Dr. Lindsay

The defendant hospital brought a motion to compel the plaintiff to satisfy undertakings from examinations for discovery and to attend vocational and physiotherapy assessments.

The plaintiff opposed the assessments, arguing the proposed experts lacked specific medical expertise and the requests were delayed.

The court ordered the plaintiff to urgently fulfill the undertakings and attend the assessments, finding them necessary for trial fairness given the substantial loss of income and future care claims.

At a preliminary inquiry, the Crown sought to commit the accused to trial on charges of break and enter, possession of break-in tools, and mischief arising from a sophisticated bank theft at a TD Bank in Burlington.

The accused were found hiding in a field shortly after the theft, in close proximity to admitted perpetrators and stolen property.

The Crown relied on circumstantial evidence including concrete dust and drywall particles found on the accused's clothing and tools in the accused Hickey's van.

The court discharged the accused on all counts, finding that the Crown's evidence was equivocal and speculative, failing to establish the essential elements of the offences beyond what a reasonable jury properly instructed could convict upon.

The appellant appealed two first degree murder convictions arising from a motel room shooting, arguing that the principal eyewitness identification evidence should have been excluded, that defence expert evidence on identification frailties should have been admitted, and that the jury charge on identification was inadequate.

The court held that the eyewitness evidence was fully testable through the adversarial process and did not create the kind of prejudice that would justify exclusion.

The court declined to revisit existing authority limiting general expert evidence on the frailties of eyewitness identification and upheld the trial judge’s conclusion that the proposed opinion evidence was unnecessary.

Reading the charge as a whole, the court found the jury was adequately cautioned about the dangers of identification evidence, including the limits of witness confidence, and the appeal was dismissed.

The accused was charged with two counts of manslaughter by omission in relation to the death of his foster child: one by criminal negligence and one by failing to provide the necessaries of life.

The jury convicted him of criminal negligence but acquitted him of failing to provide the necessaries of life.

The Court of Appeal overturned the conviction and ordered a new trial, finding the verdicts inconsistent.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the Crown's appeal and allowed the accused's cross-appeal, entering an acquittal on the criminal negligence count.

The Court held that the verdicts were inconsistent because both counts relied on the exact same failure to perform the exact same duty, and criminal negligence requires a higher degree of fault.