Dr. Woodside

The accused was convicted of sexual assault and sexual interference in 2008 but was found unfit to stand trial prior to sentencing.

In 2021, the Ontario Review Board found him permanently unfit and recommended a stay of proceedings, concluding he no longer posed a significant threat to public safety.

The Superior Court held a hearing to determine whether to stay the charges under s. 672.851 of the Criminal Code.

The court rejected the ORB's recommendation, finding that the accused, despite his age and dementia, remained a significant threat to public safety due to his risk of reoffending sexually against children if he gained access to alcohol.

The court concluded a stay would undermine confidence in the administration of justice.

The accused brought an application for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter, arguing unreasonable delay.

The proceedings spanned over 19 years, involving three trials, an appeal, and a dangerous offender application.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the net pre-verdict delay was below the Jordan ceiling after deducting significant periods of defence delay—including the accused absconding and repeatedly changing counsel—and exceptional circumstances such as a mistrial.

The court also found the post-verdict delay reasonable, as it was justified by the complexity of the dangerous offender application, further defence delays, and the COVID-19 pandemic.

The offender pleaded guilty to the second-degree murder of his wife, whom he stabbed while she was in bed.

The court considered the offender's history of domestic violence against the victim, his mental health issues, and his guilty plea.

Applying the criteria under section 745.4 of the Criminal Code, the court sentenced the offender to life imprisonment with a parole ineligibility period of 15 years.

Dangerous offender sentencing following guilty pleas to choking to commit sexual assault and sexual assault causing bodily harm arising from a prolonged stranger attack.

The court held that the Crown proved all three relied-upon designation gateways under ss. 753(1)(a)(i), 753(1)(a)(ii), and 753(1)(b) of the Criminal Code, based on a lengthy history of sexual offending, enduring paraphilic disorders, antisocial traits, failed treatment, and repeated supervision breaches.

Applying the framework in Boutilier and the least-restrictive inquiry at the penalty stage, the court found no reasonable expectation that a determinate sentence followed by a 10-year LTSO would adequately protect the public.

The offender was designated a dangerous offender and sentenced to indeterminate detention.

The accused pleaded guilty to multiple offences including sexual interference with a minor, making and possessing child pornography, smuggling obscene materials, and breaching recognizance conditions.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence, noting the severe emotional impact on the victim and the accused's flagrant breaches of bail conditions by re-offending.

The accused was sentenced to a global term of 6 years in custody, reduced to 4.5 years net after applying a 1.5:1 enhanced credit for pre-sentence custody due to physical assaults suffered in jail.

The appellant, who was found not criminally responsible for several offences including assaulting police officers, appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board.

The Board had ordered his detention in a secure forensic unit, rejecting a joint request by the appellant and the hospital for a hybrid order that would allow discretion to transfer him to a general unit.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board's decision was supported by evidence of the appellant's continuing behavioural issues and risk to public safety, and that the Board properly applied the least onerous and least restrictive test.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board's decision was reasonable and based on the expert evidence of Dr. Woodside.

The Court held that the Board's order represented the least onerous and least restrictive disposition for the appellant at the time, and there was no basis to inquire into what might happen beyond the one-year term of the disposition.

The appellant appealed his designation as a dangerous offender and the resulting indeterminate sentence.

He argued the sentencing judge misapprehended evidence regarding his willingness to take Lupron to control his risk of reoffending, and improperly admitted expert reply psychiatric evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentencing judge's factual conclusions were supported by the record and the expert evidence was admitted on consent.

The appellant appealed the long term supervision order imposed by the sentencing judge.

The trial judge had found that the appellant was not a dangerous offender, but still imposed a long term supervision order.

Based on R. v. Johnson, both parties agreed the long term offender designation could only stand if the appellant met the dangerous offender criteria.

The Crown argued the trial judge's finding that the appellant was not a dangerous offender was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal disagreed, noting the trial judge reasonably relied on the Crown's expert, Dr. Woodside, whose opinion supported the finding.

The appeal was allowed, the long term offender designation was set aside, and a three-year probation order was imposed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and unlawful confinement, and his designation as a dangerous offender.

The offences involved the severe beating and sexual assault of his former common-law partner.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the court upheld the finding that the appellant, a diagnosed psychopath with a history of domestic abuse, posed a substantial risk of reoffending that could not be reasonably controlled in the community.

The appellant appealed his convictions for multiple sexual assaults and his designation as a dangerous offender.

He argued that a saliva sample used for DNA comparison was obtained in violation of his Charter rights under s. 8 and s. 10(b).

The Court of Appeal held that the appellant provided a valid, informed waiver that severed any connection between the prior s. 10(b) breach and the taking of the sample.

The court also found no error in the jury instructions regarding expert DNA evidence or in the trial judge's dangerous offender designation, which properly assessed the appellant's treatability and risk to the community.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and sexual interference against his stepson, as well as his designation as a dangerous offender.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in her findings of guilt and in rejecting expert psychiatric evidence that suggested his risk could be managed in the community under a long-term offender designation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the verdicts reasonable and supported by the evidence.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge properly assessed the risk management evidence and was entitled to conclude that the community supervision plan, including the Circles of Support and Accountability program, lacked the necessary resources to safely manage the appellant's risk.

The appellant was found guilty by a jury of criminal harassment and invitation to sexual touching.

Prior to sentencing, psychiatric assessments suggested he may have been not criminally responsible due to mental disorder (NCRMD) at the time of the offences.

The trial judge ruled he lacked jurisdiction to enter an NCRMD verdict after the jury was discharged.

On appeal, the appellant introduced fresh psychiatric evidence.

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence under the Palmer test, set aside the convictions, and ordered a new trial, finding that the fresh evidence could reasonably be expected to have affected the result.

The Crown appealed the dismissal of a dangerous and long-term offender application and the sentence imposed for aggravated assault.

The sentencing judge had ruled that a dangerous offender designation required the predicate offence to warrant a minimum two-year sentence, similar to the long-term offender provision.

The Court of Appeal held this was an error of law, as the dangerous offender provision contains no such requirement.

The Court allowed the appeal, set aside the sentence, designated the respondent a long-term offender, and imposed a sentence of time served plus a further period of community supervision.

The Crown appealed the dismissal of a dangerous offender application against the respondent, who pleaded guilty to numerous sexual offences against children and child pornography charges.

The trial judge had dismissed the application, holding that the predicate offences were not sufficiently serious to meet the threshold for a dangerous or long-term offender designation.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in law by imposing a seriousness threshold on the circumstances of the predicate offences.

Applying the correct legal framework to the trial judge's factual findings, the Court of Appeal designated the respondent a long-term offender and varied his sentence to time served followed by eight years of community supervision.