Kimberley Crosbie

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board ordering his detention.

The Court of Appeal found no basis to interfere with the Board's finding that the appellant posed a significant risk to the public.

While the appellant argued that a treatment impasse had been reached requiring an alternative assessment, this request was not made before the Board.

The appeal was dismissed, but the Court encouraged the Board to consider exercising its jurisdiction to address the treatment impasse at the upcoming annual review.

The appellant was convicted of armed robbery and related offences and sentenced to six years' imprisonment.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred by permitting the Crown to cross-examine its own witnesses on prior inconsistent statements, failing to give a W. (D.) instruction, and holding a mid-trial chambers discussion in his absence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the cross-examination permissible, the jury instruction adequate, and applying the curative proviso to the accused's absence.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed as the sentence was fit.

The appellants were convicted of aggravated assault following a jury trial.

On appeal, they argued the trial judge erred in dismissing a motion for a stay based on unreasonable delay, allowing the preliminary hearing testimony of a key witness who was out of the country to be read in under s. 715(1) of the Criminal Code, and providing incomplete written instructions to the jury during deliberations.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the delay analysis but held the trial judge erred in admitting the preliminary hearing evidence without considering technological alternatives like videoconferencing.

The Court also found the trial judge's written jury instructions were unbalanced and compromised trial fairness.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed sentences imposed by three different Superior Court judges, with the primary focus on the sentence imposed by Ducharme J. The Court of Appeal found no error in principle, noting that protection of the public was the paramount consideration given the appellant's record and psychiatric evidence.

The court agreed that the totality principle was entitled to little weight because rehabilitation was not a factor in this case.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault and sexual assault with a weapon against his wife.

At trial, a police officer gave lay opinion evidence that a mark on the appellant's finger was a bite mark, corroborating the complainant's testimony.

On appeal, the appellant sought to introduce fresh evidence from a forensic dentist concluding the mark was not a bite mark.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that while the due diligence criterion was not met, the fresh evidence was sufficiently cogent that it could reasonably be expected to have affected the trial judge's credibility assessment and the ultimate verdict.

The appellant appealed his robbery conviction, arguing that the trial judge erred in assessing the credibility of three Crown witnesses and that he received ineffective assistance from his trial counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's assessment of the unsavoury witnesses.

The Court also rejected the ineffective assistance claim, concluding that the fresh evidence regarding a doctor's appointment would not have altered the verdict or raised a reasonable doubt, and that trial counsel was not incompetent in following the appellant's instructions to proceed without subpoenaing the doctor.

The accused was charged with two counts of manslaughter by omission in relation to the death of his foster child: one by criminal negligence and one by failing to provide the necessaries of life.

The jury convicted him of criminal negligence but acquitted him of failing to provide the necessaries of life.

The Court of Appeal overturned the conviction and ordered a new trial, finding the verdicts inconsistent.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the Crown's appeal and allowed the accused's cross-appeal, entering an acquittal on the criminal negligence count.

The Court held that the verdicts were inconsistent because both counts relied on the exact same failure to perform the exact same duty, and criminal negligence requires a higher degree of fault.

The appellant appealed his conviction for manslaughter and his effective sentence of 13 years arising from his participation in a bank robbery where a teller was fatally shot.

He argued the trial judge erred in his instructions regarding the rule in Brown v. Dunn, the Vetrovec warning, and the Corbett ruling admitting his criminal record.

The Court of Appeal found no errors in the trial judge's rulings or instructions.

The court also upheld the 13-year sentence, noting the appellant's active participation and brandishing of a handgun during the violent robbery.

The appeal from conviction and sentence was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions and total sentence of six years' imprisonment for the physical and sexual abuse of his children.

He argued the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding the sexual abuse allegations, improperly assessed videotaped statements, and rendered an unreasonable verdict on the assault charge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge's conclusions were supported by the evidence and her assessment of the videotaped statements was appropriate.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge did not err in refusing credit for time spent on strict bail conditions, though a technical correction was made to the counts on which the sentence was imposed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for administering a stupefying substance and sexual assault, as well as his 22-month sentence.

The appellant argued that the trial judge erred by failing to stay the charges due to unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter, misapprehending expert toxicological evidence regarding the effects of GHB and alcohol, and finding that the complainant lacked the capacity to consent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no unreasonable delay and that the trial judge's findings regarding the complainant's incapacity to consent due to intoxication were supported by the evidence.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for using a firearm while committing an indictable offence and his sentence.

He had shot a friend in the eye with a pellet gun while intoxicated.

The trial judge found recklessness satisfied the mens rea for both aggravated assault and the firearm offence.

The Court of Appeal held that while the trial judge erred in equating the mens rea for the two offences, the factual finding that the appellant intended to point and fire the gun satisfied the general intent requirement for the firearm offence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first-degree murder and robbery arising from the Just Desserts café shooting.

He argued that the trial judge erred in the jury selection process by prioritizing the return dates of potential jurors from identifiable minority groups to ensure representativeness.

The Court of Appeal held that while the process departed from strict statutory requirements, it did not prejudice the appellant or undermine the jury's impartiality.

The court also dismissed grounds of appeal relating to the admissibility of surveillance videotapes, recognition witness evidence, the jury charge on identification, and the trial judge's refusal to compel testimony.

The appeal from conviction was dismissed and the sentence appeal was quashed.

The appellant appealed his conviction on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel and fresh evidence.

The Crown conceded that a new trial was necessary but argued against an acquittal.

The Court of Appeal found that the fresh evidence, which included recantations and false allegations by the key witness, rendered the witness's testimony unbelievable.

Given the time elapsed, the time already served by the appellant, and his health condition, the Court set aside the conviction and directed an acquittal.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first degree murder arising from a violent bank robbery.

During the investigation, police used a self-styled spiritualist and Obeah practitioner as an agent to elicit a confession from the appellant.

The appellant argued the resulting statement was inadmissible as the product of a 'dirty trick' and protected by religious privilege.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the relationship between the appellant and the spiritualist was a corrupt criminal relationship aimed at evading police, not a genuine religious confession.

The Court also dismissed grounds of appeal relating to the trial judge's jury instructions on expert evidence, challenge for cause, and co-conspirator utterances.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder following a violent bank robbery in which a bank employee was fatally shot by a co-perpetrator.

On appeal, the appellant argued that the trial judge's charge to the jury violated his right to a trial by jury under s. 11(f) of the Charter by expressing opinions on contested factual issues, and that the comments exceeded common law limits.

The Court of Appeal held that the common law rule permitting judicial comment on evidence does not violate the Charter, provided the judge does not usurp the jury's fact-finding role.

The court found that while some of the trial judge's comments were unfortunate, they did not overwhelm the jury or deprive the appellant of a fair trial.

The appeal from conviction and the 17-year parole ineligibility period were dismissed.

The young person appealed their conviction and sentence.

The appellant argued the verdict was unreasonable and that the trial judge misapplied the standard of reasonable doubt.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding there was evidence to support the verdict and that the trial judge was satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt despite expressing himself inappropriately.