Marco Giuseppe Forte

This decision addresses Ali Baek's Charter application to exclude evidence (10 kg of cocaine) seized from his residence, alleging breaches of his section 8 Charter rights against unreasonable search and seizure.

The court conducted a Garofoli review of the warrants and orders, finding that the initial tracking warrant and production orders were issued without reasonable grounds due to erroneous, speculative, and misleading information provided by the police.

The police conduct was characterized as serious, involving reckless disregard for Charter rights and a failure of full and frank disclosure.

Applying the Grant factors, the court determined that the seriousness of the police misconduct and the significant impact on Baek's privacy interests outweighed society's interest in admitting the evidence, leading to its exclusion.

This sentencing decision concerns Peter Stewart, who pleaded guilty to possessing fentanyl and a loaded prohibited handgun.

The Crown sought a jail sentence of three to four years, while the defence argued for a conditional sentence.

The court considered significant aggravating factors, including the loaded firearm and the dangerous combination of guns and drugs, alongside numerous mitigating factors.

Key mitigating factors included an early guilty plea, first-offender status, strong family support, consistent employment, and compliance with strict bail conditions for over four years.

Crucially, the court gave significant weight to an Enhanced Pre-Sentence Report (EPSR) detailing systemic anti-Black racism, poverty, and community violence that diminished the offender's moral blameworthiness and contributed to his choices.

Applying principles from R. v. Morris and R. v. Proulx, the court determined that a penitentiary sentence was not required and imposed a conditional sentence of two years less a day, minus credit for pre-trial custody, followed by two years of probation, with strict house arrest conditions.

The applicants sought the return of seized cash and property under s. 490(9)(c) of the Criminal Code after the initial detention order expired.

The police seized $43,390 CAD and $2 USD, along with a Louis Vuitton pouch and hat, during an inventory search following a drinking and driving investigation.

The applicants provided affidavits asserting lawful ownership, with one applicant claiming the majority of the cash as rental income and the other claiming a smaller portion and the personal items.

Despite suspicious circumstances noted by the Crown regarding the money's storage and the vehicle's VIN, the court found the applicants' unchallenged evidence of lawful ownership on a balance of probabilities to be credible.

The application for the return of property was granted.

The accused, Loic Simeu, was charged with unlawful confinement, obtaining sexual services for consideration, assault police, and uttering threats.

He pleaded guilty to obtaining sexual services for consideration but contested the other charges.

The trial focused on the credibility and reliability of the complainant (AP), a friend (MM), police officers, and the accused.

The court found significant inconsistencies and reliability issues in the Crown's witness testimonies, particularly regarding the complainant's prior dishonesty with police and failure to provide crucial information during a 911 call.

The court also scrutinized the police officers' accounts of the accused's arrest and behaviour, noting their perceptions were colored by initial misinformation.

Ultimately, the Crown failed to prove the charges of threatening, unlawful confinement, and assault police beyond a reasonable doubt, leading to their dismissal.

This ruling addresses the admissibility of evidence during the cross-examination of a Crown witness in a criminal trial.

The defence sought to ask questions, which the Crown objected to on grounds of relevance and offending section 276 of the Criminal Code.

The court found section 276 applicable, adopting reasoning from R. v. Amdurski and R. v. Barton, and ruled on which specific questions could be asked, balancing relevance with the protective purposes of section 276.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent, who was charged with "over 80" after being stopped for cell phone use while driving.

The trial judge found racial profiling, excluded breathalyzer readings, and acquitted.

The appeal court found the trial judge erred by misapprehending evidence, failing to consider an innocent mistake as an alternative to racial profiling, and improperly drawing inferences from the police's failure to investigate the cell phone.

The trial judge's finding of "unconscious" racial profiling by an honest officer was deemed a stretch and difficult to substantiate.

The appeal was allowed, the acquittal vacated, and a new trial ordered.

The applicant, Dejan Mitrovic, sought a stay of proceedings under section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms due to unreasonable delay.

The charges stemmed from a large criminal organization investigation (Project Sizzle) involving drug trafficking and conspiracy.

The court calculated the gross delay from arrest to projected end of trial as 31 months and 28 days.

After deducting periods attributable to defence delay (unavailability of counsel, failure to complete pre-trial reports, preliminary inquiry scheduling issues) and exceptional circumstances (preliminary inquiry judge's deliberation time), the net delay was found to be 27.5 months, which is below the 30-month presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan.

The applicant failed to demonstrate that he took meaningful steps to expedite the proceedings or that the case took markedly longer than it reasonably should have.

Consequently, the application for a stay was dismissed.

The accused was charged with impaired driving following a traffic stop on a highway.

The defence alleged that the stop was based on racial profiling and constituted an arbitrary detention in breach of section 9 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found that while the officer was honest in her testimony, the evidence demonstrated an absence of objective grounds for the detention and that the stop was motivated by non-conscious racial bias.

The court concluded that the officer's perception of the accused—a Black male driving early in the morning wearing a hooded sweatshirt with out-of-province license plates—unwittingly triggered non-conscious racial stereotyping.

The court excluded the breath analysis evidence as a result of the arbitrary detention.

The accused pleaded guilty to possession of ketamine for the purpose of trafficking arising from Project Ice Castle (York Region charges), production of ketamine arising from Project Apollo (Toronto charges), and failure to comply with recognizance.

The accused was arrested in April 2015 in possession of 60 kilograms of ketamine and subsequently engaged in ketamine production at three clandestine drug laboratories in Toronto while on bail awaiting trial.

The court imposed a global sentence of 15 years and 6 months imprisonment, consisting of 7 years and 6 months for possession for trafficking, 7 years and 6 months for production (consecutive), and 6 months for failure to comply.

The court credited 447 days of pre-trial custody at enhanced rates for lockdown periods and strict bail conditions.

Trevor Khan faced four criminal charges including failing to stop for a peace officer, dangerous driving, possession of a stolen vehicle, and failing to stop at the scene of an accident, stemming from a stolen SUV crashing after a police pursuit.

The central issue at trial was the identification of Khan as the driver.

The court analyzed witness descriptions of the driver's appearance and clothing against Khan's actual appearance and the circumstances of the crash and flight.

Due to inconsistencies in witness descriptions and a reasonable doubt regarding the presence of a second person in the vehicle, the court found a reasonable doubt that Khan was the driver.

Consequently, Khan was acquitted on all counts.

The accused was charged with robbery, aggravated assault, breach of recognizance, and failing to comply with a probation order.

The complainant, a heroin addict with a criminal history, alleged a violent attack and robbery by the accused and others.

The court found the complainant to be an incredible and unreliable witness due to inconsistencies, exaggerations, mistaken identifications, and admitted lies.

While the complainant suffered serious injuries, the Crown failed to prove the accused's involvement in the robbery and aggravated assault beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was acquitted of robbery, aggravated assault, and breach of probation, but found guilty of breach of recognizance based on his plea and supporting evidence.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and driving with excess alcohol.

The accused brought a Charter application challenging the lawfulness of the police entry onto her property.

The officer attended at the accused's residence in response to a dispatch report of a possible impaired driver.

The property was secured by a motorized metal gate at the end of a 200-metre driveway, with intercom and security camera systems.

The officer entered the property by following a security guard through the gate without explicit permission.

The court found two Charter breaches: an unlawful entry onto the property in violation of section 8 rights, and an arrest without reasonable and probable grounds.

The court excluded all evidence obtained after the officer passed through the gate, finding that admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

At a preliminary inquiry, the Crown sought to commit the accused to trial on charges of break and enter, possession of break-in tools, and mischief arising from a sophisticated bank theft at a TD Bank in Burlington.

The accused were found hiding in a field shortly after the theft, in close proximity to admitted perpetrators and stolen property.

The Crown relied on circumstantial evidence including concrete dust and drywall particles found on the accused's clothing and tools in the accused Hickey's van.

The court discharged the accused on all counts, finding that the Crown's evidence was equivocal and speculative, failing to establish the essential elements of the offences beyond what a reasonable jury properly instructed could convict upon.

Two young persons were charged with sexual assault and gang sexual assault, as well as robbery with violence, arising from an incident on September 20, 2009, in Toronto.

The complainant, a sex worker, engaged in sexual activity with four young men in a stolen red Honda vehicle and was subsequently beaten and robbed.

The court found that while the defendants participated in the robbery, the Crown failed to prove sexual assault beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court determined that although the complainant may have had subjective misgivings about the sexual activity, her outward conduct and words were consistent with consent, and the defendants could have held an honest but mistaken belief in her consent.

The court rejected the Crown's argument that consent was vitiated by fraud or the subsequent robbery.

The accused brought an application to stay the proceeding pursuant to Section 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms for an alleged breach of the right to trial within a reasonable time under Section 11(b) of the Charter.

The charge was laid on October 26, 2010, and the trial date was set for March 28, 2012, representing a delay of approximately 17 months.

The court analyzed the delay using the framework established in R. v. Morin, considering the length of delay, waiver, reasons for delay, and prejudice.

The court found that the operative delay was 8 months (6 months institutional delay plus 2 months Crown delay), which fell within the acceptable guideline of 8-10 months.

The application was dismissed.