grant framework, the court declined to exclude the breath evidence under s. 24(2), finding the breaches were not serious and had minimal impact on the accused's Charter-protected interests.

The accused was found guilty of the 80 plus charge.

The appellant appealed a sentence imposed for uttering threats and assault with a weapon after the sentencing judge rejected a joint sentencing submission.

The respondent Crown conceded that the appeal should be allowed because the joint submission was within or close to the appropriate range.

The Court of Appeal held that the sentencing judge erred in departing from the joint submission, which did not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The appeal was allowed, and the sentence was substituted with the recommended 12-month sentence followed by 18 months of probation.

The Crown applied to introduce evidence of other sexual activity and discreditable conduct by the accused in a sexual assault trial.

The court ruled on the admissibility of this evidence, applying the balancing test of probative value versus prejudicial effect.

The court permitted general contextual questions about the relationship and evidence of the accused's controlling behavior regarding the complainant's clothing.

However, it excluded evidence of other "unusual" sexual activity, pressured sexual activity, general use of sex toys, general alcohol consumption, and the accused's mental illness, finding their prejudicial effect outweighed their probative value or that they engaged in prohibited "twin myths" or propensity reasoning.

The applicant sought a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter due to unreasonable delay.

The total delay from charge to anticipated trial date exceeded the 30-month Jordan ceiling for Superior Court matters.

The Crown argued that the delay was due to exceptional circumstances, including the COVID-19 pandemic and the co-accused's need for new counsel, which necessitated an adjournment.

The applicant had opposed the adjournment and offered to proceed if severed from the co-accused.

The court found that the net delay exceeded the ceiling and that the Crown failed to rebut the presumption of unreasonableness.

While acknowledging the impact of COVID-19 and the importance of joint prosecutions, the court determined that the Crown had a duty to sever the applicant's trial when the joint prosecution compromised his s. 11(b) rights and unreasonably extended the prejudice he was suffering.

The Crown's failure to sever was deemed a failure to take reasonable steps to avoid the delay.

Consequently, the court found a breach of the applicant's s. 11(b) right and ordered a stay of proceedings.

The accused was charged with sexual assault following an encounter in his vehicle after driving the complainant and her friends home from a nightclub.

The complainant testified she was heavily intoxicated, experienced blackouts, and awoke during sexual acts to which she did not consent.

The court found the complainant lacked the capacity to consent due to her level of intoxication.

The court further rejected the accused's defence of honest but mistaken belief in communicated consent, finding he failed to take reasonable steps to ascertain consent after the complainant had earlier expressed reluctance.

The accused was found guilty.

The accused, an Indigenous person, pleaded guilty to multiple criminal offences, including assault causing bodily harm to a police officer, breaches of court orders, and drug/weapon possession.

The court considered Gladue factors, the accused's history of trauma and addiction, and the collateral consequences of incarceration during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The Crown sought a five-year sentence, while the defence sought time served.

The court imposed a global sentence of 44 months, applying a 1.5:1 pre-sentence custody credit (35 months) and an additional 3-month mitigation credit for pandemic conditions, resulting in 6 months of new custody.

The court declined to impose a probation order, citing the accused's history of breaches and the Gladue principles.

The two offenders were convicted of sexually assaulting a 19-year-old unconscious victim.

The assault involved digital penetration by one offender while the other encouraged and facilitated the act.

The court rejected the argument that the absence of penile penetration lessened the gravity of the offence.

Emphasizing denunciation and deterrence, the court sentenced both first-time offenders to 16 months in custody followed by two years of probation, along with a 20-year SOIRA order and a weapons prohibition.

The applicant sought a stay of sexual assault charges based on unreasonable pre-charge delay (4 years, 4 months), arguing police conduct constituted an abuse of process by allowing the complainant to dictate the timing of charges.

The Crown contended that police discretion, which considered the complainant's emotional readiness and willingness to participate, was reasonable and aligned with contemporary societal attitudes and victims' rights.

The court dismissed the application, finding no actual prejudice to the applicant's fair trial rights and concluding that the police conduct, while influenced by the complainant's circumstances, did not amount to egregious state conduct that seriously compromised the integrity of the judicial system.

The two accused were jointly charged with sexual assault.

The complainant, who had consumed an unknown substance and alcohol, lost consciousness but later experienced a flashback of being sexually assaulted by one accused while the other accused watched and provided encouragement.

The court found the complainant's flashback memory to be reliable, as it was consistent and corroborated by physical bruising.

The court held that the complainant did not consent to the sexual activity.

Both accused were found guilty, with the observing accused convicted as a party to the offence for aiding and abetting by facilitating the assault and encouraging the principal offender.

The applicants, jointly charged with historical sexual offences, brought applications for a stay of proceedings alleging unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The total delay was approximately 35 months.

The court deducted periods of defence-caused delay, reasonable judicial reserve time, and exceptional circumstances arising from one applicant's Legal Aid application process.

After deductions, the net delay for both applicants fell well below the 30-month Jordan ceiling.

As the applicants failed to demonstrate a sustained effort to expedite the proceedings, the applications were dismissed.

The accused, charged with attempted murder and other domestic violence offences, applied for a bail review after being denied bail.

He argued that trial delay, medical issues, jail programming, and the prospect of a section 11(b) Charter stay constituted material changes in circumstances.

The court also ruled on an evidentiary issue, holding that the Crown generally cannot cross-examine a proposed surety on admissions made by the accused about the offences.

Ultimately, the court found no material change in circumstances and held that continued detention was necessary on tertiary grounds due to the gravity of the offences and the strength of the Crown's case.

The bail review application was dismissed.

The applicants sought to quash subpoenas issued by the respondent, Laura Pinkerton, for her criminal trial on a charge of forcible entry.

Pinkerton intended to call witnesses to support her claim of entitlement to the property, arguing a long-standing conspiracy to divest her of it.

The court found that a person's entitlement to property is immaterial to a forcible entry charge under Section 72(1.1) of the Criminal Code, which focuses on preserving public peace and actual peaceable possession.

Furthermore, the evidence sought would constitute an impermissible collateral attack on prior court orders establishing possession.

As the proposed witnesses could not provide material evidence, the Justice of the Peace exceeded jurisdiction in issuing the subpoenas.

The subpoenas were quashed.

The accused was charged with sexual exploitation of a young person under Criminal Code section 153(1)(a).

The Crown alleged that the accused, who was in a position of trust or authority, touched the complainant's private parts for a sexual purpose.

The complainant was 16 years old at the time and living in the accused's home as a condition of bail.

The trial judge found that while the complainant's evidence contained material inconsistencies and credibility issues, the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the touching occurred.

Additionally, the court found that the Crown did not establish that the accused was in a position of trust or authority over the complainant.

The accused was acquitted.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and driving with a blood alcohol level exceeding 80 mg of alcohol in 100 mL of blood.

Police observed unusual driving behavior and conducted roadside screening and breath testing.

The Crown presented toxicology and intoxilyzer evidence establishing impairment.

However, the court found multiple Charter breaches: violations of language rights (sections 7, 10(a), and 10(b)) as the accused, a Francophone, was not provided adequate communication in French during arrest, testing, and release procedures; and a violation of section 9 Charter rights due to unlawful overholding in custody.

The court determined that the convergence of these breaches warranted a stay of proceedings rather than exclusion of evidence.

The applicant sought a stay of proceedings for criminal negligence causing death, alleging breaches of Charter sections 7, 11(d), and 11(b) due to pre-charge and post-charge delay.

The court found significant pre-charge delay (26 months and 23 days) and prejudice to the applicant, including the death of a material witness and the unfairness of sequential charges (provincial offence then criminal) arising from the same incident.

The court granted a stay of proceedings based on sections 7 and 11(d) of the Charter, finding an abuse of process.

The court also considered the s. 11(b) argument but would have dismissed it due to a re-calculation of defence delay, which would have brought the net delay below the presumptive ceiling.

The applicant, Brittany Taylor, sought a stay of proceedings for a charge of possessing fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking, alleging a denial of her right to a trial within a reasonable time under section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The total delay from arrest to expected trial completion was 24 months, which is below the 30-month presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan for Superior Court matters.

The court found no attributable defence delay.

However, it determined that the applicant's efforts to expedite the trial were not sustained and that the case did not markedly exceed its reasonable time requirements, considering its complexity and the institutional delays.

The application for a stay was dismissed.

The Crown brought a pre-trial application seeking an order that the defence provide a list of its witnesses to be read to prospective jurors during jury selection to identify potential conflicts.

The defence opposed the application, arguing it violated the accused's right against self-incrimination and the principle that the defence need not reveal its case until the close of the Crown's case.

The court dismissed the Crown's application, finding that compelling the defence to reveal its witness list at the outset would amount to conscripting the accused against himself.

The court adopted a procedure proposed by the defence where a combined, anonymized list of Crown and defence witnesses would be provided to the trial judge and prospective jurors silently.

The accused, charged with second degree murder, brought applications under s. 8 of the Charter to exclude evidence derived from the warrantless seizure of his pants, shoes, and sweater.

The court found that the accused had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the clothing and that the warrantless seizures violated his s. 8 rights, as there were no exigent circumstances.

Applying the Grant framework under s. 24(2) of the Charter, the court excluded the evidence derived from the pants due to a lack of evidence regarding their seizure, but admitted the evidence derived from the shoes and sweater, finding that their admission would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The Crown brought an application to admit the hearsay statements of a deceased victim in a second-degree murder trial under the principled exception to the hearsay rule.

The victim had made statements to police, medical staff, and family members before dying from his injuries.

The court applied the test for threshold reliability, noting concerns about the victim's perception due to intoxication, medical condition, and language barriers.

Furthermore, the victim's statements identifying the attacker as a woman contradicted the Crown's theory that the male accused was the attacker.

The court found the statements lacked sufficient threshold reliability and dismissed the application.

The accused was charged with assaulting a peace officer and obstructing a peace officer in the execution of their duty.

The charges arose from an incident on July 18, 2015, involving a neighbour dispute.

While police were arresting the accused's son for breach of the peace, the accused approached from behind and grabbed or pulled at the officer's vest.

The court found the accused not guilty of assault but guilty of obstruction, finding that the accused intentionally interfered with the arrest rather than accidentally losing his balance as claimed.