Victor Giourgas

The applicants, charged with first-degree murder, conspiracy, and arson, brought a Charter application to exclude cell phone records obtained by police through "tower dump" production orders.

The applicants argued the warrants violated their section 8 rights due to their broad scope and lack of reasonable and probable grounds.

The court found that the initial tower dump warrants breached section 8 as they were based on speculation rather than reasonable grounds.

However, applying the Grant framework under section 24(2), the court declined to exclude the evidence, finding the police acted in good faith, the subsequent discovery of the specific phone numbers was inevitable due to a lawful "Mr. Big" confession, and society's interest in adjudicating a serious murder charge on its merits strongly favoured admission.

The application was dismissed.

The applicants, jointly charged with first-degree murder, conspiracy to commit murder, and arson, brought a pre-trial motion seeking leave to challenge prospective jurors for cause based on pre-trial publicity.

The media coverage included sensationalized reports of an alleged attempted prison break by one of the applicants.

The court found that despite the passage of time, the prominence and ready access to the coverage on the internet created an air of reality that the publicity could potentially undermine a prospective juror's impartiality.

The application was granted, and specific questions were approved to be put to the jury pool.

The accused, charged with first-degree murder and arson following the discovery of his wife's charred body in their garage, applied to exclude a statement he made to police.

The court found that the two-and-a-half-hour police interview constituted an investigative detention, triggering the accused's Charter rights.

The police failed to properly inform the accused of his right to silence, the reasons for his detention, and his right to counsel, resulting in serious breaches of sections 7, 10(a), and 10(b) of the Charter.

Applying the Grant framework, the court excluded the statement under section 24(2), concluding that the breaches were deliberate and admitting the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The accused was charged with committing an indecent act by exposing his genitals and masturbating in a public place on a highway in the presence of a minor, and with criminal harassment by repeatedly following the minor and causing her to fear for her safety.

The Crown sought to introduce similar fact evidence relating to a subsequent incident on Highway 401.

The court admitted the similar fact evidence and convicted the accused on both charges.

The accused subsequently brought a section 11(b) Charter application alleging unreasonable delay.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the total delay of 17 months and 5 days (after deducting defence delay) fell below the 18-month presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan for provincial court proceedings.

The appellant appealed a two-year custodial sentence with probation imposed by the trial judge, arguing that the trial judge erred in principle by declining to impose a conditional sentence.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's reasoning or application of relevant sentencing principles and dismissed the appeal.

The Crown applied under s. 486.5 of the Criminal Code for publication bans to protect the identities of three witnesses (J.D., M.S., B.S.) in a murder re-trial.

The Crown argued that non-publication was necessary to prevent harm to the witnesses' reputations and rehabilitation efforts, and to encourage participation in the justice system.

The respondents opposed, asserting the paramountcy of the open court principle and the lack of an adequate evidentiary record.

The court dismissed the application, holding that the Crown's unsworn statements were insufficient to displace the presumption of openness, and that purely personal interests like emotional distress or embarrassment do not satisfy the necessity test for a publication ban.

Michael Casey was charged with aggravated assault, assault with a weapon, and possession of a weapon.

The central issue at trial was the identification of the assailant.

The victim, Michael Greer, identified Casey, but his testimony was found to be unreliable due to significant intoxication during the incident, memory issues, inconsistent descriptions of the assailant over time, and attempts to avoid testifying or recant his statement for monetary gain.

The court highlighted the inherent frailties of identification evidence, particularly in-dock identification, and found that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Casey was the perpetrator.

Casey was acquitted on all counts.

The accused was charged with conspiracy to traffic in cocaine and marijuana, trafficking, and participating in a criminal organization.

The Crown's case relied heavily on police surveillance, tracking devices, and intercepted messages from an encrypted PGP cellphone.

The court found that the accused used specific monikers in the encrypted communications to coordinate the shipment of drugs and money.

The court concluded that the accused actively assisted both the seller and purchaser in drug transactions and contributed to the activities of a structured criminal organization.

The accused was found guilty on all counts.

This is a pre-trial application by the Crown in a criminal proceeding against Keith Ritchie, who is charged with drug trafficking and criminal organization offenses.

The Crown sought to admit the sworn statement of Salvatore Larizza, a deceased witness, and the transcript of a guilty plea entered by co-accused Frank Muzzi.

The court applied the principled approach to hearsay, finding that the Larizza statement met the criteria of necessity (due to death) and threshold reliability (due to circumstances of making and corroborative evidence).

However, while the fact of Muzzi's guilty plea was admissible, the underlying facts from its transcript were not, as the Crown failed to establish necessity for Muzzi's testimony.

The application to admit the Larizza statement and the fact of Muzzi's guilty plea was allowed, but the transcript of Muzzi's plea facts was dismissed.

The applicant, charged with drug and criminal organization offences, brought a pre-trial application seeking a stay of proceedings or exclusion of evidence under s. 24(1) of the Charter, alleging his s. 7 rights were violated due to lost police surveillance video.

The video was automatically erased by a recording device's factory default setting.

The court applied the framework for lost evidence, finding the Crown met its burden to show the loss was not due to unacceptable negligence.

The court also found no abuse of process and no irreparable prejudice to the applicant's right to a fair trial, as the video's value was speculative and alternative evidence (officer notes) was available.

The application was dismissed.

The applicant sought to excise paragraphs from an Information to Obtain (ITO) a Production Order and search warrant for his residence.

The applicant argued that the information was obtained through an unlawful search of a third party's cell phone, which had previously been ruled a breach of the third party's s. 8 Charter rights.

The court dismissed the application, holding that an accused must establish an independent privacy interest in the evidence to have standing to seek excision based on a Charter breach.

Since the applicant had no expectation of privacy in the messages on the third party's phone, he could not rely on the third party's s. 8 breach to seek a remedy under s. 24(2).

The appellants were acquitted of first degree murder and convicted of second degree murder.

They appealed their convictions on the basis that the trial judge erred during jury selection by unilaterally ordering the use of static triers for challenges for cause, despite the appellants' requests for rotating triers and the absence of an application under s. 640(2.1) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal held that the improper use of static triers deprived the appellants of their statutory right to rotating triers, rendering the court improperly constituted to try them.

The curative proviso in s. 686(1)(b)(iv) could not apply.

The Court also found the trial judge erred in failing to answer a jury question regarding closing arguments.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered for second degree murder.

The accused applied under s. 591(3) of the Criminal Code to sever an indictment charging multiple assaults against his children and assaults and sexual assaults against his former spouse.

The court considered the interests of justice test articulated in R. v. Last, balancing potential prejudice to the accused from a combined trial against the public interest in efficient proceedings and minimizing repeated testimony by child witnesses.

The court found a significant risk of propensity reasoning if all counts were tried together but also recognized the burden of requiring the children to testify in multiple trials.

As a compromise, the court ordered severance only of the sexual assault counts relating to the spouse, while leaving the remaining counts to proceed together.

The accused brought a Stage 2 third‑party records application seeking production of counselling records of two complainants following a Stage 1 finding of likely relevance under the O’Connor framework.

After reviewing the records, the court conducted the balancing analysis between the accused’s right to make full answer and defence and the privacy interests of the complainants.

The court found no indication that the counselling process revived, refreshed, or shaped the complainants’ memories of the alleged abuse.

As the records disclosed no basis to support the defence theory arising from the preliminary hearing testimony, production was refused.

The counselling records were not ordered produced to the accused.

This was a sentence appeal from the Ontario Court of Justice.

The appellant argued procedural unfairness in sentencing because the trial judge imposed a sentence considerably above the Crown's submission without inviting further submissions and refused to allow the appellant to speak before sentence.

The Court of Appeal found it sufficient to resolve the appeal on those two issues.

Given the time already served and the appellant's continuing commitment to treatment, leave to appeal was granted and the sentence was reduced to time served, with probation terms remaining in force subject to any future variation application.

The appellants pleaded guilty to aggravated assault and forcible confinement after subjecting a vulnerable victim to 17 days of torture.

The sentencing judge rejected a joint submission for one appellant and the Crown's proposal for the other, imposing significantly higher sentences without providing reasons or allowing counsel to make submissions.

The Court of Appeal found this was an error in principle, as a joint submission should not be rejected unless it is contrary to the public interest and brings the administration of justice into disrepute.

The appeals were allowed and the sentences were reduced to align with the original submissions.

The appellant challenged jury convictions for sexual assault and invitation to sexual touching arising from allegations made by a child complainant who, at trial, had no recollection of the alleged abuse or of making prior complaints.

The appeal turned on whether out-of-court statements to foster parents and police satisfied the reliability branch of the principled hearsay exception.

The court held that the trial judge misapprehended key reliability indicators, failed to grapple with leading questions, inconsistencies, delay in disclosure, and the absence of oath or meaningful truth-lie understanding, and wrongly denied the defence an opportunity to cross-examine the declarant before the jury.

The convictions were set aside and, given the long procedural history, prior successful appeal, substantial sentence served, and difficulty of a third prosecution, a stay of proceedings was entered.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentence for firearms and contraband offences.

He argued the trial judge erred in finding the vehicle search was reasonable and that he had knowledge of the contraband.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings regarding the reliability of the confidential informant's tip and the assessment of witness credibility.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the sentence was deemed fit given the appellant's prior record for similar offences.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for a sexual offence.

He argued the trial judge erred by relying on the complainant's prior consistent statements, treating his non-cooperation with police as consciousness of guilt, misapplying reasonable doubt regarding his physical limitations, and ignoring exculpatory portions of his statement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge did not rely on the prior statements for credibility, properly addressed the physical limitations, and considered the exculpatory statement.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed as no error was found in the sentence imposed.

The young person appealed their conviction for robbery and an imitation firearm offence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding overwhelming evidence of party liability under s. 21(1) of the Criminal Code, as the young person approached the victim knowing of the plan to rob and encouraged the principal offender by menacing the victim.

There was also ample circumstantial evidence of liability under s. 21(2) for the gun offence.

The sentence appeal was dismissed as abandoned.