Dave Beaton

The decision addresses the admissibility of utterances made by the accused, M.D., to police at the time of his arrest, in the context of a 7-count indictment involving intimate partner violence and firearms offences.

The court considers whether the statements were voluntary and whether the accused’s Charter rights to counsel and silence were breached.

After reviewing the evidence and credibility of the witnesses, the court finds that the accused was properly informed of his rights, that his statements were voluntary, and that there was no improper inducement, oppression, or police trickery.

The accused’s Charter application is dismissed, and the utterances are ruled admissible.

This decision concerns a Crown appeal of a conditional sentence imposed for sexual assault.

The Crown argued that a traditional jail sentence was required, emphasizing deterrence and denunciation, and alleged errors in the sentencing judge’s application of section 718.04 of the Criminal Code and in considering the offender’s intellectual disability as a mitigating factor.

The Superior Court of Justice found that the sentencing judge had carefully considered all relevant principles, including the vulnerability of Indigenous women and the impact on the complainant, and that exceptional circumstances justified the conditional sentence.

The appeal was dismissed.

This criminal trial addressed charges of public mischief and uttering threats.

The accused, Todd Ansell, was alleged to have made a false complaint against his neighbour and subsequently threatened an arresting officer.

The court found the accused not guilty of public mischief, determining that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the initial complaint was false, given inconsistencies in dating and the accused's context for his "prank call" comment.

However, the court found the accused guilty of uttering threats, concluding that the threats made to the officer, despite being uttered while in custody and under stress, demonstrated the requisite mens rea of intending to intimidate or be taken seriously, particularly given the explicit statement about carrying out the threat later.

The accused was charged with impaired care or control of a motor vehicle and care or control with a blood alcohol level exceeding 80 mg/100 mL.

Following a blended voir dire and trial, the court found that the officer administering the approved screening device (ASD) did not have objectively reasonable grounds to believe the device was in proper working order, as he failed to check the calibration and accuracy check dates despite knowing their importance.

This constituted a violation of the accused's section 8 Charter rights.

The court excluded the breath sample evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The accused was acquitted of both charges.

The accused pleaded guilty to sexual interference of a person under 16 years of age and three counts of breaching recognizance conditions.

The offences occurred over more than two years, during which the accused engaged in repeated sexual intercourse with a 14-year-old girl, resulting in two pregnancies.

The court imposed a sentence of 50 months imprisonment, with credit for pre-sentence custody, along with mandatory DNA, SOIRA, and firearms prohibition orders, and discretionary section 161 orders restricting contact with the victim and employment involving minors.

The accused was charged with aggravated assault for stabbing the victim in the neck on August 14, 2017.

The accused pleaded not guilty and raised the defence of not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder under section 16 of the Criminal Code.

The Crown and defence agreed on the facts of the assault.

The defence called psychiatric evidence from two experts: Dr. Beth Eayrs and Dr. Maxym Choptiany.

At the initial hearing, the court found the evidence insufficient to establish the defence.

The hearing was reopened to allow for additional evidence.

At the reopened hearing, the court found that although the accused suffered from schizophrenia and likely experienced psychotic symptoms at the time of the offence, the evidence demonstrated that the accused had the capacity to know his actions were morally wrong and proceeded to commit the act anyway.

The court found the accused criminally responsible and convicted him of aggravated assault.

The Crown charged Brian Jordan Ense and Joseph Bernard Edward Ense with sexual assault contrary to section 271 of the Criminal Code.

The charges arose from an alleged incident on November 5, 2016, at a house party on Manitoulin Island.

The complainant, a 16-year-old girl, testified that she was sexually assaulted by both men while intoxicated.

Joseph Ense's charges were withdrawn after his death during the trial.

The court found Brian Jordan Ense guilty of sexual assault based on the complainant's testimony, DNA evidence linking him to the complainant, and corroborating evidence from other witnesses.

The court rejected arguments regarding continuity of DNA evidence and credibility challenges to the complainant's testimony, finding her evidence credible and reliable despite inconsistencies between her police statement, 911 call, and trial testimony.

The accused was charged with sexual assault.

The complainant alleged the accused touched her breasts and vagina while she was passed out after a night of heavy drinking.

The accused denied the contact.

The court found the complainant credible but unreliable due to her intoxication and contradictions from other witnesses regarding key details like sleeping arrangements and interactions.

DNA evidence on the complainant's bra matched the accused, but the defense proposed an innocent transfer through profuse slobbering during repeated social interactions over the drunken weekend.

While finding the innocent transfer implausible, the court could not definitively rule it out, leading to reasonable doubt.

The charge was dismissed.

The accused was charged with sexual exploitation of a young person under Criminal Code section 153(1)(a).

The Crown alleged that the accused, who was in a position of trust or authority, touched the complainant's private parts for a sexual purpose.

The complainant was 16 years old at the time and living in the accused's home as a condition of bail.

The trial judge found that while the complainant's evidence contained material inconsistencies and credibility issues, the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the touching occurred.

Additionally, the court found that the Crown did not establish that the accused was in a position of trust or authority over the complainant.

The accused was acquitted.

The accused was charged with two counts under s. 253(1) of the Criminal Code: operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol, and operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The accused was found asleep in the driver's seat of a running vehicle parked on a residential street.

The trial judge found that the accused had rebutted the presumption of care and control by establishing she had no intention to drive.

However, the court found that a realistic risk of danger existed under the second prong of the Boudreault test—that an impaired person behind the wheel may unintentionally set the vehicle in motion.

The court convicted on the impaired count and stayed the over-80 count pursuant to Kienapple.

The accused was charged with dangerous operation of a motor vehicle contrary to section 249(1)(a) of the Criminal Code and failure to stop at the scene of an accident contrary to section 252 of the Criminal Code.

The Crown proceeded summarily.

The charge under section 252 was quashed as it did not constitute an offence known to law.

At trial, the Crown proved that the accused operated a vehicle in a manner dangerous to the public.

The accused did not testify.

The court found that the accused's conduct—leaving the roadway, driving onto private property, gunning the engine to escape the yard, coming within five feet of a pedestrian, and subsequently driving a severely damaged vehicle in an erratic manner—constituted a marked departure from the standard of care expected of a reasonable person in the same circumstances.

The court convicted the accused of dangerous operation of a motor vehicle.

The accused was charged with aggravated assault for stabbing the victim in the neck on August 14, 2017.

The accused pleaded not guilty and raised the defence of not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder under section 16 of the Criminal Code.

The Crown and defence agreed on the facts of the assault.

The defence called expert psychiatric evidence from Dr. Beth Eayrs, a forensic psychiatrist, who opined that the accused was suffering from schizophrenia and was psychotic at the time of the offence, acting under command hallucinations.

The court found that while the accused may have been experiencing auditory hallucinations, the evidence demonstrated that he had the capacity to know his conduct was morally wrong.

The court rejected the defence and found the accused criminally responsible for aggravated assault.

The accused was charged with dangerous operation of a motor vehicle and failure to remain at the scene of an accident involving property damage.

At the close of the Crown's case, the defence brought a motion for a directed verdict on the failure to remain charge, arguing that section 252 of the Criminal Code only applies to accidents involving another person, vehicle, or cattle, not property.

The court initially considered this as a directed verdict motion but subsequently treated it as a motion to quash.

The court found that the information did not disclose an offence known to law, as section 252 contains no reference to accidents with property.

The court quashed count 2 on the information, finding that any amendment would result in irreparable prejudice to the accused by completely changing the case to meet.

The applicant sought a stay of proceedings for criminal negligence causing death, alleging breaches of Charter sections 7, 11(d), and 11(b) due to pre-charge and post-charge delay.

The court found significant pre-charge delay (26 months and 23 days) and prejudice to the applicant, including the death of a material witness and the unfairness of sequential charges (provincial offence then criminal) arising from the same incident.

The court granted a stay of proceedings based on sections 7 and 11(d) of the Charter, finding an abuse of process.

The court also considered the s. 11(b) argument but would have dismissed it due to a re-calculation of defence delay, which would have brought the net delay below the presumptive ceiling.

Trevor Khan faced four criminal charges including failing to stop for a peace officer, dangerous driving, possession of a stolen vehicle, and failing to stop at the scene of an accident, stemming from a stolen SUV crashing after a police pursuit.

The central issue at trial was the identification of Khan as the driver.

The court analyzed witness descriptions of the driver's appearance and clothing against Khan's actual appearance and the circumstances of the crash and flight.

Due to inconsistencies in witness descriptions and a reasonable doubt regarding the presence of a second person in the vehicle, the court found a reasonable doubt that Khan was the driver.

Consequently, Khan was acquitted on all counts.