Victor Giourgas

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and his sentence as a dangerous offender.

He argued the trial judge erred by refusing to sever the counts relating to one complainant from those relating to two others, and by not designating him a long-term offender.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly considered the pending similar fact application when denying severance and correctly applied the test for dangerous offender designation, noting the appellant's lack of insight and unsuitability for anti-androgen medication.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual offences against his young child.

At trial, the Crown called an expert in child sexual abuse to testify about the child's out-of-court statements.

The expert's testimony went beyond permissible bounds by indicating his belief in the veracity of the child's foster parents and the child's disclosures, effectively usurping the jury's role in assessing credibility.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in admitting this testimony without requiring the use of hypothetical questions to properly confine the expert's opinion.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual offences against a child.

He argued the trial judge erred by refusing to take judicial notice of physical signs of sexual intercourse in a child and by treating his failure to contact his family as after-the-fact conduct indicative of guilt.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's refusal to take judicial notice or in his treatment of the after-the-fact conduct.

The appellant challenged a conviction and penitentiary sentence arising from a historical sexual assault in which consent was the central issue.

The appeal focused on whether the trial judge improperly used prior consistent statements and post-offence conduct to bolster the complainant’s credibility, misapprehended evidence, applied an uneven standard of scrutiny, and gave insufficient reasons.

The court held that the impugned statements were admissible and were used only to assess consistency of conduct placed in issue by the defence, not for their truth.

The proposed fresh evidence relating to a post-trial statement by the complainant did not meet the admissibility test because it could not reasonably be expected to have affected the verdict.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the sentence appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for administering a stupefying substance and sexual assault, as well as his 22-month sentence.

The appellant argued that the trial judge erred by failing to stay the charges due to unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter, misapprehending expert toxicological evidence regarding the effects of GHB and alcohol, and finding that the complainant lacked the capacity to consent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no unreasonable delay and that the trial judge's findings regarding the complainant's incapacity to consent due to intoxication were supported by the evidence.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for robbery, wearing a disguise, and possession of property obtained by crime, as well as his three-year sentence.

The key issue at trial was identity, with the defence alleging a third party committed the robbery.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no reversible errors in the jury instructions, evidentiary rulings, or Crown conduct.

Although hearsay evidence was improperly admitted, the Court found it did not occasion a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the three-year sentence was fit given the seriousness of the offence, despite the appellant's youth and aboriginal heritage.

The young person appealed a secure custody sentence imposed for a vicious, unprovoked attack on another youth.

The majority of the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle and that the sentence was not manifestly excessive given the devastating consequences on the victim and the appellant's history of violent episodes at school.

The dissenting judge would have allowed the appeal and converted the sentence to open custody, emphasizing the appellant's rehabilitation, genuine remorse, and the need to avoid disrupting his schooling.

The appellant appealed from an order of the Superior Court of Justice dismissing an application for certiorari to quash an order committing the appellant to stand trial.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the reasons of the Superior Court judge and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed his convictions following a jury trial.

The Court of Appeal identified two fundamental errors of law: the trial judge failed to take the verdict from the jury on both counts after the appellant was placed in their charge, and failed to direct the jury on the included offence of simple possession.

Applying the principle from R. v. Haughton, the Court found that the failure to leave the included offence with the jury may have affected the verdict.

As the Crown did not seek a new trial on the full offence and the appellant conceded guilt for simple possession, the Court substituted a conviction for simple possession with a sentence of time served, and quashed the conviction on the second count.

The young person appealed his convictions for robbery and using an imitation firearm during a home invasion, as well as his sentence of 16 months secure custody and eight months community supervision.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the fingerprint evidence compelling.

On the sentence appeal, the Court found the trial judge erred in principle by ignoring the Youth Criminal Justice Act and focusing on general deterrence.

While a custodial sentence was warranted because the home invasion constituted a 'violent offence', the Court varied the sentence to 15 months (six months secure, four months open, five months supervision) due to mitigating factors and confirmed the court's jurisdiction to combine open and secure custody for a single offence.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge misapprehended the complainant's evidence, failed to recognize inconsistencies, and provided inadequate reasons.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reviewable error in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence and concluding that the reasons were careful, thorough, and satisfied the requirements in R. v. Shepherd.

The appellant appealed his sentence for fraud and possession of stolen property.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in principle by rejecting uncontradicted information in the pre-sentence report based on its sources.

Considering fresh evidence, including reasons from the Immigration and Refugee Board confirming the appellant's good prospects for rehabilitation, the Court allowed the appeal and replaced the remaining sentence with a 10-month conditional sentence.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in his jury instructions regarding intent and an admission allegedly made to his girlfriend, and by mistakenly referring to voir dire evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge effectively gave a 'rolled up' charge on intent, properly instructed the jury on the admission, and that the mistaken reference to voir dire evidence did not create a serious risk of misleading the jury or undermine the verdicts.

The appellant, a black man, was convicted of robbing an East Indian pizza delivery man.

At trial, the judge permitted a challenge for cause based on the appellant's race but refused to allow a question addressing the interracial nature of the crime.

The Court of Appeal held that the appellant was entitled to challenge the jury for cause based on the interracial nature of the crime, even though both the accused and the victim were members of visible minorities.

The denial of this right impaired the appearance of fairness and the integrity of the trial.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and unlawful confinement, as well as his designation as a dangerous offender.

He argued the trial judge erred by admitting out-of-court statements from a child witness, misdirecting the jury on unanimity, and refusing a mistrial.

The Court of Appeal found the child's statements were improperly admitted as the Crown failed to establish necessity, leading to the quashing of the unlawful confinement convictions.

However, the sexual assault conviction was upheld by applying the curative proviso.

The court dismissed the appeal regarding jury unanimity and the dangerous offender designation, affirming the indeterminate sentence.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for assault, arguing he did not understand his right to counsel under s. 10(b) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's credibility finding that the appellant understood his rights at all material times.

The court also found the sentence was not demonstrably unfit given the serious nature of the assault.

Both the conviction and sentence appeals were dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that his section 10 Charter rights were violated when he was questioned by police on the street.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's finding that the appellant was not detained during the interaction, and therefore his Charter rights were not engaged.

The sentence appeal was dismissed as abandoned.

The appellant appealed his convictions for robbery, forcible confinement, and related offences, arguing that the trial judge erred in his instructions to the jury on alibi and failed to give an adequate Vetrovec warning regarding the evidence of an accomplice and an admitted perjurer.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, with the majority adopting the reasons of the Court of Appeal.

Two dissenting justices would have allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial on the basis that the Vetrovec warning was inadequate.