Vivian Ropchan

The accused, Gilbert Anishnabie, pleaded guilty to possession for the purpose of trafficking fentanyl and cocaine.

The sentencing hearing was delayed due to the COVID-19 pandemic and the accused's participation in a residential treatment program.

The court considered Gladue factors, a sentencing circle, and the accused's personal circumstances, including his Indigenous background, learning disability, and efforts towards rehabilitation.

Despite the Crown seeking a 4-year penitentiary sentence, the defence sought a conditional sentence.

The court found the facts distinguishable from other fentanyl trafficking cases, noting the offender's lack of knowledge regarding fentanyl and his low degree of responsibility.

A conditional sentence of two years less one day, followed by two years probation, was imposed, emphasizing rehabilitation, denunciation, and deterrence, and addressing the systemic over-incarceration of Aboriginal people.

The accused was convicted of sexual assault and sexual interference in 2008 but was found unfit to stand trial prior to sentencing.

In 2021, the Ontario Review Board found him permanently unfit and recommended a stay of proceedings, concluding he no longer posed a significant threat to public safety.

The Superior Court held a hearing to determine whether to stay the charges under s. 672.851 of the Criminal Code.

The court rejected the ORB's recommendation, finding that the accused, despite his age and dementia, remained a significant threat to public safety due to his risk of reoffending sexually against children if he gained access to alcohol.

The court concluded a stay would undermine confidence in the administration of justice.

The defendant was charged with sexual assault and failing to comply with a recognizance.

Both the defendant and complainant resided in a group home for individuals with cognitive disabilities.

The complainant, who suffers from Down's Syndrome and is mostly non-verbal, could not testify.

The defendant spent 5.5 months in custody awaiting trial while a supervision plan was arranged.

The Crown's case required expert evidence regarding the complainant's capacity to consent.

The defendant brought a section 11(b) Charter application alleging unreasonable delay.

The court found the total delay of approximately 21 months exceeded the presumptive ceiling of 18 months established in R. v. Jordan.

The Crown failed to establish exceptional circumstances beyond its control.

The court granted a stay of proceedings.

The offender was convicted by a jury of robbery arising from a violent street attack against a stranger in which the victim was punched and robbed of personal property.

The court considered aggravating factors including the random and brutal nature of the assault and the lasting psychological harm to the victim.

Mitigating factors included the offender’s status as a first offender, Indigenous background considered under s. 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code, and personal rehabilitation efforts.

Applying the principles from Gladue and Ipeelee, the court imposed a custodial sentence at the low end of the range and credited the offender for pre‑sentence custody and lengthy strict house arrest.

After credit, the remaining custodial term was ordered to be served intermittently with a probation order and ancillary orders.

The Crown applied for an assessment of the defendant's fitness to stand trial pursuant to section 672.11(a) of the Criminal Code.

The defendant, a 26-year-old deaf and non-speaking individual from Nigeria who communicates only through family sign language and is illiterate, was charged with sexual assault and sexual interference.

The defence opposed the application, arguing that deafness is not a mental disorder and that the defendant possessed rudimentary understanding of fitness concepts.

The court found reasonable grounds to doubt the defendant's fitness based on expert evidence establishing mental retardation as a mental disorder, despite the defendant's basic understanding of rules and punishment.

The court granted the Crown's application for a fitness assessment, distinguishing its conclusion from a prior ruling by Justice Schneider based on the different evidence presented.