S. Reid

The applicant, facing human trafficking charges, brought an abuse of process application after the Crown preferred a direct indictment.

The direct indictment was sought shortly after a preliminary inquiry judge granted the defence's request to cross-examine the complainant at the upcoming preliminary inquiry.

The applicant argued this was an improper circumvention of a judicial order.

The Superior Court found that while the Crown's stated rationale regarding delay was unmeritorious and its true intention was to avoid having the complainant testify twice, the Crown acted within its statutory authority under s. 577 of the Criminal Code.

The court concluded the conduct did not rise to the level of flagrant impropriety required for an abuse of process, and dismissed the application.

The accused, charged with conspiracy to commit murder and attempted murder, applied for bail.

The charges arose from a shooting in an alleyway where the accused allegedly handed a firearm to an unknown suspect who then shot the victim in the face.

The court found that while the proposed release plan with sureties and electronic monitoring might satisfy the secondary ground, detention was required under the tertiary ground.

The court emphasized the strength of the Crown's circumstantial case, the gravity of the offence, the use of a firearm, and the accused's prior criminal record involving firearms.

Bail was denied.

The offender was convicted of attempted murder, unauthorized possession of a loaded prohibited firearm, wearing a disguise with intent, and occupying a vehicle with a firearm after shooting the victim in an apartment parking lot.

The court weighed the extreme gravity of the planned shooting and the offender's prior criminal record involving firearms against his youth, difficult background, and rehabilitative potential.

Applying the totality principle, the court imposed a global sentence of 125.25 months, which was reduced to 102 months after applying Summers and Duncan credits for pre-sentence custody.

The accused was charged with attempted murder and related offences after a woman was shot multiple times by a masked man.

The Crown relied on the victim's recognition evidence, a photo line-up identification by the person who rented the getaway vehicle, and circumstantial evidence including DNA and GPS data.

The trial judge gave no weight to the victim's recognition evidence and little weight to the photo line-up due to reliability concerns.

However, the court found that the remaining circumstantial evidence, including the accused's DNA in the rented vehicle and his presence near where it was parked after the shooting, led to the only reasonable inference that he was the shooter.

The accused was found guilty on all counts.

The accused brought an application for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter, arguing unreasonable delay.

The proceedings spanned over 19 years, involving three trials, an appeal, and a dangerous offender application.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the net pre-verdict delay was below the Jordan ceiling after deducting significant periods of defence delay—including the accused absconding and repeatedly changing counsel—and exceptional circumstances such as a mistrial.

The court also found the post-verdict delay reasonable, as it was justified by the complexity of the dangerous offender application, further defence delays, and the COVID-19 pandemic.

During a dangerous offender hearing, the Crown sought to abandon reliance on a court-ordered psychiatrist whose evidence was challenged in cross-examination, and instead tender the evidence of a new psychiatrist.

The defence brought an abuse of process motion under s. 7 of the Charter, arguing the Crown was seeking an improper litigation advantage.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the Crown was attempting to provide the court with as much information as possible to assess the offender's risk, rather than acting for an oblique motive.

The accused brought a Charter application to stay firearm charges or exclude a seized firearm, alleging excessive force during his arrest and breaches of his right to counsel.

The court found that the police did not use excessive force when arresting the fleeing accused.

The court also found no s. 7 breach regarding an officer commanding a witness to stop recording the arrest, as there was no actual prejudice to the accused's defence.

However, the Crown conceded that the accused's s. 10(b) rights were violated when an officer denigrated duty counsel's advice and threatened to charge the accused's family members if he did not confess.

Applying the Grant framework, the court concluded that the serious and deliberate nature of the police misconduct warranted the exclusion of the firearm under s. 24(2) of the Charter to maintain the long-term repute of the justice system.

The applicants, three police officers charged with sexual assault, brought an application for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter due to delay.

The Crown had obtained a direct indictment, moving the trial to the Superior Court without a preliminary inquiry.

The applicants argued the 18-month presumptive ceiling from Jordan should apply because they were denied a preliminary inquiry.

The court rejected this argument, holding that the 30-month ceiling applies to all cases tried in the Superior Court, regardless of whether a preliminary inquiry actually occurs.

As the anticipated delay was 28 months, falling below the 30-month ceiling, the application for a stay was dismissed.

The Crown brought a pre-trial motion to qualify three police officers as expert witnesses in a prosecution for cocaine importation and money laundering.

The court applied the Mohan and Abbey tests for admissibility.

The court admitted the general opinion evidence of the money laundering expert, excluding portions relating to methods not alleged against the accused.

The court fully admitted the evidence of the cocaine trafficking expert, including opinions on pricing and cell phone use.

However, the court excluded the proposed evidence regarding Mexican drug cartels, finding it irrelevant to the charges and highly prejudicial as bad character evidence.

The accused brought a pretrial motion for a stay of proceedings, alleging a breach of their s. 11(b) Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The total delay from the date of the charge to the anticipated end of the trial was 35 months, exceeding the 30-month presumptive ceiling established in Jordan.

The court found that the Crown successfully rebutted the presumption of unreasonableness by demonstrating that the matter was a "particularly complex case" involving extensive wiretap evidence, multiple accused, and voluminous disclosure.

The court concluded that the Crown had a reasonable plan to manage the complexity and dismissed the application for a stay.

The offender was found guilty of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and breach of probation after fleeing from police during a traffic stop.

He was found with 2.5 ounces of cocaine and had a significant criminal record including three prior convictions for the same offence.

The court emphasized specific and general deterrence, sentencing the offender to 30 months in custody for the drug offence and 90 days concurrent for the breach of probation.

The accused brought a pretrial application to exclude evidence of crack cocaine seized from a vehicle he was driving, alleging breaches of his rights under sections 8 and 9 of the Charter.

After being pulled over for speeding, the accused fled the scene on foot and was later arrested.

The police towed the vehicle as abandoned under the Highway Traffic Act and discovered drugs during an inventory search.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the accused abandoned any reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle by fleeing, and that the police lawfully impounded and searched the vehicle.

The applicants, dissident shareholders of Oremex Silver Inc., requisitioned a shareholders' meeting.

The directors called a meeting for November but later postponed it to December, setting a new record date.

Just before the new record date, the directors issued 34.5 million shares to a third party in escrow, significantly diluting the applicants' voting power.

The applicants sought to confirm a meeting they held in November or, alternatively, to change the record date for the December meeting.

The court found the directors validly postponed the November meeting but improperly issued shares to manipulate the voting process for the December meeting.

The court ordered a new record date prior to the share issuance and appointed an independent chair for the December meeting.

Five police officers were convicted of attempting to obstruct justice, and three of them were also convicted of perjury, arising from a warrantless search of a drug suspect's apartment and subsequent false memo book entries and testimony to conceal the timing of the search.

The Crown sought penitentiary sentences of three to four years, while the defence sought non-custodial sentences.

The court considered the serious breach of trust and the need for denunciation and deterrence, but also weighed significant mitigating factors, including the catastrophic impact of the prolonged 14-year investigation and proceedings on the officers' lives, careers, and health.

The court concluded that a penitentiary term was not warranted and imposed a 45-day conditional sentence (house arrest) for each offender.

In Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act proceedings, the applicant sought an extension of the stay period, an increase to debtor-in-possession financing, authorization to honour pre-filing prepayments made by merchant customers for loyalty program points, and a variation of the initial order to defer statutory notice to certain creditors.

The court granted the stay extension and approved the increased DIP facility, finding the debtor had acted in good faith and required additional financing to continue operations during the sale and investor solicitation process.

The court also authorized the debtor to honour prepayments for loyalty points where doing so would preserve customer relationships and enhance prospects for a going‑concern sale, applying a cost‑benefit approach consistent with earlier CCAA jurisprudence permitting payment of certain pre‑filing obligations.

However, the court refused to vary the statutory notice requirements under s. 23 of the CCAA, emphasizing that transparency and creditor notification are foundational principles of CCAA proceedings.

The applicant corporation sought an Initial Order under the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act to obtain protection from creditors and pursue restructuring options.

The evidence showed the corporation owed more than $11 million to creditors, had a significant working capital deficit, and faced termination of a key commercial agreement that generated most of its revenue.

The court found the statutory requirements of the CCAA were met, including insolvency and claims exceeding $5 million.

The court granted a 30‑day stay of proceedings, appointed a monitor, and approved administrative, directors’, and DIP lender charges to facilitate restructuring efforts.

The Crown sought leave to call reply evidence from a former federal drug prosecutor regarding general expectations of the federal Crown concerning the preparation of police Crown briefs, disclosure obligations, and the handling of confidential informants.

The proposed evidence was intended to rebut defence testimony suggesting disclosure had been made in accordance with Department of Justice policy.

The court held the evidence remained only marginally relevant because no evidentiary link connected those general expectations to the accused police officers or their training.

Given its limited probative value and the risk that calling a sitting Superior Court judge as a witness would unduly influence the jury, the court found the potential prejudice outweighed the minimal probative value.

The application to introduce the reply evidence was therefore refused.

In a pre‑trial application, the Crown sought to admit similar fact evidence against one accused in a prosecution for aggravated sexual assault involving alleged non‑disclosure of HIV‑positive status during sexual encounters.

The proposed evidence included testimony from other individuals alleging similar encounters, statements from a roommate suggesting non‑disclosure practices, and chat log communications from the accused’s computer.

Applying the governing framework for similar fact evidence articulated in R. v. Handy, the court assessed whether the probative value of the evidence outweighed its prejudicial effect.

The court found the proposed evidence inconsistent, partially related to outstanding charges in another jurisdiction, and largely directed to propensity reasoning.

Concluding that its prejudicial impact outweighed its probative value, the court ruled the evidence inadmissible, while noting the ruling could be revisited depending on the evidence at trial.

In a criminal trial involving allegations of assault, theft, perjury, and conspiracy to obstruct justice by police officers, the Crown sought to introduce Toronto Police Service directives and evidence of standard police practices.

The defence objected on grounds including irrelevance, prejudice, and hearsay.

The court held that the directives and expert evidence regarding general police norms were admissible because they provided context for assessing the accused officers’ conduct and state of mind, particularly regarding omissions in memo books, handling of seized property, disclosure practices, and use of informants.

However, testimony about how particular directives were implemented at a specific police division without personal knowledge was excluded as hearsay.

Selected directives and limited expert evidence were admitted subject to these constraints.

The defendants, charged with aggravated sexual assault for allegedly failing to disclose their HIV-positive status before engaging in consensual sexual acts with the complainants, brought a pre-trial application under section 276 of the Criminal Code.

They sought to cross-examine the complainants on their prior sexual activity, including casual and group sex, to challenge their credibility and their assertion that they would not have consented had they known of the defendants' HIV status.

The court granted the application, finding the proposed evidence highly relevant to the issue of whether consent was vitiated by fraud, and concluded its probative value outweighed any potential prejudice to the administration of justice.