Robert Gattrell

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for offences arising from a high-speed car chase where a police officer was struck and seriously injured.

The main issue at trial was the identity of the driver.

The trial judge admitted an unsworn videotaped statement from a passenger identifying the appellant as the driver, as the passenger claimed no memory at trial due to heroin use.

The Court of Appeal upheld the admission of the statement, finding it met the threshold requirements of necessity and reliability.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, with the court noting the appellant's lengthy criminal record and the deliberate attack on a vulnerable police officer.

The appellant, who held a power of attorney for an elderly resident in a long-term care facility, misappropriated over $378,000 of the resident's assets and defrauded Veterans Affairs Canada.

He was convicted of theft and fraud, and sentenced to two years less a day in jail, restitution, and a lifetime prohibition order under s. 380.2(1) of the Criminal Code.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the convictions, the jail sentence, and the restitution orders.

However, the Court struck the s. 380.2(1) prohibition order, finding that it constituted punishment and therefore the presumption against retrospectivity applied, meaning it could not be imposed for an offence committed before the section was enacted.

The appellant appealed his sentence, seeking corrections to clerical errors on the warrant of committal and adjustments to his pre-sentence custody credit.

The Crown conceded errors in the recorded sentence and the calculation of 2012 pre-sentence custody.

The Court of Appeal corrected these errors and applied the Summers framework to grant 1.5:1 credit for the appellant's pre-sentence custody, noting that the 1:1 limit under s. 719(3.1) did not apply because the Crown had not proceeded with a bail revocation application under s. 524(8).

The appeal was allowed and the warrant of committal amended.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder following a fatal stabbing during a parking lot altercation.

On appeal, he argued that he should benefit retrospectively from the new self-defence provisions in the Criminal Code, and that the trial judge erred in refusing to leave the defence of provocation with the jury and in her W.(D.) instructions regarding self-defence and exculpatory statements.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the new self-defence provisions are substantive and apply prospectively only.

The court also found no error in the trial judge's assessment that provocation lacked an air of reality, nor in her jury instructions.

The Crown appealed the sentence imposed on the respondent for offences including robbery with a firearm and aggravated assault.

The trial judge had erred by failing to apply the five-year mandatory minimum sentence under s. 344(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

Despite this error, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, declining to interfere with the sentence.

The Court noted the respondent's youth, the co-offender's sentence, and fresh evidence demonstrating substantial rehabilitative gains during his time in the reformatory system.

The appellant's second degree murder conviction was previously set aside by the Court of Appeal and a manslaughter conviction was substituted.

The Court determined the appropriate sentence for the substituted manslaughter conviction.

Considering the appellant's level of culpability as a non-physical participant in the fatal stabbing, his youth, and the time he had already served in custody, the Court imposed a sentence of one day of imprisonment in addition to time served, plus one year of probation.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred by permitting the Crown to cross-examine a recanting witness on a prior inconsistent police statement under s. 9(2) of the Canada Evidence Act, and that the Crown's closing address improperly invited the jury to use the statement for its truth.

He also challenged the adequacy of the Vetrovec warning regarding the Crown's key witness.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the limited cross-examination served the ends of justice, the jury was properly instructed on the use of the statement, and the Vetrovec warning adequately cautioned the jury while properly identifying independent confirmatory evidence.

In a joint murder appeal arising from a planned street robbery and fatal stabbing, the court held that the trial judge erred by instructing the jury that they could treat a co-accused's explanatory statements as adoptive admissions by silence against the appellants.

The record did not establish the factual context necessary to support an inference that either appellant could reasonably have been expected to respond, particularly where the statements were non-accusatory and related primarily to the declarant's own state of mind.

The court further held that, even if the evidence were capable of supporting adoption by silence, the jury charge lacked the necessary caution and analytical guidance.

One appellant received a new trial on first degree murder, while the other had his conviction set aside and a manslaughter conviction substituted.

The appellant, previously found not criminally responsible for sexual assault, appealed an Ontario Review Board disposition continuing his detention in a hospital.

The appellant argued he did not suffer from a mental illness and that the Board's reasons were insufficient to establish he posed a significant threat to public safety.

The Court of Appeal upheld the finding of mental illness but agreed the Board's reasons were insufficient, particularly regarding its reliance on uncorroborated hearsay evidence and its failure to explain why the threat was deemed 'significant' despite contrary psychiatric evidence.

The matter was remitted to the Board for a new hearing.

The appellant appealed his convictions for fraud and breach of trust by a public officer.

He argued the trial judge erred in assessing evidence, finding a key witness credible, and applying the elements of fraud.

The appellant had submitted false travel expense claims to the government, claiming $217 per trip while only paying $50 and pocketing the difference.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence or credibility.

The court also held that the element of deprivation for fraud was met, as the government would not have paid the claims had it known the truth.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for firearms offences following a foot chase and altercation with police.

At trial, the jury acquitted him of assaulting police but convicted him of possessing a handgun found at the scene.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred by allowing oath-helping evidence regarding a police officer, permitting cross-examination on his 'Young Thugs' tattoo without a limiting instruction, redacting his medical records to remove his account of how he was injured by police, and improperly handling hearsay evidence of a third party's admission of gun ownership.

The Court of Appeal found that the cumulative effect of the trial judge's errors regarding credibility evidence prejudiced the appellant's right to a fair trial.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his convictions for firearms offences and his 50-month sentence.

He argued the police used the Highway Traffic Act as a pretext to stop and search his vehicle, violating his Charter rights.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the stop had a valid dual purpose and that the smell of marijuana provided reasonable grounds for arrest.

The court also upheld the admission of evidence under s. 24(2) despite a minor s. 10(b) breach.

On the sentence appeal, the court found the appellant was not entitled to enhanced pre-sentence custody credit because he was on bail and bound by a weapons prohibition at the time of his arrest.

The applicant, having been convicted of first degree murder at his second trial, applied under s. 684 of the Criminal Code for the appointment of counsel for his appeal.

He argued that his appeal had merit based on an unreasonable verdict, citing his acquittal at his first trial, the subsequent discrediting of a gang expert, and alleged errors regarding prior testimony and Vetrovec cautions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding that the proposed grounds of appeal were not arguable on the materials filed, as the first verdict was irrelevant and the expert's subsequent treatment did not render the current verdict unreasonable.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentence for firearms offences, arguing the trial judge misapprehended evidence and made unreasonable findings of guilt.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no critical misapprehensions of evidence and that the findings were firmly rooted in circumstantial evidence.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the appellant was apprehended with a fully loaded semi-automatic handgun while bound by a recognizance and a firearms prohibition, making the sentence fit.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first-degree murder of his wife, arguing a lack of motive, improper jury instructions, and insufficient evidence of planning and deliberation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's instructions to the jury.

The court held that the verdict was reasonable based on the totality of the evidence, which included the appellant arriving at the home dressed as a construction worker, bringing a knife, and attempting to kill an eyewitness by stabbing her 13 times.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and sexual interference involving a minor student.

He argued that the trial judge unfairly and illogically rejected the alibi evidence provided by his wife, which would have exonerated him.

The Court of Appeal found that there was a solid evidentiary basis for the trial judge's adverse credibility findings regarding the wife, noting her history of deceit and bizarre behaviour.

The court concluded that the trial judge did not subject the evidence to an unreasonably high standard of scrutiny and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant, a serial sexual murderer, appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board directing his continued detention at the Oak Ridge Division of the Mental Health Centre in Penetanguishene.

The appellant conceded he remained a significant risk to public safety but argued that a transfer to a medium secure unit at the Brockville Mental Health Centre would be the least onerous and least restrictive disposition.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board reasonably considered the appellant's ongoing minimization of his sexually deviant offences, the potential for reduced staff diligence in a medium secure setting, and the equivalent treatment modalities available at both facilities.

The Court concluded the Board made no error in its assessment of the statutory criteria and the appellant's placement.

The appellants were convicted of first-degree murder and attempted murder following a jury trial.

During deliberations, the jury reported an impasse three times.

On the third occasion, the trial judge delivered an exhortation that singled out one juror, stating she had an incorrect understanding of reasonable doubt and instructing the other jurors to disabuse her of this error.

The appellants appealed, arguing the exhortation was improper.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge misconceived the juror's understanding of the law and improperly pitted the majority against the minority.

A new trial was ordered.

The appellant, a youth sentenced as an adult, appealed his conviction for first degree murder arising from a stabbing on a city bus.

The appellant, who was the initial aggressor in an attempted robbery, argued the trial judge erred by refusing to leave self-defence under ss. 34(2) and 35 of the Criminal Code to the jury.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no air of reality to the self-defence claims.

The court held it was unreasonable for the appellant to believe the victim's resistance was an unlawful assault under s. 34(2), and there was no evidence the appellant attempted to retreat as required by s. 35.

The self-represented appellant appealed his conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's reasons regarding guilt.

The court also noted that the sentence had already been served and was reasonable.

The appeal was dismissed.